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“Knowledge only means complicity in guilt; 
 ignorance has a certain dignity” 
 
- The words of Sir Humphrey 
Appleby, the Permanent Secretary 
of the Department of 
Administrative Affairs, in the 




1 I first heard the phrase ‘challenge and be challenged’ at a DECC Stakeholder Event with 
academic social scientists in 2012 and was intrigued to inquire of its origins. Not only was 
this a phrase included in the job description for a seconded academic social science research 
fellow in DECC (as we will see in Chapter 5), but, I argue here, it also captures the lived 
experience of social researchers within DEFRA and DECC between 2001 and 2015. And this 
has implications for our theoretical understanding of the civil service in STS and related 
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  Government social researchers are a group of civil servants who have been 
overlooked in the existing literature on policy-making in the UK. Their role is 
particularly intriguing in policy areas relating to environment, food, and energy 
policy. In these domains, researchers in Science and Technology Studies have 
argued that policy-makers hold flawed assumptions about citizens’ views and likely 
actions, contributing to an image of UK policy institutions as overly technocratic 
and resistant to change. In this context, this thesis aims to understand changes in 
social research capacity and influence in the Department for Environment, Food and 
Rural Affairs (DEFRA) and the Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) 
between 2001 and 2015. Based on an analysis of more than 200 documents and 46 
interviews with civil servants and external researchers, this thesis illuminates the 
growth of social research capacity and influence within DEFRA and DECC, since 
these departments were formed in 2001 and 2008 respectively. 
   The first two empirical chapters (4 & 5) explain how social research capacity 
expanded within specific institutional, political, and epistemic contexts, through 
changes in how actors perceived the meanings, roles, and value of social research. It 
is shown that, contrary to what has been implied by recent literature, DEFRA and 
DECC are epistemically diverse and dynamic: they house multiple and conflicting 
epistemic perspectives which are reshaped over time. Moreover, social researchers 
are committed to performing a ‘challenge function’, whereby they question 
assumptions, values, and the framing of ideas. Indeed, such challenging has been 
important in shaping the capacity for social research within these departments. 
   Social researchers’ ‘challenge function’ has also contributed to their gaining 
greater influence in DEFRA and DECC. Considering policy areas from each 
department in depth, Chapters 6 & 7 show that social researchers have enabled both 
‘single-loop’ and ‘double-loop’ learning. As a result, in both departments social 
researchers have had some success in encouraging their colleagues to develop and 
test out policy ideas with the help of empirical research about citizens’ perspectives 
and everyday lives. 
While social researchers’ 'challenge function' is a significant policy learning 
mechanism, it has also been inhibited in various ways within these departments. 
The thesis concludes that their challenge function could be strengthened if social 
researchers gain greater representation in the senior civil service and more 
institutional recognition of their expert knowledge relating to a policy area (besides 
their skills). Moreover, better interdisciplinary collaboration is needed early on in 
policy development processes. Such changes have the potential to improve both the 
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Introduction: Missing Masses and the Multiple 
Meanings of Social Research in the Context of 
Environment, Food, and Energy Policy 
 
 
1. Finding a Focus 
 
VER THE PAST FIFTY YEARS, researchers in Science and Technology 
Studies (STS) and related fields have shown how the construction 
and application of technical expertise in society can be subjected to 
sociological, historical, and philosophical examination. From theories of 
gravity waves1 to bog quality,2 and from bicycles3 to financial models,4 the 
development and application of knowledge and artefacts are shown to shape 
– and be shaped by – their social and material context. No longer can it be 
said that the social dimensions of expertise constitute the ‘missing masses’5 in 
 
1 Collins, 1992. 
2 Yearley, 1989. 
3 Pinch and Bijker, 1984. 
4 MacKenzie and Spears, 2014.  
5 Yearley, 2005, p.vii; Latour, 1992. 
O 
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the sociology, history, and philosophy of science, technology, and related 
policy-making processes. 
  This is clearly the case with matters relating to environment, food, and 
energy policy, with which this doctoral thesis is concerned. In recent years in 
the United Kingdom, researchers in STS and related fields have fruitfully 
examined a wide range of ‘controversies’ – either between citizens and 
experts (for example, relating to renewable technologies, genetically 
modified foods, and bovine spongiform encephalopathy)6 – or between 
different experts (for instance, climate science, nuclear power, pesticides).7 
These accounts typically brought to light the (often unacknowledged) 
uncertainties and assumptions embedded within experts’ judgement. They 
also highlighted the importance of context for understanding the epistemic 
content of disputes and their resolution. Such studies thereby emphasised 
the ‘hybrid’8 sociotechnical nature of the evidence on which government 
decisions are said to be based.  
  But while this sociotechnical perspective has gained traction in academic 
circles, many STS analysts object that the UK Government continues to frame 
environment, food, and energy policy problems as if their social dimensions 
are immaterial to the policy-makers’ concerns.9 This has given rise to charges 
that the policy-makers responsible for these policy areas operate in overly 
‘technocratic’ and ‘scientistic’ ways.10 For this, politicians, civil servants, and 
stakeholders have been accused of lacking democratic legitimacy or ‘social 
 
6 Burningham et al., 2014; Doubleday and Wynne, 2011; Van Zwanenberg and Millstone, 
2003. 
7 Hulme, 2009; Johnstone and Stirling, 2015; Irwin, 2013. 
8 Irwin, 2013, p.113. 
9 Irwin, 2013, p.126; Wyatt, 2008. 




robustness’.11 In sum, UK policy institutions engaged with these domains 
seem destined to overlook what might be termed the ‘missing masses’ of 
science policy – that is, citizens and communities, as understood within their 
epistemic, political, and material context. 
  Where social scientists do try to account for policy-makers’ lack of attention 
to citizens’ diverse perspectives and concerns with regards to science and 
technology, the proffered explanations include: the prevalence of shared 
assumptions and commitments that go unchallenged and unacknowledged 
within government organisations;12 the predominance of ‘instrumental 
rationales’ amongst policy-makers, which are said to focus efforts on 
delivering agreed outcomes and limit scope for reflection;13 and the related 
claim that “reflexivity is not a natural or easy condition within policy 
institutions”.14 Given other social scientists’ claims that “criticism is a 
problem”15 for civil servants, a rather pessimistic picture emerges of British 
policy-makers’ abilities to govern with regards to environment, food, and 
energy policy areas.  
  What, then, is the focus of this PhD study? This thesis was inspired by a 
passing observation. In a world where many STS analysts argue that the UK 
Government is failing to acknowledge the importance of understanding 
these missing masses in environment, food, and energy policy, I aim to make 
sense of an unexpected observation in the government departments 
responsible for these policy areas. In spring 2013, I spotted a link on the 
archived website of the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 
 
11 Wynne, 2014; Nowotny, 2003. 
12 Rip, 2006, pp.357-358; Irwin, 2013, p.126. 
13 Chilvers and Macnaghten, 2011, p.539; Pallett and Chilves, 2013; Wynne, 1993. 
14 Burchell, 2009, p.57.  
15 LSE Group GV314, 2014; citing Norris, 1995. 
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(DEFRA), dating back to 2007.16 It was labelled ‘social research’. Clicking on 
this link revealed that there were at the time ‘government social researchers’ 
within DEFRA – and that they worked on encouraging pro-environmental 
behaviour amongst the public. I later also found out that DEFRA has had 
social researchers working on diverse aspects of its remit since 2004, that the 
Department of Energy and Climate Change (DECC) – which was formed in 
2008 – only began to employ social researchers in 2010, and that at the time 
that I conducted my interviews (late 2013 to summer 2014), DEFRA and 
DECC each employed approximately 20 social researchers. I was full of 
questions: who are these social researchers? What do they do? How did they 
get there?  
  Akin to the seemingly improbable electron diffraction effects observed in 
the famous double-slit interference experiment,17 finding that there are 
‘government social researchers’ situated within the walls of DEFRA and 
DECC seemed to me to pose a problem for recent depictions of these 
departments in the STS literature. What did these observations mean? 
Perhaps these actors embody the British Government’s recognition that the 
social sciences have something important to say about technical policy 
topics? If so, then the problem is no longer one of ‘missing masses’, but of 
empirical observations that are inconsistent with the STS literature. 
  After finding no mention of these actors in any STS publications (and 
indeed limited recent discussion of the role of government social researchers 
 
16 DEFRA [National Archives], 2012.  
17 The standard interpretation of the double-slit interference experiment in physics is as 
follows. Tens of thousands of electrons are fired at two slits separated at a fixed distance. On 
the other side of the slits is a detection screen. We would expect the pattern of electrons 
detected on the screen to appear random, but instead the pattern resembles the crests of 
water waves undergoing interference as they pass through two gaps in a barrier. This 
surprise finding is interpreted to mean that under some conditions electrons behave like 




in academia in general)18 I set out to understand DEFRA and DECC’s 
communities of social researchers. The next two sections considers in greater 
depth how ‘social research’ might be interpreted in the context of these 
departments - from an STS perspective, and then more broadly.  
 
2. Research and Reflexivity 
 
  It was argued in the previous section that the presence of social researchers 
in DEFRA and DECC is particularly intriguing in the light of existing STS 
literature on the the contributions of other sorts of expertise within the 
domains of environment, food, and energy policy. This section elaborates on 
this by providing a background to the relevant issues in the STS literature. 
  Since at least the 1990s, STS researchers have challenged the dominance of 
‘technocratic’ framings of policy problems in regard to environment, food, 
and energy policy in the UK. In mid-1990s a predecessor department to 
DEFRA, the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food (MAFF), was 
engulfed in scientific controversies concerning their management of two 
epidemic diseases: bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) and foot-and-
mouth disease (FMD). Analysing the BSE crisis, Sheila Jasanoff observes that 
MAFF was accused of letting down the public, after ministers had assured 
citizens that British beef was safe to eat.19 The ministry was deemed overly 
concerned with protecting farmers’ interests and was let down by the 
reassuring advice of scientists, veterinary experts, and the medical 
 
18 There is one notable exception to this. Nutley et al. observe that at the time of writing the 
number of government social researchers had doubled since 1997, a Government Social 
Researcher had been appointed and anecdotal evidence suggested that their expertise was 
more valued than previously (2007, p.247).  
19 Jasanoff, 1997, p.222. 
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professions. MAFF was therefore accused of not sufficiently prioritising the 
concerns of members of the public when these conflicted with the advice or 
interests of the farmers, scientists, veterinarians, and health practitioners 
with whom they engaged. Jasanoff concludes from her analysis that the 
ministry should engage earlier and more honestly with citizens’ concerns, 
and allow their stakeholder groups to face open investigation by members of 
the public.20 But the resulting loss of public confidence in the institution 
eventually led to its downfall.21 
  While MAFF was abolished in 2001, STS analysts continued to direct similar 
criticisms towards its successor, DEFRA, and towards related institutions 
(including DECC) regarding what they saw as the over-extension of technical 
experts’ influence over the framing of EFE policy problems. Across diverse 
policy issues including the regulation of pesticides,22 the framing of policy 
problems such as climate change,23 the understanding and management of 
risks associated with chemicals and emerging technologies24, and the 
appraisal of options for energy generation capacity,25 STS analysts have 
argued that citizens’ concerns have been consistently treated as secondary to 
experts or industry stakeholders’ priorities (when considered at all). This has 
given rise to what Brian Wynne has termed the ‘deficit model’, according to 
which policy-makers and scientists attribute citizens’ concerns to a deficit of 
knowledge, trust, or some other property which can be easily remedied 
without changing policy-makers’ priorities or courses of action.26 
 
20 Jasanoff, 1997, p.230. 
21 Taylor, 2003; Wilkinson, 2011. 
22 Irwin, 2013, p.124. 
23 Pallett and Chilvers, 2013. 
24 Kearnes et al., 2006. 
25 Stirling, 2008, p.272. 




  In the above cited examples, researchers have argued that policy actors 
ought to appreciate that contrary to ‘deficit model’ discourses, members of 
the public often have genuine concerns, relevant knowledge, and/or ascribe 
to alternative problem-framings. If these are taken seriously by policy actors, 
the argument follows, we would have more open policy debates and 
government’s consideration of approaches would be more ‘congruent’27 with 
public sentiment, values, understandings, and framings. Hence, rather than 
asking how technologies or scientistic framings of problems could be 
accepted by citizens or attempting to motivate them to change what they do, 
these STS researchers suggest that policy actors should rather seek to 
construct ‘socially robust’ policies that are more firmly rooted in citizens’ 
understandings of the world. This, argues Wynne, would require science and 
policy institutions (such as DEFRA and DECC) to become more 
‘institutionally reflexive’.28 That is to say, actors within those organisations 
should be more critical of their own assumptions and understandings of 
science, citizens, and the relationships they have with citizens and other 
actors.  
  As is extensively discussed in the literature, Tony Blair’s Labour 
Government responded to these criticisms by involving citizens in policy-
making through public engagement processes, often with STS researchers 
involved.29 Yet, while those processes have been closely scrutinised in the 
literature, the same Government undertook major reforms in how the civil 
service uses scientific advice - under the heading of a ‘Modernising 
 
27 Stirling, 2008, p.272. 
28 Wynne, 1993. 
29 Thorpe, 2010; Lock, 2008.  
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Government’ agenda.30 The latter reforms have been overlooked in STS. And 
yet there is some evidence to show they may have been substantial: Sandra 
Nutley and colleagues have claimed that between 1997 and 2007 the 
Government doubled its number of social researchers, established new 
capacity in departments where there was previously none, and also created 
the post of Chief Government Social Researcher to provide dedicated 
leadership to the analysts.31 
  Bringing these observations together when I began this project, it seemed 
reasonable to hypothesise that DEFRA and DECC’s social research 
community might well have been established and sustained in order to 
address what I described above as the missing masses in science policy. But 
this was to presume too much. ‘Social research’ is a broad church, and there 
are many other forms it could take beyond the examination and 
improvement of processes of scientific advice-making that are of relevance to 
these departments. As such, it is an empirical question to see which forms of 
expertise are recognised and which are not in specific departments. The next 
section identifies a handful of the forms of social research that are relevant 
for this thesis. 
 
3. Multiple Meanings of Social Research 
 
A document published by the Cabinet Office in 2011 defines ‘social research’ 
as follows:  
 
 
30 Cabinet Office, 2000. 




Understanding the potential and actual social impacts of policy decisions/practice, 
including understanding public perceptions and the opportunities for behaviour 
change. Advising across government on research methodologies and ethics.32  
 
  While this definition may seem straightforward, it is notable that ‘behaviour 
change’ is a relatively recent term in policy discourse, and one whose rise in 
significance in the minds of policy-makers has been supported by the 
changes which I discuss in this thesis. Clearly then, government actors’ 
interpretations of social research can be said to be historically contingent, and 
merit further elaboration. Furthermore, despite broad ‘top-down’ definitions 
articulated by the Cabinet Office, in practice the meanings that come to be 
associated with ‘social research’ within a government department are fluid 
and shaped by the institutional, epistemic, and political influences acting 
within it.33  
  We can identify a range of forms of social research which actors may view 
as constituting (either in combination or as a whole) what it means to do 
social research in government. The forms of research identified below are not 
to be read as exhaustive nor mutually exclusive – the same project may 
combine different types of research. Rather, they are intended to introduce 
the reader to the range of ideas that are found to be associated with social 
research within government, and which will be referred to throughout this 




32 Analytical Coordination Working Group, 2011, p.2.  
33 Walker, 1987. 
34 After developing this categorisation I found that Martin Bulmer produced a similar but 
more generic typology of forms of social research in government (1980, pp.5-6). The 
categories distinctions presented here are preferred because they are tailored to the forms of 
social research that we will encounter throughout the thesis.  
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Studies of public attitudes and perceptions 
  The first type of social research that we can expect to find in the civil service 
is concerned with understanding citizens’ views. This can involve qualitative 
or quantitative research, and could be used as a basis from which to develop 
policy ideas or to set expectations about citizens’ likely reaction to a new 
policy idea. Depending on how a research study is designed, it might reveal 
differences in framings, understandings, or values between citizens and 
expert advisors, but it could just as easily be designed to assume a deficit 
model. Examples of such studies include regular surveys to monitor public 
attitudes (which might also be managed by statisticians),35 qualitative 
analysis of particular groups of citizens’ views,36 and investigations into the 
reasons why a specific issue has gained salience for citizens at a particular 
time (for instance, using the social amplifications of risk theoretical 
framework).37 
 
Understanding what people do 
  A second form of social research is the analysis of what people do within 
the context of their everyday lives. Such research might be framed in terms of 
understanding individuals’ behaviours through a psychological and/or 
economic lens, with the aim of making sense of the choices that individuals 
make and how these vary under different circumstances. One key text for 
our purposes is the book Nudge,38 which provides readers with examples of 
cheap and effective changes that have been used to influence the actions of 
individuals in a setting where they can make choices. As an example, the 
 
35 E.g. Ipsos Mori, 2013; 2014. 
36 E.g. Brook Lyndhurst, 2007. 
37 Kasperson et al., 1998. 




authors present the case of a utility company in the USA, who reported a 
reduction in domestic consumers’ energy use at peak times of around 40% 
within weeks of an intervention.39 The intervention involved sending 
customers an ‘Ambient Orb’ which glowed orange during times of high 
energy use. The authors argue that the scheme was a success because it 
makes energy visible to customers, and because the orb grabs attention and 
motivates action. With tips like these, the book inspired David Cameron to 
set up the Behavioural Insights Team (which was soon coined the ‘Nudge 
Unit’) when he entered office in 2010.40 The book also inspired the Cabinet 
Office’s MINDSPACE report, which provides further examples and guidance 
on how policy-makers can apply nudge-style approaches.41 
  Another approach is to focus not on the choice but on the practice. 
Proponents of practice theory argue that specific practices (such as ways of 
cooking or commuting) are sustained by the dynamic interactions between 
three elements that underpin a given activity: ‘meanings’, ‘materials’ and 
‘competencies’.42 On this view, practices are sustained in society because they 
are imbued with meaning for citizens, are supported through ‘material’ 
technologies or tools such as objects, infrastructures, and rules and 
regulations, and are enabled through particular competencies such as access 
to skills and other resources. So, for example, the rise of domestic recycling 
practices in Scotland can be explained in terms of the interactions between 
material changes (such as the roll-out of kerbside recycling boxes),43 
 
39 Thaler and Sunstein, 2008, p.194. 
40 BBC News, 2010a. 
41 Dolan et al., 2010. 
42 Shove, Pantzar, & Watson, 2012, p.22. 
43 Stewart, 2011, p.141. 
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particular competencies (e.g. ease of access)44 and specific meanings (i.e. the 
notion of ‘doing my bit’, and what this signals to neighbours)45. Practice 
theorists use examples like these to argue that policy-makers should take a 
more holistic approach to understanding how to make everyday activities 
more sustainable, rather than fixating narrowly on a material change or 
individual incentive. It is, they argue, the combinations of elements (which 
change and shape each other over time), that determine when and how a 
practice will emerge, survive, or be superseded.46    
 
Learning about sociotechnical transitions 
  A third form of social research that is relevant for DEFRA and DECC’s 
remits can be characterised as sociotechnical transitions theory.47 An 
important insight in this research, which draws upon STS, policy studies, 
management studies, and other fields, is that successful transitions towards 
sustainable societies rely not only upon new technologies, but also upon new 
linkages between networks of actors, markets, meanings, governance 
structures, and users.48 It is for this reason that the transitions are termed 
‘sociotechnical’.49 Researchers in this field aim to develop a framework for 
understanding – and supporting – long-term transitions towards 
sustainability.50 The Multi-Level Perspective51 is particularly useful in this 
regard, in that it focuses the analyst’s attention on three levels of change (the 
niche, regime, and landscape levels), and how these shape each other. At the 
 
44 Stewart, 2011, p.141. 
45 Stewart, 2011, p.149. 
46 Shove, Pantzar, & Watson, 2012, p.25. 
47 Geels, 2004. 
48 Geels, 2010, p.495. 
49 Kern & Smith, 2008, p.4094.  
50 Kern & Smith, 2008, p.4093. 




niche level are novel technological innovations and energy practices, which 
emerge and start to challenge incumbent actors.52 Above this level is the 
regime, which refers to a relatively stabilised alignment of regulatory 
structures, stakeholders’ interests, technological configurations, research 
priorities, and cultural meanings.53 Then, interacting with changes in the 
niche and regime levels, are political, social, or material changes at the 
landscape level, which are beyond the control of actors operating at the 
regime or niche levels.54  
  Surprisingly, sociotechnical transitions theory  did not feature prominently 
as a form of social research in the data generated as part of this study. It may 
be that the relevant academic social scientists engage directly with 
government scientists or economists rather than the social researchers which 
this PhD focuses on, or they may have achieved an ‘enlightenment’ model of 
influence (defined in Chapter 3, Section 7 below) which was not observed 
here. 
 
Assessing the potential impacts of different policy options  
  Social research in government can also mean conducting (or 
commissioning) empirical studies or literature reviews to understand the 
possible impacts that a range of policy options may have, and to inform 
policy-makers’ selection. This can involve the analysis of the social and 
distributional impacts of present or past policies, pilot studies (including 
randomised controlled trials and action-based research projects) to test 
 
52 Geels, 2004, p.912. 
53 Geels, 2004, pp.905-906. 
54 Geels, 2004, p.913. 
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between options, and/or the use of theoretical frameworks55 to explore the 
effects of a given policy. 
 
Policy evaluation studies 
  Alongside policy appraisal sits policy evaluation, which is concerned with 
learning lessons from past policies. This may take the form of process 
evaluations, which seek to understand how a given policy was developed 
and delivered, or outcome evaluations, which are concerned with the 
intended and unintended consequences of policies. The central Government 
Social Research Unit, (situated in the Cabinet Office) provides guidance for 
conducting policy evaluation using social research methods in the Magenta 
Book.56 But policy evaluation may also be conducted using economic 
methodologies, and guidance for this is provided by the leadership of the 
Government Economics Service (who are also based in the Cabinet Office), in 
the Green Book.57  
 
  Clearly then, there are multiple possible meanings associated with social 
research and so it is wrong to presuppose a priori that the rise of social 
researchers in DEFRA and DECC has anything to do with STS arguments 
concerning the social dimensions of science and technology policy. Following 
the lesson of meaning finitism,58 this study does not presume a particular 
 
55 E.g. Harper and Price, 2011. 
56 A guide to policy evaluation and analysis that is published and continuously updated by 
the Government Social Research Unit, which is based in the Cabinet Office. See, e.g. GSRU, 
2007.  
57 Cabinet Office, 2003. 
58 This is the idea that actors’ interpretations and uses of terms are based on a finite number 
of examples and emerge through social interactions. It is through sanctioning one another’s 
application of a term that people construct the meaning of a term. Judgements about what 





interpretation of social research to be more correct than others. Rather, 
exploring the multiple meanings of social research amongst civil servants in 
DEFRA and DECC, how these meanings gain currency, and what their 
implications are will be an important empirical task for this project. And as 
Stuart Blume has argued, we can expect the mobilisation of different 
meanings to be shaped by the expectations and perspectives of actors within 
and around the given government department.59 Furthermore, it also follows 
from meaning finitism that we should beware of reifying the forms of social 
research listed above. Social research, like all concepts, is open-ended, and 
will therefore take on new meanings over time.  
  Before we begin to explore how social research has been constructed and 
mobilised within the contexts of DEFRA and DECC over the course of the 
departments’ histories, it is worth providing a basic background to the civil 
service in general, and the structures associated with government social 
research in particular.  
 
4. The UK’s Civil Service 
 
  In the United Kingdom, the Prime Minister appoints each of the 
Government’s Cabinet Ministers, most of whom are given the title of 
‘Secretary of State’ for a specific policy portfolio. Ministerial departments 
support these Cabinet Ministers (and the junior ‘Ministers of State’ who aid 
them) in the administration of their given policy portfolio.60 The departments 
are staffed by ‘civil servants’ (also known as ‘officials’). The most senior 
 
material world, and therefore also involve actors taking account of interests (Bloor, 1997, 
p.70). 
59 Blume, 1987, p.90. 
60 HM Government, 2016. 
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official in a department is the ‘Permanent Secretary’, who provides 
leadership to the rest. The organisations are then further divided into 
‘directorates’ (or ‘divisions’), with Directors General providing oversight for 
teams that serve specific policy areas or provide administrative functions. 
Nowadays many departments also appoint a ‘Chief Scientific Advisor’,61 
typically from academia and of Director General standing, who is tasked 
with providing strategic oversight for the department’s use of science and 
research. 
  Structured in this way, the civil service is a hierarchical institution, such that 
an official’s grade will normally determine not only their pay but also which 
meetings they can attend and what level of responsibility and budget they 
are afforded.62 We will see that social researchers typically occupy posts at 
grade 6 or 7 in the departments studied here (as ‘middle managers’), with 
many more economists, scientists, and engineers occupying roles in the 
senior civil service.63 This has implications for the kinds of influence that 
different analysts can exert through their resources and access to meetings. 
Since civil servants are “encouraged to take decisions at the lowest level in 
the hierarchy at which they can confidently do so”,64 their judgements are 
influential not only in delivering policies devised by ministers, but also in the 
construction of new policy ideas. For this reason, civil servants and 
politicians are often collectively described as ‘policy-makers’.  
  There is a long-standing convention, dating back to the implementation of 
the Northcote-Trevelyan reforms in the late 1800s, that civil servants do not 
 
61 HM Government, 2015a. 
62 Walker, 1987. 
63 See Chapter 4, Section 5 and Chapter 5, Subsection 3.2 for respondents’ accounts of the 
positions of different analysts in the hierarchies in DEFRA and DECC. 




typically attain promotions within their current post.65 This convention is 
justified as a measure to ensure that the recruitment in the civil service is 
meritocratic by preventing promotion through criteria that were deemed 
non-competitive – such as length of service.66 Instead, civil servants typically 
seek promotion by competing for a post elsewhere – either in a different 
team or different organisation. It is typical for an official to seek promotion 
approximately every two years. And we will see throughout this thesis that 
this convention has epistemic consequences for policy-makers’ engagement 
with social research expertise.  
  Civil servants are appointed independently of party politics, and are 
expected to commit to the Civil Service Code.67 This stipulates that civil 
servants should “serve the government of the day” (whoever that may be) 
with ‘impartiality’ and ‘integrity’. In this way, their work is judged by its 
perceived utility towards the department’s overall aims. At the same time, 
civil servants look beyond the objectives of the current government, to 
ensure the institution’s own sustainability. In the words of the Head of the 
Civil Service at the time of writing, Sir Jeremy Heywood, the civil service 
“serves the government of the day, while retaining the flexibility to serve 







65 Hennessey, 1989, p.48. 
66 Hennessey, 1989, p.31. 
67 Civil Service Commission, 2014. 
68 HM Government, n.d. 




5. Government Social Researchers in the Civil Service 
 
  Since at least the 1920s, a distinction has been drawn between ‘generalists’ 
and ‘specialists’ in the civil service.69 Generalists are those officials who are 
said to possess broad and ‘versatile’ skills and experiences relevant to public 
administration.70 They often have responsibility for managing policy 
development and implementation projects. In contrast, a ‘specialist’ is 
considered to possess expertise in a particular domain and typically acquires 
a professional identity as a ‘government analyst’. Following Sheila Jasanoff,71 
the distinction could be understood as the product of boundary work which 
lends legitimacy not only to the analysts as an expert group isolated from 
politics, but also to the policy officials who benefit from being seen to draw 
upon independent expert advice from the specialists.  
  There are five distinct government service ‘schools’ that provide 
accreditation and support for each of the following groups of evidence-based 
analysts: natural scientists and engineers, economists, social researchers, 
statisticians, and operational researchers.72 Social researchers are accredited 
by the Government Social Research Unit, which is situated in the Cabinet 
Office,73 and accredited social researchers are said to belong to the 
‘Government Social Research Service’ (henceforth ‘GSR’) – which is distinct, 
for example, from the ‘Government Economics Service’ (GES).  
 
69 Gummett, 1980, p.71.  
70 Gummett, 1980, p.70. 
71 Jasanoff 1990, p.236. 
72 HM Government, 2014a. 
73 According to an interview, the distinction between social research and statistics has 
occasionally given rise to the misconception that social researchers only specialise in 
qualitative methods when this is not the case. This in turn can have implications for how 




  The Government Social Research Unit was formally established in the early 
2000s, as part of the then Labour Government’s efforts to professionalise the 
civil service’s social research community.74 The unit was originally led by a 
grade 5 (i.e. senior civil service) ‘Chief Social Scientist’, but since 2010 the role 
has been split between two ‘Heads of GSR’ at a lower grade.75 Each 
government department or agency with substantial social research capacity 
has a Head of Profession who holds responsibility for supporting social 
researchers within the organisation.  
  To support social researchers and maintain standards the Government 
Social Research Unit arranges regular events and produces professional 
advice guidelines – including the ‘GSR Code’,76 which social researchers are 
expected to abide by. There is also a competency framework that outlines the 
specific skills and experience that researchers should exhibit at each grade, 
and which is used to assess whether a candidate is suitably qualified for a 
more senior position.77  
  Although practice will vary between departments and change over time, it 
is worth considering how social research expertise is constructed within the 
(latest version of the) GSR competency framework.78 The framework 
identifies two strands of expertise: ‘technical skills’ and ‘using and 
promoting social research’.79 In terms of technical skills, members are 
expected to have an understanding and experience of a broad range of 
qualitative and quantitative methodologies, be able to identify research 
requirements and develop and design research projects – for both in-house 
 
74 Burnett & Duncan, 2008. 
75 According to a former Head of the GSR Unit. 
76 GSR Unit, 2009. 
77 GSR Unit, 2013.  
78 GSR Unit, 2013.  
79 GSR Unit, 2013.  
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projects as well as external commissioning – and also to be able to manage 
and commission research projects in accordance with departmental 
procedures. In terms of ‘using and promoting social research’, members are 
required to: communicate research clearly and in a timely fashion to help 
policy colleagues, draw on and support the wider GSR network and cross-
cutting resources, and work with a deep understanding of the policy context 
in which they operate. In addition, social researchers should act as 
‘champions’ of social research, which involves “persuading others to support 
the research process, for example, industry bodies to release necessary 
information or policy customers of the value of social research”’.80 Also 
intriguing is the fact that, through the competency framework, government 
social researchers are encouraged to provide a ‘challenge function’ – to apply 
their expert judgement to confront colleagues’ ideas or decisions.81 As GSR 
members progress in their career they achieve greater responsibility in the 
above areas. But topic-relevant knowledge is not included as a requirement. 
This is consistent with the fact that civil servants are incentivised to progress 
in their career through changing posts: acquiring transferable skills is more 
helpful than topical knowledge if one is to gain career progression in this 
way.  
  Government social researchers are thus professionally committed to not 
only serve the government of the day according to obligations in the Civil 
Service Code discussed above, but also to provide expert advice to particular 
standards. The implication of social researchers’ ‘hybrid’ identities as 
researchers and as officials is that they are expected to exert appropriate 
judgement in striking a balance between imperatives which may come in 
 
80 GSR Unit, 2013. 




tension. To be deemed credible experts amongst policy colleagues and 
external researchers they must be seen to uphold research standards.82 If 
policy colleagues do not recognise or appreciate their expertise then 
opportunities for social research to contribute to policy development and 
delivery processes might be overlooked or alternatively projects may be 
managed by non-experts. Similarly, if external researchers do not recognise 
them as credible experts then they may refuse to engage with them on 
research projects or be publicly critical of them, which can in turn cause 
embarrassment to the department and damage social researchers’ reputation 
internally. And at the same time, social researchers might find their value 
questioned if colleagues begin to doubt their commitment to the Civil Service 
Code.83 Hence social researchers may be (or may consider themselves to be) 
bound by potentially conflicting demands and expectations. 
  An accredited government social researcher might have academic training 
in any of the social sciences, including in STS.84 As part of the process for 
gaining accreditation, an analyst normally takes a written examination 
and/or interview. The researcher can then be eligible for positions that are 
specified for social researchers. But in practice accredited social researchers 
may hold ‘hybrid’ generalist-specialist posts or may even hold an entirely 
generalist position, while at the same time experienced social scientists (or 
otherwise accepted members in the department’s social research community) 
might not yet have obtained the formal qualifications. And in the fast-
moving (and often high-stress) environment of a government department, 
 
82 For which the “professionalisation” of the GSR service during the early 2000s was 
especially important – see Burnett & Duncan, 2008. 
83 Civil Service Commission, 2014. 
84 Government Social Research, 2010a, p.15. 
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social research projects may be worked on by officials with little or no 
recognised expertise.  
 
6. Thesis Outline 
 
  This thesis provides a historical account of social research within DEFRA 
and DECC by focusing on two key questions: how has ‘social research 
capacity’ changed over the years, and what influence have social researchers 
achieved? These questions form the backbone to the thesis, which consists of 
seven further chapters. 
  Chapter 2 sets out how I conceived, designed, and conducted a historical 
analysis of social research capacity and influence. The chapter discusses the 
decisions that I made in terms of topic, research questions, data generation, 
analysis, and efforts taken to secure the validity of the project findings. I then 
outline some limitations to this study and suggest ways in which the 
research might have been different. 
  Given the lack of relevant STS concepts for understanding research capacity 
and influence, I have drawn heavily on theory from policy studies, politics, 
organisational studies, geography, and the history of science to build a two-
part analytical framework. This is the focus of Chapter 3. The first part of the 
framework begins by defining ‘social research capacity’ as it will be used 
within this thesis. It then provides us with the analytical tools to address our 
first concern – how do officials in DEFRA and DECC conceive of social 
research? That is to say, what do they understand social research to be? How 
do they interpret its role? And for what reasons is it valued? It emerges that 
understanding changes in these perceptions – what we might call learning 




capacity and how it changes in an organisation. Furthermore, we see that we 
can only understand how policy-makers learn about social research by 
exploring the institutional, epistemic, and political context in which they 
work. 
  It is one thing to build capacity, but quite another to mobilise that capacity 
in an influential way. The second half of the theoretical framework (which is 
developed in Section 7) provides the analytical perspective which I use to 
explore the different types of influence that social researchers have exercised 
in specific policy areas.  
  The subsequent four chapters are empirical in nature. Chapters 4 & 5 
analyse changes in social research capacity in DEFRA and in DECC 
respectively. Chapter 4 shows that between 2001-2015 DEFRA’s officials 
continuously updated their understandings of what social research is. New 
interpretations of social research were proposed to officials by influential and 
interested actors who wanted to see a change in how the department 
operated. At various points in the department’s history these included: the 
Secretary of State, the Chief Scientist and his academic advisors, the Chief 
Economist, and, once they reached a critical mass, the department’s own 
social researchers. These actors not only promoted new meanings for 
DEFRA’s officials, but also enabled the emergence of new types of roles that 
social research could play in policy processes – proving, for instance, that 
social research could contribute to even the most technical policy areas. I 
show that for different reasons and under different conditions, generalists 
across the department’s policy areas – as well as more senior staff – 
increasingly valued social research. Focusing on the changes in perceived 
meanings, roles and value of social research in this way we can see how 
social research capacity has changed in DEFRA.  
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  The history of social research capacity in DECC over the seven and a half 
years of its existence (October 2008 - July 2016) can be understood in the 
same way. After a slow start due to indifference from senior officials towards 
social science, key actors began to raise concerns about the lack of social 
research capacity. These individuals, who included scientists and economists 
within DECC as well as social researchers elsewhere in government, were 
eventually successful in encouraging officials to recruit social researchers 
from 2010 onwards. At first social research’s role was understood in very 
narrow terms, as useful for policy evaluation or for changing consumer 
behaviours within the new Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition 
Government’s priority areas for the department. But in time social 
researchers, economists, and scientists all helped to enable social research 
capacity to flourish across the department – including in some technical 
policy areas that are not concerned with consumer behaviour. Despite some 
initial teething problems, it is clear that social research expertise came to be 
highly regarded across the organisation. 
  In Chapter 6, we move on to see how social researchers in DEFRA have 
achieved influence in a specific policy team. The policy team chosen for this 
analysis is the sustainable consumption and production (SCP) group, which 
hosted social researchers for approximately a decade. While at first social 
researchers’ contribution was conceived by some actors as forming the basis 
for information provision, the analysts soon proved the value of their 
expertise (particularly in influencing citizens’ behaviours) if engaged early in 
the policy process. They showed how social research could contribute 
positively to policy development and implementation – culminating with 
action-based research projects that enabled the co-design and testing of novel 




have enabled DEFRA to move beyond deficit-model thinking in policy 
development for sustainable consumption and production, thereby changing 
the policy framing. This has, in some cases, resulted in what some 
researchers in STS refer to as ‘reflexive’ policy designs. 
  Chapter 7 completes the set by investigating the range and extent of social 
researchers’ influence within policy teams in DECC, again with a particular 
focus on their expertise in understanding citizens’ views and actions. For 
this, three policy teams in energy efficiency and demand reduction were 
chosen: those working on the Green Deal, on the roll-out of smart meters 
across the UK, and domestic heat policy. Intriguingly, while social 
researchers in DECC used similar methods as their DEFRA counterparts to 
understand citizens’ perspectives, there is less evidence of social researchers 
achieving a significant change in any policy framing, seemingly due to the 
fact that they have been typically invited to engage with other officials at a 
late stage in the policy process. Consequently, while I do claim that social 
researchers have enabled DECC to move beyond simplistic understandings 
of citizens’ engagement with energy efficiency and related technologies, the 
evidence suggests that their input never engendered greater institutional 
reflexivity within the department. 
  The final chapter takes a more holistic approach to the subject matter of this 
PhD by identifying cross-cutting themes. It begins with some comparisons 
between DEFRA and DECC’s social research capacity and influence, 
highlighting the value of the theoretical framework applied to these cases. I 
then go on to draw some overall conclusions. Here, it is emphasised that 
throughout the thesis social researchers’ challenge function emerged as a key 
theme for understanding changes in social research capacity and influence. 
We see that it is through challenging colleagues’ assumptions about citizens, 
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science, technologies, social science, and the role of government that 
perceptions change, with consequential impacts. 
  Furthermore, such challenge has over the years resulted in DEFRA and 
DECC becoming ‘epistemically dynamic’, in that they are departments where 
officials do change their views in the light of evidence from external actors. 
As well as epistemically dynamic, DEFRA and DECC are also shown to be 
‘epistemically diverse’ – by which I mean that scientists, engineers, 
economists, statisticians, social researchers, and others have all expressed 
perspectives based on their understanding of the issues, and that these 
perspectives are not always in agreement or consistent. Such diversity is 
important for achieving greater effectiveness and democratisation in policy-
making processes.  
  These conclusions have implications for prevalent academic conceptions of 
the civil service – particularly when dealing with technical policy domains. 
But they also suggest that more research is needed in DEFRA and in DECC’s 
successor (the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, 
DBEIS),85 to better understand other government analysts’ identities and 
interactions within the departments. I close the thesis by offering some 
normative reflections on the analysis presented here, and their implications 
for decision-making processes in respect to energy, environment, and food 
policy. In particular, it is argued that greater senior social researcher 
representation within DEFRA and DBEIS, and the introduction of a formal 
requirement that generalists engage with social researchers at an early stage, 
can support officials to work more effectively and more democratically.  
 














1. Selecting Cases, Research Aims and Objectives 
 
HIS CHAPTER outlines how the research was designed, and how it 
was conducted in practice. I begin this section with the problem of 
case selection because my attempts to solve it took me on a journey that 
would eventually reshape my research project.  
  In 2012, I completed a Master’s degree in STS in which I indulged in many 
readings that were critical of policy-makers’ understanding of citizens and 
their relationships with them – across a variety of technical policy topics 
including climate change mitigation, an issue in which I had previously 
worked and had a particular interest.1 I was also aware that many of the STS 
researchers I was reading had engaged with scientists and policy-makers in 
various formats. I was therefore eager to go beyond these readings, and 
 
1 Chilvers and Macnaghten, 2011; Irwin, 2001; Wynne, 1996; Shackley and Wynne, 1996; 
Shove, 2010. 
  T 
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explore to what extent STS analysts’ insights had been translated into the 
construction of climate science and mitigation policy, through a case study 
approach. While this seemed sensible at first, I soon found it problematic: 
what sorts of examples could justifiably be compared to discuss the use of 
STS ideas? I began to consider STS too diverse a field to be analysed in these 
terms. My supervisors suggested that a way out of this quandary might be 
found by conducting a pilot study with a small sample of STS researchers 
who could point me to examples around which I would identify appropriate 
cases of STS engagement with policy. This was an illuminating and 
productive exercise, and I am indebted to my seven interviewees for sharing 
their experiences, perspectives and insights with me. 
  Conducted in spring 2013, the pilot interviews (which were semi-structured 
and audio recorded) provided me with multiple but disparate examples of 
STS engagement with scientists and policy-makers. There seemed to be 
limited clear scope for elaboration of the interviewees’ stories into 
substantive cases – what more could I add that would be of interest and 
novel for the field?  
  To my surprise, a more fruitful line of inquiry emerged in what these 
academic researchers told me they did not know about: I was intrigued to 
note that three of these interviewees identified the same government social 
researcher in DECC as somebody who was making innovative contributions 
to the department. And yet these interviewees could tell me little about what 
this researcher did, or indeed what a social researcher in government does. 
Similarly, in DEFRA there had been civil servants who, in some respondents’ 
views, ‘got’ STS – but the participants could not tell me what, if any, impact 




  It is these realisations that motivated me to search the analysis pages of 
DEFRA and DECC’s archived websites, to find any mention of social science, 
how it is applied, and whether it serves as a channel for promoting STS 
ideas. I found that STS was not a term used on those pages, but intriguingly 
there were pages devoted to ‘government social research’. I could see that 
there were entire communities of ‘social researchers’ within DEFRA and 
DECC.  
  This revelation inspired me. It seemed to me that this was a category of 
actors whose experiences had not been recounted in the literature, and 
whose presence suggested a complication to portrayals of DEFRA and DECC 
as departments that are deaf to social science. And although I found minimal 
evidence of this in my initial web search, my pilot interviews suggested that 
these actors may also play a role in translating STS ideas into these 
departments. I decided that my thesis could make a novel contribution to 
knowledge by providing an account of the experiences of social researchers 
within DEFRA and DECC. 
  With this new focus in mind I opted to shift my priority from ‘etics’ to 
‘emics’,2 that is, from understanding and applying academic perspectives on 
policy-making towards making sense of the lived experiences and 
worldview of civil servants and the actors they engage with. What mattered 
now for the purpose of my analysis was not to assess to what extent 
normative ideas from STS research were mobilised and interpreted by civil 
servants, but rather to provide an account of the experiences, meanings, and 
issues associated with being a social researcher within DEFRA and DECC, as 
interpreted by those actors and those they work with. And I realised that 
 
2 Jardine, 2004. 
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achieving this aim could support two broader (and, to my mind, worthwhile, 
objectives): i) to address a gap in the literature regarding the epistemic 
context within DEFRA and DECC and ii) to aid researchers in STS and 
related fields in understanding challenges and opportunities for research 
utilisation in these departments.  
 
 Research Strategy and Research Questions 1.1
 
  My new research aim lent itself to an abductive research strategy (in 
Norman Blaikie’s sense),3 in that I would seek to understand the experiences 
and meanings associated with social research in DEFRA and DECC. This 
involves developing theories that are “derived from social actors’ language, 
meaning and accounts in the context of everyday activities”.4 But I was not 
only interested in social researchers’ experiences today – my pilot interviews 
and web search had already suggested that social researchers had a short 
history in DEFRA and DECC. So I saw the existence of these communities to 
be the result of recent social and historical processes. 
   To investigate these processes I opted for an ‘idealist’ ontology under an 
‘interpretivist’ paradigm, according to which beliefs, discourses, meanings, 
and actions are understood as the products of social actors.5 This enabled me 
to explore how beliefs, meanings, discourses, and actions – which may be 
taken for granted by civil servants and external actors – have come to be the 
way they are, as perceived by those actors in DEFRA and DECC and relevant 
stakeholders.  
 
3 Blaikie, 2009. 
4 Blaikie, 2009, p.89. 




  It follows from an abductive research strategy that I operationalise a 
constructionist epistemology:6 if civil servants (and related actors’) beliefs, 
meanings, discourses, and actions are formed through social interactions, 
then the data generated via interactions with these actors will reflect those 
interactions. Indeed, as we will see throughout this chapter, the historical 
account presented here could well have been different under different 
circumstances. As such, it is not tenable to assert that this study provides a 
singularly correct historical account of social research in DEFRA and DECC: 
other reasonable historical accounts could also be written. We will return to 
this issue of validity in Section 5.  
  It is with those ontological and epistemological assumptions that I pursued 
an abductive research strategy. But as Blaikie notes,7 the abductive researcher 
might subsequently supplement the data generated with other concepts from 
existing literature to address questions that would be interesting to others in 
the field. This would involve shifting from an abductive to a retroductive or 
an inductive research strategy, in order to go beyond detailed accounts of 
actors’ lives and develop an analysis that answers questions of relevance to a 
given research field. It is in this way that constructionist historians and 
sociologists of science are able to transition from an understanding of 
scientists’ experiences to make more generalised claims about the ways in 
which knowledge claims are situated, contingent, and context-specific.8 A 
similar transition is made in this thesis: while the first pair of empirical 
chapters develop a model to understand the changes in social research 
capacity in DEFRA and DECC as viewed by actors involved in the process, 
 
6 Blaikie, 2009, p.95. 
7 Blaikie, 2009, p.89. 
8 Jasanoff, 1990; Wynne, 1991. 
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the second set of empirical chapters address theoretically important 
questions concerning the type of influence that social researchers have in 
these departments. In doing so, I maintain a commitment to the emic 
approach which privileges actors’ own accounts where these conflict with 
my assumptions or with existing theory.  
  To this end, this thesis addresses the following research questions: 
 
Research Question 1: How has DEFRA’s internal capacity for utilising social 
research changed since it was formed in 2001? 
 
Research Question 2: How has DECC’s internal capacity for utilising social research 
changed since it was formed in 2008? 
 
Research Question 3: How have social researchers influenced work on specific policy 
areas in DEFRA? 
 
Research Question 4: How have social researchers influenced work on specific policy 
areas in DECC? 
 
  For the purposes of examining social researchers’ influence (i.e. to address 
research questions 3 and 4 in Chapters 6 & 7 respectively), I chose to focus on 
social researchers’ work on policy areas that have involved considerable 
attention to citizens’ behaviours. The selected policy areas are DEFRA’s work 
on sustainable consumption and production, and DECC’s work on energy 
efficiency and demand reduction. 
  The selection of policy areas for addressing research questions 3 and 4 was 




the first interviews I found that social researchers’ work on understanding 
and influencing citizens’ behaviours was a prominent feature in both 
departments, and was also described to be of paramount importance for any 
historical understanding of the significance of social research in DEFRA and 
DECC – indeed, some actors even considered ‘behaviour change’ as 
synonymous with social research, as we will see. As such, while that form of 
social science is not commonly associated with many STS researchers (whose 
influence I initially intended to understand as we saw earlier in this section), 
the chosen policy areas are exemplary cases for understanding the variety of 
forms of influence that have been achieved by social researchers and how 
these have been shaped by the conditions in which researchers operate. For 
this reason, Chapters 6 & 7 are not to be understood as comprising a 
comprehensive account of social researchers’ influence in DEFRA and DECC 
– rather, they are to be seen as exemplary of the forms of influence that social 
researchers have achieved. With these points in mind, let us consider the 
approaches taken to data generation and analysis. 
 
 Data Generation  1.2
 
  Having decided to pursue an abductive research strategy I reflected on the 
methods available to me for data generation. One option for such research is 
to use participant observation within the chosen policy institutions. 
Following Andrew Webster,9 Kevin Burchell has argued that this approach 
would be fruitful in helping STS scholars to understand the “implicit and 
tacit modes of thinking, norms and assumptions” which operate within such 
 
9 Webster, 2007a, p.610. 
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organisations.10 To do this I would follow social researchers within DEFRA 
and DECC, with the aim of making sense of their lived experiences. While 
this method has its merits, it would prejudice the current conditions of social 
researchers above those of the past. As such, it would not be particularly 
illuminating about how social research capacity has changed in these 
departments, and for what reasons. 
  Another option I thought about was to use focus groups. This method was 
also suggested by actors, as a means of gaining a deeper understanding into 
the use of social research in a broad array of policy areas. However, I 
reasoned that since focus groups can quell disagreement between actors this 
would not be conducive to understanding the range of perspectives of 
different actors.11   
  Reasoning along these lines, I chose to use a combination of document 
analysis and interviews with key past and present actors. My first step in 
data generation was to compile a spreadsheet of documents produced or 
commissioned by DEFRA and DECC. Documents were arranged in historical 
order by publication year, and included on the basis of satisfying one of two 
criteria: that they either discussed (or had implications for) DEFRA or 
DECC’s engagement with social science, or they might constitute examples 
of the research products of social researchers in DEFRA or DECC. To 
generate this spreadsheet I conducted online searches through the historic 
webpages of DEFRA and DECC,12 as archived by the National Archives. I 
was fortunate to find that links for most pages dating back to DEFRA’s 
formation in 2001 were preserved and accessible from my own computer. I 
 
10 Burchell, 2009, p.59. 
11 Bryman, 2016, p.515. 




started to compile this spreadsheet in spring 2013, and continued to develop 
it during fieldwork as interviewees pointed me to documents they deemed 
important. 
  At the same time as collating documents, I prepared to conduct semi-
structured interviews with civil servants and related actors. Semi-structured 
interviews were preferred to fully structured (and unstructured) interviews 
because they enable the analyst to address specific pre-defined questions, 
while allowing for any emerging insights to be explored through ‘in-flight 
adjustments’ as appropriate.13 This seemed particularly suitable for my 
purposes since I wanted to maintain control of a given interview so that I 
could address different periods of the departments’ history, while at the 
same time acknowledging that prior to conducting interviews I knew very 
little about social researchers in DEFRA and DECC, and therefore there 
would no doubt be plenty that I might not have asked about but which the 
interviewee considered important.  
  I began developing my list of potential interviewees using purposive 
sampling.14 Starting with a handful of names from the pilot interviews, I 
sought to supplement these by picking out names from the documents I 
could find, and through broader web searches. I also benefited from chance 
encounters at conferences. I wanted to target actors who i) were active at 
different time periods, ii) would alert me to key issues and events, and iii) 
could help me reach a range of other actors in DEFRA and DECC. Through 
this process I identified 35 names of people who I might interview, trying to 
ensure that I had an even distribution of actors from different time periods 
(i.e. roughly fifteen who were active in DEFRA between 2001 and 2008, and 
 
13 Bryman, 2016, p.201.  
14 Bryman, 2016, p.419. 
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15 who were active in DEFRA and DECC between 2008 and 2013). Conscious 
of the limits of my understanding at this stage, I did not stick too strongly to 
this list, but rather selected a handful of different actors who could provide 
me with a useful starting point, and then asked them for names so that I 
could improve my sample of interviewees through the snowballing 
technique.15  
  Aware that snowballing has the potential limitation that one might develop 
a homogeneous sample,16 I planned to ask my interviewees to suggest actors 
with different perspectives as well as actors whose perspective they shared. 
Interviewees also pointed me to new documents that I had not been aware 
of, and to issues that I had not considered, which I then explored through 
more document analysis and subsequent interviews. In this way, I pursued 
an iterative triangulation process.17 This is useful since documents and 
interviews can be used together to address the blind spots of the other: 
interviews may reveal interpretations or meanings within a text that are not 
obvious to the uninformed reader, and likewise documents can record events 
or decisions which the interviewee may not mention in interviews.18  
  From spring 2013, I began to prepare for fieldwork. But I had the good 
fortune to have been offered an ESRC-sponsored internship with the Scottish 
Government’s Environment Social Research team, based in the Rural 
Environment Science and Analytical Services team in Edinburgh. This 
placement, which I held between September and December 2013, was 
designed as a work placement rather than fieldwork. Nonetheless, the 
placement provided me with first-hand experience of being a member of a 
 
15 Bryman, 2016, p.415.  
16 McPherson et al., 2001.  
17 Stoecker 1991, p.92. 




community of government social researchers in the area of environment, 
food, and energy policy. This exposed me to the activities, interactions, and 
discourse of a body of social researchers who were akin to the analysts I 
would be studying in DEFRA and DECC. Nothing could have better 
prepared me for what I would encounter. In addition to acquiring a sense of 
the kinds of issues that my interviewees would discuss with me, I also 
inferred useful tricks for improving success during my fieldwork. For 
instance, I noticed that social researchers – indeed civil servants in general – 
would often respond to low priority emails when they first arrived at their 
desk, or else before leaving at the end of the day. I found that emails sent 
during these times were more likely to receive a quick response than emails 
sent during the middle of the day. Observations such as these helped to 
shape the way that I would subsequently approach and conduct my research 
interviews.  
  Thus, instead of conducting interviews in summer and autumn 2013 as 
originally planned, I spent the months before and during my full-time 
internship with the Scottish Government to prepare for my interviews and 
gather documents. At first I aimed to complete interviews between 
December 2013 and April 2014, during which time I would reside at my 
parents’ house in London for ease of access to actors in and around DEFRA 
and DECC’s offices. 
  I presented this study as ‘a history of social research in DEFRA and DECC’ 
to my prospective interviewees (see Appendix 1 for an example of pre-
interview correspondence), and I found that many civil servants, academic 
researchers and consultants were surprisingly willing – eager, even! – to take 
part. For some actors, this was because they wanted to contribute to a 
historical account, while for others it was seen as a useful exercise in 
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highlighting the contribution of social researchers - with all the legitimacy 
that comes with an outsider’s analysis. Some engaged in the project because 
they were encouraged to by others. These different motivations will no doubt 
have influenced the interactions we had in the interviews.  
  As I had hoped, the interviewees kindly suggested other key actors who I 
should interview, as well as bringing my attention to key documents to add 
to my list. Indeed some were particularly supportive and provided me with 
additional information or invited me to meet on a regular basis to update 
them with my findings. In DEFRA’s case, I was invited to an incredibly 
informative meeting of the social research community, which elucidated 
what they deemed to be the key issues they faced. This meeting also served 
to prime interviewees about my project and my wish to interview them, and 
gave actors an opportunity to self-select themselves to be interviewed by 
emailing me directly – which two informants did, to my surprise.  
  Aside from the pilot interviews discussed above, I conducted 46 interviews 
with 45 different participants in total. Three interviewees agreed to be 
interviewed a second time as I had follow-on questions for them. And in two 
cases I interviewed two actors at the same time – in both cases this was 
because the interviewee had invited another actor along to take part. Table 1 
below provides some basic non-identifiable information about the 
interviewees. Note that in one case an interviewee was interviewed for two 
positions that they held over the time period concerned, such that the sum of 








Table 1: Interviewees Arranged by Position 
 Position Number of actors 
Academic researcher 11 
Social researcher in DEFRA or DECC 17 
Other civil servant 13 
Non-academic research consultant 5 
 
Of the 30 civil servants selected for interview, 15 were chosen because they 
had worked for DEFRA, 11 because they had worked for DECC, and four 
because they either worked for or with both DEFRA and DECC. The slight 
weighting of DEFRA above DECC actors is justified on the basis that DEFRA 
has a longer history than DECC. Prior to starting the interviews, I conducted 
the University of Edinburgh’s self-assessment for research ethics, and 
concluded that the interviews would not go beyond Level 1 – i.e. I identified 
no significant ethical risks to myself or to participants. 
  The interview codes used to cite interview material throughout the thesis 
broadly map onto the positions in Table 1, although often it is appropriate to 
be more specific when referring to the interviewee’s position. For instance, 
DECC’s Head of Policy Evaluation was a social researcher with a leadership 
role in the department, and so, with the actor’s consent, that researcher’s 
specific title is given to contextualise the reader’s understanding of the data 
provided. In some cases it was also appropriate to highlight that the actor 
was not in the described post at the time of interviews, by referring to them 
as a ‘former’ official. For each quotation, the precise wording of the interview 
code was checked with the participant. Where multiple actors were assigned 
the same interview code (as was the case with DEFRA social researchers), 
they are numbered in order of appearance in the thesis document.  
 
 




2.  Conducting the Interviews 
 
  Following examples provided by one of my supervisors at the time, Sarah 
Parry, I devised a standard consent form that would be signed prior to every 
interview (see Appendix 2). The vast majority of civil servants insisted that I 
anonymise their names in publications. I did not explicitly ask interviewees 
to state whether they would like to have any quotations checked prior to 
publication, but this was requested by almost every civil servant as a 
condition for the interview. Some civil servants went further than this, 
insisting that the full text of any writing I produced about their department 
could be checked for factual inaccuracies. To me this seemed reasonable and 
indeed constructive, as it provided an opportunity to receive feedback (and 
challenge) from interested parties, while allowing me to maintain 
independence over the analysis and style. 
  All topic guides for interviews were designed along similar lines (see 
Appendix 3 for an early example). I would invariably ask about the 
interviewee’s background, as well as ask them to provide examples of their 
engagement with social research in DEFRA and/or DECC: who they 
interacted with, how insights were discussed and applied, who they saw as 
relevant actors and institutions, whether they had faced any issues or 
barriers, and whether (and how) things had changed over time. Following a 
tip I heard in the data collection course in my Master’s year, I always asked 
‘how’ questions rather than ‘why’ questions – the former enables one to 
explore processes, while the latter can invite post-rationalisations as 
justifications for what happened, and may also invoke a defensive response 




  The vast majority of interviews were conducted face-to-face, and I preferred 
this on the basis that it enables a deeper connection and rapport to be built 
with one’s interlocutor. On a handful of occasions face-to-face meetings were 
not possible, and telephone or Skype interviews were used instead. 
Telephone interviews were also used in the three short follow-up interviews 
I conducted as it was more convenient to do so. Most face-to-face interviews 
were performed at the place of work of the interviewee, but at the suggestion 
of the interviewees a small number took place in cafes, bars, or their personal 
homes. The duration of the majority of interviews was one hour, but some 
were considerably longer. The most leisurely interview lasted four and a half 
hours in the comfort of the actor’s home. It involved the consumption of a 
fine bottle of red wine and despite the occasional digression and overly-
thorough repetition of interview questions towards the end, it was an 
invaluable resource. All interviews were audio recorded19 and I used Express 
Scribe software to transcribe them. 
  The opportunity to participate was declined in a handful of instances, and 
while this was to be expected, I must acknowledge that it resulted in some 
gaps in the story I could tell. The first social researcher to work in DEFRA 
was supportive of the project but was unable to take part for personal 
reasons. Others were on extended periods of absence for one reason or 
another. A small number, including past senior officials in DECC and the 
Cabinet Office’s Behavioural Insights Team, responded to say that they were 
too busy or claimed that they would not be able to help with this project. As 
a result, those actors’ perspectives could not be fully accounted for in the 
 
19 Although in one Skype interview a foolish arrangement involving earphones and a 
dictaphone resulted in my recording just my voice until I noticed the issue and changed the 
arrangement. 
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analysis. And while every effort was made to provide an impartial account of 
different actors’ perspectives and experiences,20 this meant that it was not 
possible to present those actors’ views in balance with the criticisms others 
have made against them. This is consistent with the issues that Scott, 
Richards and Martin also faced when attempting to achieve impartiality in 
practice.21  
  After each interview I would write an entry into my research diary, which 
helped me to take stock of key points, build up a provisional picture of what 
I had learned so far, and think ahead to identify how gaps in my 
understanding could be addressed in subsequent interviews. Having noticed 
that I was arranging interviews faster than I could transcribe them, and that 
for this reason I was missing opportunities to deepen my understanding by 
addressing particular points with new interviewees, I decided to extend my 
stay in London till August 2014 so that I could spread out my interviews and 
conduct a greater portion of the transcription and analysis during this time. 
With hindsight, I think this was a hugely important step for ensuring that I 
got the most out of my interviews as I went along.  
  By the end of July 2014, I felt confident that I had enough data to draw a 
line under this stage of fieldwork. I had not achieved ‘saturation’22 on every 
issue – there were certainly more examples of using social research that I 
could learn about, as well as more to understand in terms of actors’ 
experiences. But on some particular matters that interviewees highlighted as 
important for understanding the history of social research in these 
departments – such as the process by which social research communities had 
 
20 In line with David Bloor’s Strong Programme in the Sociology of Scientific Knowledge 
(Bloor, 1991, p.7). 
21 Scott et al., 1990. 




grown in DEFRA and DECC, and on social researchers’ work around 
influencing citizens’ behaviour, I did consider my data gathering to have 
reached saturation. On these issues I judged that I had ‘rich’ and ‘thick’ 
data:23 I acquired many detailed and nuanced insights about significant 
developments from the time that DEFRA and DECC were formed to the 
present day and, on the whole, I was not gaining new insights from 
subsequent interviews. It helped that I began to transcribe and analyse my 
data during this fieldwork stage,24 as this enabled me to aim for a broad 
enough array of actors, to ask the same questions to different actors, and to 
triangulate data from different sources – all of which help analysts to achieve 
data saturation. 25 
  Yet, as Juliet Corbin and Anselm Strauss emphasise, saturation is not 
reached during data generation but during data analysis.26 I knew that there 
was more I could find out from interviews, but I ended the interview stage in 
August 2014 – aware that I could return to my respondents to address any 
gaps I found. As expected, after months of analysing my data I started to 
spot gaps in the narratives that I began to construct, and sought to fill these 
gaps through follow-up interviews and email exchanges with my 
respondents.   
  Having discussed the design and practicalities of conducting fieldwork, I 





23 Corbin and Strauss, 2008, p.108. 
24 Miles & Huberman, 1984, p.49. 
25 Corbin and Strauss, 2008, p.145. 
26 Corbin and Strauss, 2008, p.145. 




3. Data Analysis 
 
  As discussed in the previous section, I began to analyse documents prior to 
conducting interviews. I started by choosing DEFRA’s science and research 
strategy documents which had been published in 2003, 2006, 2010, and 2014. 
I explored how the terms ‘social science’ or ‘social research’ were used in 
these publications, and drew comparisons between the interpretations 
presented between the different reports. Following Corbin and Strauss’s 
approach to grounded theory,27 I began with a ‘microanalysis’ of these 
documents, which involves isolating a particular unit – a word, phrase, or 
sentence, and identifying the different possible meanings that might be 
invoked. It is a highly detailed (and time consuming) approach – intended to 
help the researcher to explore interpretations of the data. Inspired by the 
theory of meaning finitism,28 I wanted to understand what ‘social research’ 
meant to actors in DEFRA and DECC at different times. I coded for different 
interpretations of ‘social research’ represented in those documents, such as 
understanding citizens’ behaviours, investigating the issues faced by 
concerns of rural communities, and exploring citizens’ views of new 
technologies.  
  This initial analysis enabled me to better prepare questions for my 
interviews – which I would in turn transcribe and analyse using NVivo. Over 
the course of my fieldwork I coded my data and found three emerging 
themes: one was associated with explaining the growth of social research 
communities within a department, the second was about understanding the 
 
27 Corbin and Strauss, 2008, p.59. 




way that social research had been used to contribute to a department’s work 
on influencing citizens’ behaviours and the third concerned how the idea of 
the public was mobilised by actors in DEFRA and DECC (sometimes as 
citizens, sometimes as consumers, and occasionally as research subjects). 
And I began to see these as the three ‘core categories’ of my thesis.29 During 
the fieldwork stage I also discussed with my supervisors a draft contents 
page for the thesis as a whole, in which I set out ideas for three empirical 
chapters – one along the lines of each of these themes. But as I gained deeper 
insights into the histories of social research in DEFRA and DECC, I found 
that my idea for the first empirical chapter (about the growth in communities 
of social researchers in DEFRA and DECC) would better be split into one 
chapter devoted to DEFRA’s history, and another devoted to DECC’s history. 
Likewise, the history of social research being used to influence behaviours in 
DEFRA was distinct from that in DECC, and so that empirical chapter should 
also be split. Last, the original idea for the third empirical chapter, on the 
different interpretations of ‘the public’ at play, was dropped as I was less 
clear on its potential salience for development.  
  Towards the end of my fieldwork I began to write up my analysis into 
drafts of empirical chapters. Some of these writings constituted ‘sacrificial 
writing’,30 where I would write for the purpose of clarifying my 
understanding, ‘safe’ in the thought that I would later discard the document 
because it was too finely detailed in its analysis or because it was otherwise 
too experimental and provisional. At this point I no longer committed to 
updating my NVivo project with new documents, preferring instead to 
analyse documents and transcripts as I went along. I found this more 
 
29 Corbin and Strauss, 2008, p.104. 
30 Jane Calvert’s term, unpublished. 
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efficient given that I had already identified core categories around which to 
frame my chapters.  
   
4. Reflections and Practicalities 
 
  In outlining the research strategy for this project in Subsection 1.1 of this 
chapter, I stated that I intended to pursue an abductive research strategy, 
which would enable me to uncover actors’ meanings and experiences. While 
this may have been a noble intention, with hindsight I see that it would have 
been impossible to produce the narratives that I have if the data generation 
and analysis were not laden with theory, presumptions, and expectations 
from the outset. I explore how these influenced my research below. 
  First, it must be acknowledged that this research project is premised on the 
concept of meaning finitism described above: I was expecting respondents to 
recount to me how social research has had different meanings in different 
situations and at different times. This is indeed what I found, and it would be 
hard to imagine finding this if I had presumed that I already knew what 
social research would mean in these contexts.  
  There are many other ways in which I brought my own expectations and 
concepts to my analysis. The literature I had read and prior interactions 
(including the pilot interviews) had prepared me to find DEFRA and DECC 
to be dominated by actors who did not value social research very much.31 My 
experience at the Scottish Government had revealed to me some ways in 
which social research might be used in the areas of environment, food, and 
 




energy policy.32 My prior work with an environmental think-tank, Green 
Alliance, had brought me in close contact with DEFRA and DECC’s work on 
behaviour change – indeed I was, in 2010/11, using social researchers’ 
research products without being aware of it. All of these examples helped to 
shape how I prepared and conducted interviews and analysis. 
  Moreover, I suspect that the way that my own identity was constructed in 
interactions with my interviewees will have shaped their responses. First, it 
must be noted that civil servants and research contractors are committed to 
not disclosing what may be considered sensitive information to non-
government actors.33 In addition to this, many were cautious not to damage 
working relationships with internal and external colleagues. While I 
promised to anonymise interviewees’ names as requested, one’s identity as a 
particular type of actor could not be easily protected. Aware of this, some 
were careful to offer a more diplomatic account than they might have done 
otherwise. There were also many instances where interviewees avoided 
answering a question, or where they asked that I do not quote them on 
sensitive issues they discussed. And although these actors could be described 
as ‘elites’, I was also conscious that social researchers were also, in a sense, a 
vulnerable group34 - they and those who supported them had struggled to 
make their case for social science heard over the years. I saw no benefit in 
making them more vulnerable by disclosing narratives which they or their 
colleagues preferred to be kept out of this thesis. For that reason I often 
obliged, but on occasion I was given permission to paraphrase key points.  
 
32 Such as the Individual-Social-Material toolkit for behaviour change (Horne and Darnton, 
2013). 
33 For civil servants this obligation continues for three years after leaving their post, 
according to one former civil servant.  
34 Smith makes a similar point that civil servants are not always easily characterised as elites 
(2008, p.112).  
“Challenge and Be Challenged” 
-48- 
 
  If I had been conducting this project as an insider in these departments I can 
imagine that the data generated would have looked different. Indeed on one 
occasion I found that issues were more candidly discussed in published 
reports than they had been in interviews.35  
  Alongside my identity as an ‘outsider’, my identity as a social scientist in 
STS also had implications for how my interviewees engaged with me. Many 
actors were aware of STS research and discussion about the field often 
preceded or followed the interview – some spoke positively of the field and 
its luminaries, while others were critical. Consequently, some expressed 
suspicion about my intentions, although on the whole most saw value in the 
project. For some interviewees then, my academic identity is likely to have 
shaped the sorts of responses they gave – for instance about the interaction of 
different epistemic perspectives. In one case, an interviewee even used 
concepts from the field to explain what they saw as the significance of the 
DEFRA-DECC Social Science Expert Panel: 
 
You’re creating an object… I’m reminded by saying that it’s a ‘boundary object’…is 
that an STS kind of term? Acting as a boundary between these two things, there’s a 
physical entity that takes shape?36 
 
  Furthermore, I noticed that a group of civil servants used the term 
‘practices’ instead of ‘behaviours’ during interviews, and I infer that this was 
a conscious effort to express to me and my readers that they were aware of 
behavioural and social practice theory approaches and open to the use of 
both (a matter we will revisit in the empirical chapters). 
 
35 DEFRA SAC’s report (2006) is more revealing about the barriers to growing social research 
capacity in the department at that time than some interviewees were willing be. 




  Similar dynamics will have been at play in interviews with academic 
researchers, some of whom were in STS (or related) fields, while others were 
not. Of course, being a member of the STS community exposed me to more 
STS actors than others, and I aimed to counteract this by following civil 
servants and other actors’ suggestions for who else to interview. 
  There is also likely to have been an important gender dimension to the 
interviews which I was not able to investigate in depth in this thesis, but 
which merits further study.37 It is widely recognised by civil servants that 
government social researchers are more commonly female. Their 
contribution is often undervalued by their colleagues, who are more typically 
male. It is striking that while the gender divide was not mentioned 
spontaneously in the vast majority of interviews, the one social researcher 
who did bring my attention to it in interviews was male. This suggests that 
female researchers may have been less comfortable discussing gender issues 
with me. Clearly then, the data generated could have looked very different 
under different circumstances. A future research project may explore the 
gender dimension of analytical services in government in more depth.  
  The preceding paragraphs indicate ways in which the analysis might have 
been different under different circumstances. But this is not to dismiss the 
findings. The next section outlines steps that I took to maximise their validity 
in as far as possible. 
 
5. Internal and External Validity 
 
  The previous section addressed ways in which the findings of this project 
have been shaped by subjective judgements and contingencies. This suggests 
 
37 Manderson et al., 2006.  
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that a different researcher (one who was not male, and/or was not in STS, 
and/or was working within the civil service) may well have written a 
different history of social research in DEFRA and DECC. Nonetheless, this in 
itself does not show that my findings are invalid, just that the claims made 
could be different. I took many steps to maximise the internal validity (i.e. 
the accuracy of the claims made within the empirical findings presented) as 
well as the external validity (i.e. the generalisability of findings beyond the 
findings presented).38 These steps are the focus of this section. 
  All quotations were sent to interviewees to be checked for accuracy as well 
as to address any anonymity concerns. This was a lengthy but constructive 
process. As Randy Stoecker argues, an important sign of internal validity is 
that interviewees accept “that the behaviours, motivations and meanings we 
attribute to them are indeed their behaviours, motivations and meanings”.39 
To this end, quotations were sent to interviewees along with the surrounding 
passage and an accompanying abstract explaining the argument of the 
overall chapter. In this way I showed them not only the quotation to be used 
but also how it is interpreted and its significance within the overall narrative. 
In addition to this, experienced civil servants in both DEFRA and DECC 
wanted to see full copies of drafts of the thesis and articles for comment. 
  This process on the whole helped to identify factual inaccuracies and 
nuances, and rarely was the interpretation of any quotations found to be 
problematic. There were some instances where civil servants did suggest 
changes that went beyond issues of accuracy and were more related with 
how the department is represented to external audiences. To take one 
example, a researcher suggested I remove reference to the political context in 
 
38 Stoecker, 1991. 




which their research was conducted. This was perhaps for fear that political 
motivations for a project would be interpreted as constituting bias in the 
project. This seemed to me a remarkable request from a researcher within a 
government department, and I did not accept the recommendation on the 
basis that it was a stylistic point rather than a case of factual inaccuracy. In 
more typical cases, actors requested that they change the wording of their 
quotations – usually to improve its readability, but sometimes because they 
feared how the issue might be interpreted. Indeed one of my proudest 
achievements is that I found ways of expressing and substantiating key 
arguments while, on the whole, allaying actors’ concerns about how they or 
their colleagues would be represented in the public domain. 
  Internal validity was also strengthened through regular interactions with 
civil servants and external researchers. Since completing fieldwork I have 
been invited to present my research to people in DEFRA, DECC, and the 
DEFRA-DECC joint Social Science Expert Panel, and also to seminars and 
workshops at seven academic institutions across the UK. In most cases, there 
were interviewees present, along with relevant actors whom I had not 
interviewed. These meetings were all thoroughly constructive. Occasionally 
the discussions would have me reassess my interpretation of the data, or 
point me to more data which helped to nuance a point. But I also found that, 
on every occasion, my broader argument resonated with at least some 
audience members’ interpretations of the data I provided. Indeed, in one 
seminar at a university in London, an academic researcher (who was not 
included as an interviewee but who could have been) remarked that my 
presentation was ‘like seeing my career before me’.  
  Moreover, I found that such meetings also provided, to an extent, checks on 
the external validity (i.e. generalisability) of my research findings. External 
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validity is generally considered to be a problem with case study research40 
(although drawing comparisons between DEFRA and DECC helps to 
improve this to a degree). Conversations with civil servants and external 
researchers who were not interviewed for this project revealed to me that 
they too would, without prompting, provide accounts of DEFRA and 
DECC’s use of social research which resonated with my own. They often 
spoke of the ‘learning journey’ that the departments had been on, and of a 
multiplicity of perspectives housed within the same walls in Whitehall. Most 
reassuringly, I found that my presentation in May 2016 to the Scottish 
Government’s team of social researchers in the Rural Environmental Science 
and Analytical Services division (the team I had previously worked with, but 
which now consisted of entirely new faces), resonated with those 
researchers’ everyday experiences. The ensuing frank and open discussion 
provided an opportunity for social researchers to express their views and 
experiences which seemed consistent with those of their colleagues ‘down 
south’, and we took this as an opportunity to discuss what could be done 
differently – what has been tried and what may be tried in the future. 
Discussions such as these fill me with confidence that my analysis satisfies a 
minimum degree of validity, and I submit this thesis to academic debate in 
the hope and expectation that its findings are further nuanced and developed 
in its reception. 
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O ANSWER the research questions set out in the previous chapter, I have 
gone beyond the STS literature and drawn insights from other fields 
including policy studies, politics, and the history of science. This chapter 
analyses key threads from these literatures to produce a two-part theoretical 
framework, which in turn will be applied as a heuristic tool to explore 
changes in research capacity and influence in the government bodies 
examined here. Part one of the framework, which provides the concepts for 
analysing changes in a department’s research capacity, is developed in 
Sections 2 to 5, and is tested through its application to historical cases in 
Section 6. As we will see, the toolkit draws the analyst’s attention to 
significant features in the institutional, political, and epistemic context that 
shape how key actors perceive social research, which in turn enable changes 
in social research capacity. 
T 




  Many of the concepts discussed in those sections are also of relevance for 
addressing research questions three and four, regarding the influence that 
social researchers have achieved in DEFRA and DECC. But two further 
perspectives will also be important for approaching these questions: the first 
concerns the types of learning that can occur within an organisation, and the 
second relates to the forms of influence that the researchers might achieve. 
These are discussed in Section 7, before conclusions are presented in Section 
8.  
 
2. Social Research Capacity: What Is It and How Does It Change? 
 
  Early in the process of analysing documents and interview data, I noticed 
that civil servants saw the number, seniority, and resources of social 
researchers as measures of ‘social research capacity’. But the idea of research 
capacity was not clearly defined nor used consistently. This section sets out 
how this term will be understood in this thesis.  
  A useful working definition of ‘research capacity building’ is found in the 
health services literature, where it is defined as “a process of individual and 
institutional development which leads to higher levels of skills and greater 
ability to perform useful research”.1 This definition is consistent with the 
description above, but it raises more questions for the STS analyst – what do 
actors consider to constitute appropriate skills, or useful research? These too 
can change over time, and so the proliferation of different types of research 
may also be indicative of an expansion of social research capacity.  
 




  As such, the first half of this thesis explores the processes by which social 
research capacity has changed in terms of how many researchers there are, 
how senior they are, and their access to resources, but also in terms of 
changes in the variety of forms of research that those researchers conduct 
and, relatedly, changes in the types of contribution that are deemed useful. 
These indicators may be intertwined: the number of researchers will be 
influenced by the range of contributions and forms of expertise that are seen 
as appropriate for a department to possess. But they may also move in 
opposite directions – the number of social researchers could rise while the 
concept of ‘social research’ becomes narrowly defined around one or a few of 
the specific forms of knowledge described in the introduction. This may 
complicate the idea that social research capacity could be said to expand or 
shrink in a general sense. Nonetheless, this range of indicators can be used to 
build a qualitative sense of the types of changes in what is taken by actors to 
constitute social research capacity over the years.  
  Since on both the empirical and theoretical counts the notion of research 
capacity is strongly associated with the attributes of social researchers, we 
will start by investigating what they do within government departments. 
  A commonsensical view of social researchers is that they are there to 
provide social science knowledge to the generalists that they work with – to 
‘speak truth to power’.2 But we have already seen in the introduction that 
government social researchers’ expertise is defined in terms of their skills, not 
topic-specific knowledge. 
  Nor should we assume that they are employed to facilitate the exchange of 
knowledge between policy officials and academic researchers qua 
 
2 Wildavsky, 1987. 
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‘knowledge brokers’3 (or alternatively ‘brokercrats’ for knowledge brokers 
working within a policy institution).4 While this might seem an obvious role 
for social researchers, Gill Clark and Liz Kelly’s study of knowledge 
exchange in the Scottish Government provides a brief (and rare) discussion 
of social researchers in the civil service. The authors reveal that for the 
analysts they studied, providing a knowledge brokerage function qua 
brokercrats “is a layer of ‘extra effort’ applied over their mainstream work 
programmes”,5 and thus not recognised as a researcher’s key function. But 
these authors do not offer further insights into what social researchers do do 
within government. 
  Oddly, the most recent account of what social scientists do within the UK’s 
civil service was published by Robert Walker in 1987. His picture is 
consistent with Clark and Kelly’s, in presenting engagement with academic 
social science as a relatively marginal aspect of researchers’ work.6 But 
Walker’s eclectic study also reveals a surprisingly broad variety of 
contributions that ‘social science research officers’ (the predecessors to 
‘government social researchers’) made in the civil service at the time – 
emphasising that there was considerable diversity in the nature of their 
contribution across different departments.7 First, he reports that the social 
science research officers in the Department of Health and Social Security 
typically did not conduct their own research – instead they would 
commission it from external contractors.8 By contrast, prior to 1980 
researchers in the Home Office – who were in a separate unit from other civil 
 
3 Knight & Lyall, 2013, p.309. 
4 Clark and Kelly, 2005, p.1. 
5 Clark and Kelly, 2005, p.32. 
6 Walker, 1987, p.148. 
7 Walker, 1987, p.144. 




servants and were managed by the Chief Scientist – would carry out research 
and develop theory akin to university staff. But in 1980, alongside reductions 
in staff numbers, came a restructuring that would make the researchers focus 
more on addressing what their generalist line-managers deemed to be gaps 
for research. 
  Similarly, the team of researchers in the Department of the Environment 
was disbanded and individual researchers were embedded within policy 
teams in 1980 to stimulate better collaboration between them, with this move 
then being reversed a few years later.9 According to Walker, the focus on 
policy-relevant research tended to result in a good proportion of the research 
resembling what he terms “‘up-market’ market research”, as opposed to in-
depth studies informed by social science theory. Another consequence, he 
argues, is that this brought a shift towards prioritising short-term research 
projects ahead of long-term, strategic projects. In this way, the location of 
researchers – either in a dedicated analytical unit or embedded within a 
policy team – affects the type of work they produce.  
  These two points emphasise that the type of work that is deemed to 
constitute appropriate output from social research ‘capacity’ in a department 
is likely to vary over time and across departments. It may include 
engagement with academic projects and constructing a deep knowledge 
base, and/or it may involve quick-turnaround empirical research projects. 
  But Walker’s analysis also clearly shows how changes in capacity are linked 
with officials’ ideas about social research – which are themselves influenced 
 
9 Unfortunately for the purposes of this project, Walker does not elaborate further upon the 
role of social science research officers within the Department of the Environment, nor could 
any other study be found on these actors. 
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by the circumstances. Taking inspiration from a combination of studies10 and 
analysed documents11 which explicitly discuss the role and value of social 
research, we can categorise actors’ ideas about social researchers into three 
sets. These are ideas about: i) the meanings of social research, ii) the roles it 
can play, iii) its value for the officials concerned. 
  To consider civil servants’ perceived meanings of social research first, 
Walker argues that within government, sociology and psychology were 
marginalised, and social research was mainly interpreted in terms of 
empirical ‘fact-gathering’ as opposed to theoretically-driven work. Clearly 
then, ideas about what social research is influence what sort of activities 
social researchers do.  
  Similarly, Walker shows that the activities of social researchers are 
influenced by officials’ conceptions of the role that social research can play, 
which in turn depend on who makes decisions about what research gets 
commissioned and how it should be used. He notes, for example, that in the 
1980s social science research officers were often responsible for not only 
commissioning projects but also for proposing and specifying them, on the 
grounds that they were “the group best able to appreciate the potential of 
research”.12 This afforded social science research officers a degree of 
autonomy over their activities. 
  Digging further, we find that the idea of social science research officers as 
the best-placed officials to make decisions about a department’s research 
needs is consistent with Lord N. V. M. Rothschild’s recommendation that 
 
10 Many academic authors, particularly in the knowledge utilisation literature, are concerned 
with the perceived role and value of social science – e.g. Nutley et al., 2007; Caswill and 
Lyall 2013; Pacharapha and Ractham, 2012. 
11 E.g. DEFRA, 2003a; DEFRA SAC, 2006.  




social science should be excluded from his ‘customer-contractor principle’. 13 
The exclusion was premised on his view that the role of social science is to 
alert policy-makers to issues of concern for debate, rather than to help them 
in finding solutions to known problems. In this way, influential actors’ ideas 
about the role of social research within the civil service clearly have 
implications for social research capacity. 
  Besides the type of civil servant in charge of a department’s social research 
portfolio, we should also consider their status in the organisational 
hierarchy. Intriguingly, Walker observes that since civil servants typically 
meet with others in their own grade, advisory roles are commonly played by 
more senior staff while the research itself is carried out by more junior staff.14 
As such, the way that social research is put to use in the department will 
depend on how many junior and senior social researchers there are, and 
whether social research is handled by social researchers or other actors at 
different points in the organisational hierarchy.  
  Last, Walker identifies a wide range of reasons to explain why officials 
sometimes perceived social science to lack value,15 including: a perception 
that social scientists are predominantly biased towards the political left and 
lack professional standards; a “long-running tension” between specialists 
and generalists; a lack of existing capacity thereby rendering social science 
research officers unreliable for meeting deadlines, and the risk that policy 
officials take when commissioning research that might embarrass the 
minister or that might reveal insights that seem commonsensical. In addition, 
Walker argues that the dynamics between teams in the same institution can 
 
13 Rothschild, 1982, p.11. Cited in Walker, 1987, p.153. 
14 Walker, 1987, p.145. 
15 Walker, 1987, p.141. 
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shape the roles that social research expertise plays in unexpected ways. He 
finds that the production of research can sometimes be motivated by “sub-
departmental interests”,16 adding that individuals compete for recognition, 
and that “policy developments in one part of a department are likely to have 
repercussions elsewhere” – with the consequence that policies often evolve 
through contestations resulting in changing ‘alliances’ between policy teams 
in the same department.17 He even claims that research is occasionally used 
“to undermine the policy interests and credibility of other divisions” within 
the same organisation.18 Clearly then, alongside understanding officials’ 
perceived meanings and roles of social research, analysing how they perceive 
its value will provide important empirical insights for explaining changes in 
research capacity.  
  The above re-categorisation of Walker’s analysis in terms of perceived 
meanings, roles, and value provides a strong starting point for exploring 
how changes in key actors’ ideas about social research can lead to particular 
changes in social research capacity in DEFRA and DECC – as understood 
within the context in which policy-makers operate. While nearly thirty years 
have passed since Walker’s article was published, focusing on social 
research’s perceived meanings, roles, and value provides a cornerstone of 
part one of this theoretical framework. 
  The range of reasons that officials might value social research (or not) 
demand to be investigated further. We have already seen that generalists 
may value research for serving surprising functions – for instance to pursue 
internal ‘sub-departmental interests’. The next two sections are therefore 
 
16 Walker, 1987, p.156. 
17 Walker,1987, p.156. 




focused on exploring the reasons that policy officials may find value in social 
research.  
 
3. Valuing Social Research within a Policy Institution (1): Policy 
Stages and Objectives as Organising Principles 
 
  It was suggested in the previous section that deadlines can shape the type of 
contribution that social research makes to policy. Here I do not meant that it 
is simply a matter of producing research at a fast enough pace for it to be 
used. Rather, deadlines for different activities at different times will frame 
what sort of research is valued and the reasons why. These deadlines in turn 
will depend upon how officials see their work in relation to the broader 
policy-making process, and what their objectives are. As such, officials’ 
interpretations of the policy-making process, and of their objectives, can be 
understood as organising principles within an institution. How these can 
shape how social research is valued within an organisation will be 
considered in this section. 
 
 Policy Stages as Organising Principles 3.1
 
  Policy development has been shown to be more complex and messy than is 
suggested by models that identify distinct policy stages.19 Nonetheless, civil 
servants reportedly find the idea of stages useful for the purposes of 
arranging action and resources which in turn shape actors’ appreciation of 
different forms of knowledge at different times.20 Following Nutley et al., it is 
 
19 Colebatch, 2005, p.19. 
20 Daniell et al., 2016, p.3. 
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helpful to distinguish between four policy stages with respect to how the 
contribution of social research may be valued at each of these points in 
time.21 These four stages are: problem identification and agenda setting, 
decision making, policy implementation, and policy evaluation.  
  In the problem identification and agenda setting stage, policy-makers 
(either explicitly or implicitly) select the problems they will address and how 
they will be framed within the policy-making context. Research at this stage 
can elucidate stakeholders’ views on the important issues and the reasons 
why the issues should be addressed. 
  But the inclusion of academic insights at this stage will depend on the 
process by which ideas emerge onto the policy agenda. John Kingdon’s 
concept of a ‘policy window’ captures the time during which ideas may have 
particularly strong salience and be picked up by policy-makers. 22 He argues 
that policy windows arise when three metaphorical ‘streams’ interact. The 
political stream refers to political events, such as a change of government or 
the rise of public concerns on politicians’ agenda.23 The policy stream refers 
to the supply of policy ideas that exist in policy networks, and which may 
not even be associated with a particular problem that government seeks to 
address.24 The third stream, the problem stream, refers to the range of 
problems that government actors seek to address.25 Kingdon emphasises that 
these streams can co-exist independently, and occasionally they align such 
that an opportunity arises for ideas to be developed into a policy 
programme. Thus, to understand how research insights might inform policy 
 
21 Nutley et al., 2007, p.93. 
22 Kingdon, 1995, p.165. 
23 Kingdon, 1995, p.145. 
24 Kingdon, 1995, p.116. 




ideas, we must pay attention to the emergence of policy options prior to their 
arrival at the minister’s desk.   
  After the problem identification and agenda setting stage comes the 
decision-making stage, where policy-makers identify courses of action for 
addressing the identified issues and choose amongst them – taking into 
account the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats associated with 
each. Expert advisors can help at this stage to evaluate the range of policy 
options available, to analyse how best to implement actions, and also to aid 
in thinking ahead for monitoring and evaluation plans. 
  Then, in the policy implementation stage, the officials seek to deliver their 
proposed outcomes. Researchers might be called in to contribute towards 
understanding and overcoming any issues faced at this stage.  
  Academic social scientists whose work has relevance in technical policy 
areas have complained that policy-makers often see the implementation 
stage as the earliest appropriate point at which to engage with social 
research. According to what has been termed the ‘end-of-pipe’ model,26 
natural scientists, engineers, and economists are enrolled first to define a 
problem and assess the cost-effectiveness of solutions, before social scientists 
are brought in to make the implementation of that idea as smooth as possible 
by securing public acceptance or engagement. These researchers argue that 
social science should not just be used in the implementation stage but earlier, 
to help define the problem.  
  Last, after the policy has gone ‘live’, Nutley and colleagues claim that 
officials should monitor the effectiveness of the policy and its 
implementation, and evaluate what lessons could be gleaned for future 
 
26 Lowe et al., 2008, p.230. 
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reference.27 Research might be carried out for these purposes and then 
utilised when considering problems and agendas again at a later occasion – 
although Aaron Wildavsky observes that government officials may not 
always be interested in evaluating their policies.28 For instance, they may be 
cautious of evaluating a project which is seen as valuable to key 
stakeholders, in case findings suggest that the scheme is not effective. 
Assuming that an evaluation does occur, the officials will gain lessons to take 
forward for the next time they are in the problem identification and agenda 
setting stage. 
  Clearly then, policy-makers’ appreciation of particular types of research 
input will vary according to the stage of development they consider a policy 
to be in, and what is deemed appropriate at that stage by key actors.  
 
 Objectives as Organising Principles 3.2
 
  The previous subsection implicitly took for granted that officials organise 
their research activities around a straightforward interest to use outputs for 
the purposes of instrumentally improving policy outcomes. This is consistent 
with much of the literature on research utilisation. As Christina Boswell 
notes: “theories of the role of knowledge, research and ideas in policymaking 
are almost without exception premised on the notion that knowledge is 
valued as a means of advancing certain rational organizational goals”.29 
However, her empirical analysis reveals that this assumption is problematic. 
Pointing to a discrepancy between the UK Government’s considerable 
 
27 Nutley et al., 2007, p.93. 
28 Wildavsky, 1987, p.213.  




attention to (and investment in) expertise during the first decade of the 
twentieth century on the one hand, and their resulting utilisation of 
knowledge (particularly social science)30 on the other, she argues that this 
discrepancy makes sense if we acknowledge that, under different conditions, 
social and institutional drivers rather than rationalistic drivers might be 
dominant. This observation is consistent with Walker’s point about sub-
departmental interests shaping policy-makers’ engagement with research.  
  Boswell draws a distinction between two ways that government agencies 
might use expert knowledge: ‘instrumentally’ and ‘symbolically’. 
‘Instrumental uses’ are those in which knowledge is applied to aid an 
organisation to achieve better outcomes or to improve their processes.31 In 
contrast, Boswell defines two forms of ‘symbolic’ uses of knowledge,32 where 
research is not intended to change outcomes or processes but rather to 
strategically bolster the organisation’s position. 
  One type of ‘symbolic’ application occurs when research is used to provide 
additional reasons for supporting a previously chosen course of action. 
Boswell refers to this as a ‘substantiating’ use of knowledge.33 The other type 
of symbolic function is termed ‘legitimizing’. This occurs when expert 
findings are invoked with the intention of nothing more than to bestow 
legitimacy for government’s ability to make decisions. In such cases, the bulk 
 
30 Boswell, 2009, p.30. 
31 Boswell, 2009, p.29. Note that in contrast to other accounts in the policy studies literature, 
Boswell does not specify that research is applied ‘directly’ (c.f. Nutley et al., 2007, p.36) or ‘in 
pursuit of a given objective‘(c.f. Owens, 2015, p.10). The means by which research comes to 
be applied to alter an organisation’s outputs or processes are not specified by Boswell. It 
simply matters that such changes occur. Hence, the different modes of influence that those 
authors (and others) contrast against what they define as instrumental use (discussed in 
Section 7 of this chapter), can all be subsumed under Boswell’s category of instrumental 
research use. 
32 Boswell, 2009, p.61. 
33 Boswell, 2009, p.62. 
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of the evidence need not be aligned with the chosen course of action. Rather, 
governments can benefit from doing nothing more than being seen as 
engaging with the research. This enables policy-makers to show that the 
ministers are taking some sort of action on the issue, and may even enable 
them to “shelve an uncomfortable political issue in the hope that it will go 
away”, as Walker has put it.34  
  From an STS perspective, the distinction between instrumental and 
symbolic uses of knowledge is problematic, since it is often shown that 
instrumental uses of research simultaneously perform a symbolic function, in 
bestowing legitimacy upon particular actors and their arguments.35 We can 
therefore expect to find that instrumental and symbolic rationales may be at 
play. Nonetheless, the distinction is useful for Boswell’s key claim, which is 
that by understanding the symbolic types of knowledge utilisation we can 
better make sense of the apparent disjuncture between government 
investment and apparent interest in evidence-based policy on the one hand, 
and the persistent disregard of research findings on the other hand.36 
  Boswell goes on to suggest conditions under which different organisations 
may be inclined towards one of the three different uses of expert knowledge. 
Starting from the perspective that policy-makers are fundamentally 
concerned with the perceived legitimacy of their organisation, Boswell points 
out that they have two options for strengthening this, as they can improve 
either outcomes or processes. In situations where an organisation perceives 
that there is pressure from stakeholders to change their output, also believes 
 
34 Walker, 1987, p.155. For a similar point with respect to the creation of expert committees as 
a means for being seen to be taking action, see Owens, 2015, p.8. 
35 Jasanoff, 1990, p.78; Gieryn, 1983. 




that a change can be successfully delivered,37 and furthermore, accepts that 
there is a gap in knowledge for which research could aid the delivery of new 
outcomes,38 then, Boswell argues, the organisation is more likely to intend to 
use expert knowledge instrumentally. If, however, actors in an organisation 
perceive that significant stakeholders consider the evidence to be more 
disputed than they do, then they are more likely to value knowledge for its 
legitimising function, and use it in this way.39 Last, if working in a contested 
policy landscape where an organisation and its stakeholders both believe 
that more evidence will settle the causes of contestation, then the 
organisation is more likely to seek out knowledge to substantiate a 
predetermined course of action.  
  From Boswell’s account we conclude that the reasons that actors value 
knowledge within an organisation can depend on how they believe the 
organisation’s work is perceived by key stakeholders, and whether they 
think that there is value in utilising social research expertise with regards to 
improving the organisation’s standing. A government department’s interest 
in – and attempts to improve – the use of research is therefore likely to 
change in accordance with changes in how they value the research and how 
they act in response to signals from their surroundings. Boswell thus offers a 
useful means of conceptualising how and when actors in government 
departments might value expertise. 
  We can also expect these motivations to differ between actors within the 
same organisation. By observing cases in the UK, the European Union, and 
Germany, she notes that actors within the same policy institution sometimes 
 
37 Boswell, 2009, p.49. 
38 Boswell, 2009, p.56.  
39 Boswell, 2009, p.82. 
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hold divergent views on the roles of expertise.40 Boswell’s empirical analysis 
thereby reveals a glimpse of the epistemic diversity that can be sustained 
within an institution. She shows that while some officials value research for 
serving an instrumental purpose, others do so for symbolic reasons. But 
Boswell does not probe into how differences in motivations are associated 
with the type of official in a department – i.e. whether they are generalists or 
specialists. Even if we assume that both sets of actors see value in the use of 
evidence for securing credibility for policies, these actors are likely to seek 
credibility from different stakeholders. We can expect policy officials to be 
concerned with satisfying ministers and balancing the demands of 
stakeholders, while specialists will be more likely to prioritise the 
perspectives of their academic or industry counterparts. It follows that they 
might have different reasons for engaging with research: specialists will 
perhaps be more concerned with using research instrumentally to help 
decide policy outcomes, while we can expect generalists to be more 
interested in securing credibility for an idea with less concern about whether 
this is achieved through instrumental or symbolic engagement with 
researchers. In as far as it is possible to infer actors’ motivations for engaging 
with social research from interview data and documents, Boswell’s 
categorisation will be useful for understanding how social research capacity 
has changed in DEFRA and DECC. 
  Philip Gummett’s account of the history of expert natural science advisors 
within the UK Government, published in 1980,41 is more revealing than 
Boswell’s in terms of understanding how differences in analysts’ and 
generalists’ objectives can play out in internal tensions over the role and 
 
40 Boswell, 2009, p.217-8. 




status of scientists, and the implications this can have for research capacity. 
The lower status of scientists in Whitehall was historically rationalised on the 
grounds that generalists had greater ‘adaptability’42 and would more likely 
exercise balance in listening to scientific advice alongside other political, 
legal, and budgetary imperatives.43 This translated into significant pay 
differences between scientists and administrators of similar grades, with the 
generalists benefiting from greater chances of promotion. More significantly 
for our purposes though, Gummett argues that this difference in status also 
had epistemic consequences within the hierarchical civil service, as scientists 
would complain that policy officials would not ask for scientists’ advice in 
making decisions where science could contribute.44 He shows that between 
the 1920s and late 1970s, scientists continually fought against differences in 
status and grading.45 Although steps have been taken towards remedying 
this46 – particularly with the implementation of recommendations from 
reports by Lord Fulton (1968)47 and Lord Rothschild (1971)48 – the concern 
that a scientist’s specialisation can restrict one’s chances of promotion 
remains in the civil service today.49 By analogy, we can expect to find that 
social researchers will be more motivated to pursue opportunities for 
instrumental research utilisation than their policy colleagues, and also expect 
that the resolution of conflicts between these actors will be important in 
shaping how research capacity is built in an organisation.  
 
42 Gummett, 1980, p.76. 
43 Gummett, 1980, p.76. 
44 Gummett, 1980, p.75. 
45 Gummett, 1980, p.71. 
46 Gummett, 1980, p.82. 
47 HM Government, 1968. 
48 HM Government, 1971. 
49 Government Office for Science, 2013.  
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  To summarise this subsection then, it is clear from Boswell and Gummett’s 
accounts that government departments may host divergent institutional 
objectives and epistemic perspectives, and the interactions between different 
actors therefore shape how particular forms of evidence are valued. Social 
research will therefore be valued differently for its potential to serve 
particular functions according to the given circumstances. Of course, civil 
servants’ perceptions of the value of research are also susceptible to the 
views of the politicians they serve. The next section considers how 
incumbent politicians may influence key actors’ perceptions of the value of 
social research within DEFRA and DECC.  
 
4. Valuing Social Research within a Policy Institution (2): Perceived 
Credibility of Social Research 
 
  Having seen how internal organisational drivers can shape civil servants’ 
appreciation for social research, we must also examine how politicians’ 
perspectives on the credibility of the social sciences can shape the epistemic 
context within a government agency. This section explores that issue by 
means of a contextualised history of the social sciences since the Second 
World War.  
  Between the 1940s and mid-1960s in Britain there was prevailing support 
for centralised state planning for the benefit of society.50 In this context, social 
science was seen as offering promise for providing solutions for social 
problems – and more attention and resources began to be devoted to the 
field’s development than had been previously. But even then, politicians and 
natural scientists questioned whether the social sciences were on firm 
 




enough epistemological grounds to warrant government support and 
utilisation. Many senior Labour and Conservative ministers treated social 
science with scepticism - including Labour’s Herbert Morrison and the 
Conservative’s Lord Hailsham, who both held the post of Lord President of 
the Council and therefore held responsibility for research funding. The latter 
claimed that social science was a “happy hunting ground for the bogus and 
meretricious”.51  
  The formation of a Social Science Research Council (SSRC) in 1965 did come 
with greater recognition for (“a firmly positivist conception of”)52 social 
science research.53 But this did not bring an end to politicians and others 
expressing qualms over the legitimacy of particular kinds of social science. 
This continued till the end of the twentieth century54 and, we might expect, 
such views may still linger in DEFRA and DECC during the period under 
consideration here.  
  Nonetheless, with the support of a SSRC, between 1966 and 1984 
government departments’ inflation-adjusted expenditure on social science 
research grew approximately three-fold.55 This period also saw a growth in 
the number of social science research officers employed by government 
departments, peaking in 1979 before reductions in departmental budgets saw 
a decline in staff numbers. But these cuts were not uniformly distributed. 
Robert Walker shows that while in 1975 social science research officers 
outnumbered economists across Whitehall, a shift took place under Margaret 
 
51 ESRC, 2005, p.6. 
52 King, 1997, p.21. 
53 King, 1997. 
54 Walker, 1987, p.148. 
55 Walker, 1987, p.146. 
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Thatcher’s Government such that by 1983 the reverse was true.56 This was at 
a time when the incumbent Conservative ministers viewed non-economic 
social science as politically aligned with a centralised planning agenda, 
which they opposed.57 Moreover, Walker recounts that ministers “became 
noticeably more involved in commissioning and vetoing research than had 
traditionally been the case”.58 According to a recent survey this matter of 
departments ‘leaning’ on contracted researchers appears to remain an issue 
today,59 although Edward Page and colleagues claim that this is less common 
when a ‘research officer’ (such as a social researcher) is managing the project. 
  It is clear from this section so far that civil servants’ attribution of value to 
social science and to social scientists depends heavily upon the perceived 
credibility of social science. Doubts raised by politicians and influential 
actors have been effective in restraining the growth of social science expertise 
in government in the latter half of the twentieth century. 
  Although Tony Blair’s Government was no more committed to a state 
planning agenda than its predecessors were, the Labour Government of 
1997-2010 expressed strong commitments to using social science in policy-
making processes.60 Since this is the time period in which DEFRA and DECC 
were both formed, let us examine it in more detail.  
  In 2000, David Blunkett envisioned social science making a significant 
contribution to policy-making processes: 
 
Social science should be at the heart of policy making. We need a revolution in 
relations between government and the social research community – we need social 
 
56 Walker, 1987, p.147. 
57 King, 1997, p.24. 
58 Walker, 1987, p.148. 
59 LSE Group GV314, 2014, p.234. 




scientists to help to determine what works and why, and what types of policy 
initiatives are likely to be most effective (Blunkett, 2000).61  
 
  It is worth noting that a particular conception of what social research is and 
how it can contribute to policy-making is being invoked here. The phrase 
“what works and why”, notably suggests a role for social research early in the 
construction of policy ideas, rather than a tool to improve the effectiveness of 
a pre-determined policy initiative. Moreover, on Blunkett’s account social 
research is valued as an instrument for achieving more effective policy 
designs for realising pre-existing aims, as opposed to a means by which one 
can understand public views and use them as a basis for framing policy 
problems (as per the arguments made by STS researchers discussed in the 
introduction). 
  The Labour Government introduced a range of measures to promote ‘better’ 
policy-making, all with a view to improving the “relevance, availability, 
credibility, and user-friendliness”62 of research findings for policy officials.63 
These included greater investment in the Economic and Social Research 
Council, new initiatives to manage knowledge and to improve its 
communication, efforts to improve how research and evaluation studies are 
commissioned within the civil service, the professionalisation of a 
Government Social Research Service within the Cabinet Office, and reforms 
to civil service working practices. 
  Little has been written so far on whether the 2010-2015 Coalition 
Government maintained a similar commitment to using evidence in policy-
making. Some authors claim that the relationship between social science and 
 
61 As described in Nutley et al., 2007, p.10. 
62 Nutley et al., 2007, p.239.  
63 Nutley et al., 2007, p.233ff.  
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policy actors “deteriorated”64 over this time, due to new government 
pressure on research councils and an apparent lack of interest in funding 
research within government. Yet, other authors have suggested appreciation 
was sustained, albeit in a financially constrained context.65 The creation of a 
Behavioural Insights Team in the Cabinet Office was described by one author 
as indicative of the administration’s commitment to using behavioural 
sciences – a particular form of social research – in the development of 
policy.66 In any case we are likely to find some variation, and it will be 
important to pay attention to politicians’ statements with regards to the 
value of social research as we can expect these to have some influence over 
the social research capacity in DEFRA and DECC. Since the incumbent 
ministers are the most important stakeholders for a government department, 
their speeches and commitments provide officials with a reason (to be seen) 
to be valuing social research expertise. Hence, in a context where ministers 
emphasise the use of social research for better policy-making, a department 
is likely to believe that being seen to engage with social research would 
bolster the department’s legitimacy in the eyes of politicians. 
  Clearly then, this section has highlighted that any history of social research 
capacity within DEFRA and DECC must pay attention to what happens 
outside and around the departments as well as within it. Of course, 
institutional and political contextual factors are also epistemic, in that they 
relate to the perceived credibility of particular types of social scientific 
knowledge. This was explicitly the case in Lord Hailsham’s quotation above 
in which he questioned the value of social science, just as it was in David 
 
64 Brewer, 2013, p.166; See also Tarling, 2011. 
65 Talbot and Talbot, 2015. 




Blunkett’s words which presented social science as valuable to policy-
makers. For completion then, a framework for understanding social research 
capacity within a civil service institution must pay attention to the 
institutional, political, and epistemic circumstances that shape key actors’ 
perceptions of the value of social research.  
  So far, so good. But what is missing from this framework is an appreciation 
of the process by which new perceptions of the meanings, roles, and value in 
social research emerge. It is in interactions, STS authors argue, that expertise 
is constructed.67 Hence, understanding social researchers’ interactions and 
experiences is vital if we are to understand their history.68 A close inspection 
of the interactions between actors and the roles that these have will be 
important in understanding the shaping of DEFRA and DECC’s research 
capacity. The next section fills in this final gap in the theoretical framework 
by focusing on interactions and learning.  
 
5. Learning About Social Research Through Interactions 
 
  The observation in the introduction to this thesis that some actors in DEFRA 
and DECC have been interested in social research capacity suggests that 
some learning must be taking place within the departments – learning about 
specific forms of social research, what they contribute, and why their 
contribution could be valuable to a given organisation. It is useful to refer to 
this as learning about social research, as opposed to learning from social 
research, which is the focus of the latter two research questions. Considering 
the means by which civil servants learn about social research will enable us to 
 
67 Jasanoff, 1990; Gieryn, 1983. 
68 Parry and Murphy, 2013.  
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better understand the processes by which capacity for social research is 
developed, while exploring the circumstances around how they learn from 
social research will go some way to explaining the influence of social 
researchers within these organisations. This is not to say that the processes 
by which people learn about social research are necessarily distinct from 
those by which they learn from social research – both may be achieved 
through involvement in the commissioning of a research project, for 
example. Rather, the distinction is useful for the purposes of addressing the 
different aspects of the history of social research in DEFRA and DECC. 
  Three general points can be drawn from the literature on learning. First, 
following Hugh Heclo69 (and many policy researchers since)70 we can see 
learning as a core aspect of what policy-makers do. These authors argue that 
learning is to be treated as separate from (but causally intertwined with) 
power dynamics between stakeholders.  
  Second, learning can be understood as a social process. To this end, it is 
shaped by the social interactions between actors. It has been argued that it 
may be easier to learn from friends,71 suggesting that the building of a 
rapport between actors will be important. But this is not to say that learning 
is never an adversarial process. Arie Rip has suggested the concept of 
“agonistic learning” to highlight what he describes as the importance of 
learning through disagreements as a means of producing ‘robust outcomes’.72 
Whether UK policy-makers learn in agonistic contexts is an open question, 
and is to be explored in this thesis. The existing literature appears to take it 
for granted that policy learning through critical engagement is unlikely. For 
 
69 Heclo, 1974. 
70 See Owens, 2015, p.10, for a neat overview. 
71 Freeman, 2006, p.376. 




instance, Huw Davies et al. claim that “the more challenging the research 
ideas, the more readily such research may be dismissed, misunderstood, 
misconstrued or misappropriated [by policy-makers]”.73 This view resonates 
with Nigel Norris’s dated yet still cited claim that “criticism is a problem” for 
civil servants.74 Intriguingly, no studies to date have mentioned the 
emergence or operationalisation of government analysts’ ‘challenge 
function’, which we saw in the introduction to this thesis. As such, 
examining whether the challenge function is conducive to agonistic learning 
about – and from – social research will be an important contribution of this 
thesis.  
  Learning is also said to be contingent on the circumstances in which 
interactions take place. The process of translating ideas from elsewhere is 
transformative – information and ideas are often shaped by the contexts in 
which they are put to use. Political influences, the views of experts, and 
policy-makers’ values are all said to influence the translation process.75 To 
these, Richard Freeman adds that what actors know will be shaped by what 
they already know.76 In this sense, prior understandings can be limiting for 
future learning. 
  In summary, we can expect civil servants to learn about social research 
through interactions with particular actors, and that this process will be 
shaped by the contexts in which these interactions take place. To address the 
first two research questions then, we must be attentive to the interactions 
that take place, and the contexts in which they do so. 
 
73 Davies et al., 2007, p.233. 
74 Norris, 1995, p.274. The claim is uncritically cited in a recent article: LSE Group GV314, 
2014, p.227. 
75 Freeman, 2006, p.376, citing Rose, 1993.  
76 Freeman, 2006, p.382. 
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  But we should not presume that external researchers simply impart their 
knowledge on civil servants as if they are ‘speaking truth to power’.77 
Collingridge and Reeve, for instance, have highlighted how the bringing 
together of policy actors and researchers can result in new domains being 
defined, new questions being valued and new roles identified for experts.78  
  Moreover, Michael Gibbons and colleagues’ notion of the new production 
of knowledge suggests that there may be something distinctive about the fact 
that social researchers are situated within what they refer to as the “context 
of application”.79 They argue that research is conventionally conducted in 
academic institutions, where researchers enjoy a defined disciplinary focus, 
homogeneity in perspectives, autonomy over their subject matter and strict 
processes of quality assurance (such as peer review). By contrast, Gibbons 
and colleagues define ‘mode 2’ knowledge production as occurring within 
the context of application. In such contexts, they claim, actors’ concerns are 
‘transdisciplinary’ (i.e. concerned with problems that are defined by 
practitioners rather than by academic researchers),80 a heterogeneous set of 
skills within and outwith government are brought together to solve 
problems,81 actors exhibit a greater degree of reflexivity or social 
accountability than academic researchers,82 and quality is determined not by 
strict peer review processes but by taking into account a broad variety of 
indicators – including the quality of the output for the intended purposes.83 It 
is important, then, to bear in mind that the production and use of research 
 
77 Wildavsky, 1987.  
78 Collingridge and Reeve, 1986, p.35. 
79 Gibbons et al., 1994, p.3. 
80 Gibbons et al., 1994, p.4. 
81 Gibbons et al., 1994, p.6. 
82 Gibbons et al., 1994, p.7. 




within DEFRA and DECC will likely differ from an academic institution – 
although it remains to be seen empirically what key features of the context 
actors deem important for accounting for the histories of social research 
capacity in these departments. 
  Keeping with the view that we must understand the social context in which 
knowledge is produced and applied, Sheila Jasanoff has developed the non-
determinist idiom of co-production to highlight how changes in the 
production and/or uptake of knowledge often coincide with changes in social 
order.84 Eschewing accounts that place too strong an emphasis on the role of 
knowledge in determining the formation and maintenance of social 
structures on the one hand, and accounts that treat knowledge as fully 
accounted for by social factors on the other, Jasanoff emphasises that in some 
sites, knowledge and social order can be said to be co-produced. In 
particular, she argues that analysts should expect to find that the 
mobilisation of knowledge in political settings often coincides with 
important changes in actors’ identities, institutions, discourses, and 
representations. By considering these changes, we can observe how new 
perceptions of the meanings, roles, and values in social research are 
constructed and sustained, and therefore how the idea of social research 
gains legitimacy and traction within DEFRA and DECC. 
  STS accounts such as those of Jasanoff, Collingridge and Reeve, and Thomas 
Gieryn,85 amongst others, bring into question the possibility of drawing an 
incontestable line of demarcation between experts and policy-makers. 
Viewing any such demarcation as the result of judgements taking into 
 
84 Jasanoff, 2004, pp.39-45. 
85 Gieryn, 1983. 
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account actors’ interests and the strains they face,86 Sheila Jasanoff argues 
that a constructed distinction between experts and policy-makers enables 
each to claim legitimacy.87 Therefore, in paying close attention to the 
processes in which social research capacity is shaped, we should not be 
surprised to find experts engaged in political roles, and likewise policy-
makers involved in epistemic matters.  
  This section has highlighted the importance of paying attention to processes 
of learning about social research, as these are likely to inform the form of a 
department’s social research capacity and the means by which it is 
developed. This section has thereby emphasised the importance of 
understanding interactions, and the contexts which shape those interactions, 
for the purposes of understanding processes of learning about social 
research. 
  With the last piece of the puzzle in place, the full theoretical framework for 
understanding changes in DEFRA and DECC’s capacity for social research 
emerges. Drawing on the range of literature analysed so far in this chapter, I 
argue changes in capacity must be understood through a close examination 
of the processes by which internal actors’ perceptions of the meanings, roles, 
and value of social research change. We have seen that these perceptions are 
likely to be shaped through interactions and collaboration, and must be 
situated within the institutional, political, and epistemic contexts in which 
the actors operate.  
  It is with this framework, summarised graphically in Figure 1 below, that I 
approach the following two research questions. These guide the analysis in 
Chapter 4 (about DEFRA) and Chapter 5 (about DECC). 
 
86 Gieryn, 1983. 




Research Question 1: How has DEFRA’s internal capacity for utilising social 
research changed since it was formed in 2001? 
 
Research Question 2: How has DECC’s internal capacity for utilising social 
research changed since it was formed in 2008? 
 
  This theoretical framework is a novel contribution, and as such has never 
been applied. However, it can be tested through application in historical 
examples. The next section does this by applying the framework to two 
cases.  
 
Figure 1: A Graphical Illustration of the Theoretical Framework for Understanding 




















6. Testing Part One of the Framework: Histories of the 
Institutionalisation of Novel Forms of Expertise in UK 
Government 
 
  Perhaps for reasons associated with difficulty of access, historical accounts 
of natural science expertise in the civil service reveal more than 
contemporary STS studies do about the epistemic context in which officials 
work. Indeed Andrew Webster identified this as a gap in the STS literature 
nearly ten years ago:  
 
I would also suggest that an important task that STS needs to undertake to make 
[policy] engagement more effective is a detailed analysis of the epistemic culture 
found within the social world of science policy making: what forms of knowledge 
do members of the scientific civil service treat as reliable and robust and how are 
these performed through the informal and formal institutions of government? An 
understanding of this civil service episteme and the assumptions on which it is 
based would provide an invaluable insight into the policy production process, its 
management of science and its own attempts to simplify or "purify" science as an 
object for policy making. This would help the STS analyst develop a credible critique 
of policy from within and not simply outside of the policy arena.88 
  
A key theoretical contribution from this thesis then is a deeper 
understanding of the epistemic context within DEFRA and DECC and how it 
changes.  
  Given the absence of recent accounts of the experiences of analysts within 
government, we can instead use historical accounts to test the theoretical 
framework presented here. Particularly intriguing for our purposes are 
studies of natural scientists within government departments at a time when 
their expertise was afforded lower status than it is today. Two examples are 
drawn upon: historical analyses of the role of the Chief Medical Officer 
 




within the Ministry of Health and its successors,89 and Sabine Clarke’s 
history of the Colonial Office’s Colonial Research Committee.90 In these cases 
the government’s capacity to use scientific research is at stake, although the 
actors and analysts do not put the issue in these terms. For these reasons they 
are valuable case studies.  
  According to Martin Gorsky’s research, the idea of creating the civil 
service’s first Chief Medical Officer in 1855 has its roots in a particular 
interpretation of medical expertise in terms of its ability to explain the spread 
of disease at a time when politicians were concerned about the sanitary 
conditions of British workers.91 This interpretation of medical expertise 
afforded a particular function: to help in the development of policies to 
tackle sanitary conditions in cities. But as Gorsky notes, the Chief Medical 
Officer’s duties gradually expanded over the years, with new roles emerging. 
At first these duties were for the purposes of monitoring the state of sanitary 
conditions, but gradually as academic research developed, new 
interpretations of medical expertise took hold. This included bacteriological 
analysis, which in turn provided further functions for medical expertise, in 
terms of not only preventative but also curative contributions. With changes 
in interpretations of medical expertise, came new opportunities for the Chief 
Medical Officer to contribute, and this in turn afforded a growth in the 
number of medically trained experts employed by the ministry.  
  Sally Sheard’s account adds to this story by highlighting tensions and 
changes in the perceived value of medical expertise from the time the first 
Chief Medical Officer was appointed in 1855, up to the Second World War. 
 
89 Sheard, 2010; Gorsky, 2007. 
90 Clarke, 2007. 
91 Gorsky, 2007, p.468. 
“Challenge and Be Challenged” 
-84- 
 
She argues that throughout this time the incumbents in those posts were 
“engaged in an almost continuous battle to gain and maintain sufficient 
medical staff to carry out their duties”. A key issue, she finds, was civil 
servants’ lack of appreciation for experts’ judgements as a basis for 
supporting policy decisions and procedures. A quotation by Arthur 
Newsholme, who held the post in the 1910s, reveals two types of tension that 
he encountered: 
  
[First,] an honest belief, common to many government departments, that technical 
advice is advice not to be given until called for by the secretariat who, it is assumed, 
are entirely competent to decide whether such advice is needed. Second, when such 
advice is on record, it is assumed that it can be safely reapplied in what are regarded 
by the secretariat as analogous circumstances. (Newsholme 1936: 62)92 
 
  Sheard goes on to show that the establishment and subsequent growth of 
the National Health Service after the Second World War engendered greater 
recognition of medical experts’ value and afforded them more influence 
within the Ministry of Health (and its successor departments). The Chief 
Medical Officer also successfully argued to retain line management of the 
medical staff, for fear that they might otherwise not be valued enough to 
contribute effectively. Yet, the function that the medical experts served in the 
department continued to be contested by politicians as well as by civil 
servants. And the extent of their contribution was constantly undermined by 
cuts to the medical profession – which the Chief Medical Officer was 
powerless to stop.93  
  From Gorsky and Sheard’s accounts then, we can see that new roles for 
research may emerge as new interpretations of expertise are constructed. 
 
92 Quoted by Sheard, 2010, p.194. 




Moreover, while some internal actors will value their contribution, there may 
well be sustained contestation from others. We can infer that within 
government departments like DEFRA and DECC, we should expect to find 
tensions and contestations over the role and value of social research 
expertise. We might also find that amid constraints to budgets or other 
threats, those who support the growth of social research expertise will seek 
to exert their influence to protect or strengthen social researchers’ positions 
within departmental staff hierarchies.  
  As a second historical application of our framework, consider Sabine 
Clarke’s analysis of the formation of a Colonial Research Committee by the 
Colonial Office, in the 1940s. The committee was to contribute expertise on 
“colonial environments and societies”, for specific purposes with regards to 
improving the effectiveness of plans to tackle disease control and strengthen 
crop growth in those contexts.94 The case for a Colonial Research Committee 
was won, Clarke argues, in part because of the support of high profile and 
respected voices such as the Lord Hailey, but also because the issue was 
raised just at the time that reforms were being conducted in development 
policy and so a new committee offered a means by which the Colonial Office 
could address some of their own prior concerns associated with colonial 
research activities.95 On Clarke’s account, these social and political 
circumstances affected how the policy-makers valued the decision to develop 
a Colonial Research Committee. In turn, the Colonial Research Committee 
successfully campaigned for colonial research institutes to have the 
autonomy to conduct long-term, generalizable research, although in 1952 the 
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Colonial Office sought to direct those research institutes to tackle practical 
problems to aid development in the colonies.96  
  Sabine Clarke’s study highlights the messiness and context-dependence of 
policy processes. She shows that experts’ attempts to convince senior officials 
to appreciate the value of a particular form of expertise might involve actors 
enrolling the support of more senior departments or individuals. Clarke also 
brings attention to the importance of timing – and ‘windows of opportunity’ 
in particular – in the policy process, as recognised by Kingdon. 97 This serves 
as an instructive reminder that we should not expect policy design and 
delivery to be linear or rational – but rather messy, complex, and shaped by 
the broader political and institutional context. If new resources are allocated 
towards the development of social research capacity, then we should seek to 
understand the means by which these are won, as well as the purposes to 
which they are to be deployed. 
  Applying the theoretical framework developed in this chapter to these two 
historical cases suggests that it provides a fruitful heuristic tool for exploring 
how social research capacity changes in DEFRA and DECC. Before we apply 
this in Chapters 4 & 5, we must first explore additional concepts and 
literature that underpin the second set of empirical chapters. There our 
concern will be with understanding the circumstances in which social 
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7. Part Two: Understanding Social Researchers’ Influence 
 
  We can expect that the circumstances in which policy actors learn about 
social research will also affect how they learn from social research. As such, 
the concepts in the previous sections will be important for understanding 
how social researchers have influenced policy work in DEFRA and DECC. 
But before we begin to examine this, we need to supplement part one of the 
framework with two more sets of theoretical concepts. The first set relates to 
the types of learning from social science that can occur in a policy 
organisation. The second draws on Susan Owens’s application of those types 
of learning as part of a categorisation of the different forms of influence that 
experts may achieve.  
 
 Types of Learning 7.1
 
  We saw in Subsection 3.2 that policy-makers may value research for 
‘instrumental’ reasons – i.e. for its potential to inform a decision – or for 
‘symbolic’ reasons – to bolster their perceived credibility. A further 
distinction can be drawn between types of learning associated with 
‘instrumental’ reasons for using research. The first type of learning occurs 
when insights are used to address a pre-defined problem.98 This might 
involve policy actors using a research project (or a public participation 
exercise) that is predicated upon policy actors’ problem definitions, and is 
used to address a particular issue within an agreed policy or research 
framing. The second mode of learning, by contrast, involves using insights to 
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rethink how a given research or policy issue should be framed in the first 
place. This involves a challenge to policy-makers’ assumptions and 
understandings of a problem, such that it is conceived differently. This then 
opens opportunities for novel ideas and approaches to be deliberated, and 
may make previous options seem redundant.99 It is this sort of learning that 
can give rise to more fundamental policy change. 
  Susan Owens notes that within different literatures these two forms of 
learning have been termed ‘simple’ and ‘complex’, ‘instrumental’ and 
‘social’, ‘instrumental’ and ‘reflexive’, ‘technical’ and ‘conceptual’ or ‘single-
loop’ and double-loop’.100 In this thesis the terms ‘single-loop’ and ‘double-
loop’ are preferred. As such, single-loop learning occurs when research is 
used instrumentally to solve a set problem, while double-loop learning refers 
to situations where research is used to reframe the given problem. We can 
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 It is interesting to note that Helen Pallett and Jason Chilvers view double-
loop learning to be a prerequisite for policy organisations to gain what Brian 
Wynne has termed ‘institutional reflexivity’ – the capacity of policy actors in 
those institutions to critically examine their own assumptions and 
knowledge commitments about science, the public, and their institutional 
relationship with the public.101 This would require self-awareness about their 
“taken-for-granted models of society, and of science and its boundaries 
embedded within their culture”.102 In their analysis of public participation 
exercises in the domain of UK climate change policy in the first decade of this 
century, Helen Pallett and Jason Chilvers have argued that policy-makers in 
DEFRA and DECC are motivated to engage the public by ‘instrumental 
rationales’, to aid them secure public acceptability for proposed policies. The 
authors argue that “the dominance of instrumental rationales can preclude 
transformative communicative learning between practitioners and policy 
makers”,103 suggesting that this prevents DEFRA and DECC from becoming 
institutionally reflexive organisations. They go on to add that “[t]here are a 
few examples of double-loop or transformative learning in the [Sciencewise] 
network,  though they rarely resulted from formal organisational 
mechanisms”104 – providing no examples where such learning did arise from 
formal mechanisms.  
  The same authors have since produced a literature review which argues 
that academics’ own assumptions of organisational stability contribute 
towards preventing them from observing reflexive learning. The writers 
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therefore acknowledge that there may be diversity and dynamism within 
organisations than previously assumed: 
 
The failure of previous attempts to induce organizational change and reflexive 
learning can in part be explained by the adherence to conventional assumptions 
about organizations as stable, bounded entities and the co-option of interventions by 
organizational actors and others into instrumental procedural fixes which fall short 
of the initial promise… A vital focus for future research and engagement therefore 
will be to explore how the novel and emergent perspectives on organizations and 
organizational change described in this paper can be used in the development of 
new forms of normative intervention which embrace the plurality, diversity and 
messiness of organizations instead of resting on the old assumptions of coherence 
and rational control.105 
 
  An additional core concern which this thesis can address, then, is whether 
social researchers provide a formal mechanism for promoting institutional 
reflexivity through double-loop learning in a way that does not appear to 
have been observed hitherto. Given the previously cited literature, there are 
good reasons to believe that government social researchers would be ill-
placed to deliver such changes. The apparent predominance of instrumental 
rationales shaping policy-makers’ activities, coupled with the prevalent view 
that ‘criticism is a problem’ for civil servants, seem to suggest that social 
researchers are unlikely to provide such a mechanism. We can expect the 
issue to be compounded further by social researchers’ proximity to policy-
makers. Nutley et al. argue that the closer that social researchers get to policy 
actors, the more their independence is threatened, such that they are likely to 
undergo policy ‘capture’.106  
  At the same time, we also saw in Chapter 1, Section 4 that government 
social researchers are notionally committed to providing a ‘challenge 
 
105 Pallett and Chilvers, 2014, p.161. 




function’. As such, while the expansion of capacity for social research 
expertise might be justified for specific instrumental reasons, once 
researchers join a team their interpretation of their own role may differ from 
that attributed to them by colleagues – and is by no means pre-determined. 
This point resonates with Susan Owen’s view of expert committees: 
 
As rational analysts or political symbols, advisory bodies serve the purpose of 
others, and their function might be characterized as instrumental. As cognitive and 
discursive agents, they can develop a degree of autonomy, in the sense that they may 
not only (or not even) serve the purposes for which they were established.107 
 
  So while the rationale for recruiting government social researchers is likely 
to be driven by a single-loop instrumental rationale, once employed they 
might attain a degree of autonomy to set their own agendas internally. We 
should therefore beware of presuming that they will be ‘captured’ within 
policy processes. Instead, we should treat the negotiation of their influence as 
an empirical problem. Next we turn to the final set of perspectives that will 
help us to address such questions, by outlining the different forms of 
influence that might be achieved.  
 
  Forms of Influence That Can Be Achieved 7.2
 
  We saw in the previous subsection that social scientists can help policy-
makers to learn from social science either through informing ideas within a 
particular policy framing, or by contributing to the way in which policy and 
research questions are framed – and therefore the types of questions that are 
seen as acceptable. A further distinction can be drawn between theories of 
 
107 Owens, 2015, p.16.  
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research informing policy (either in a single- or double-loop sense) in linear 
and predictable ways on the one hand, and those which describe this process 
as under-determined and unpredictable. The former can be described as 
constituting ‘a rationalist’ perspective, and is criticised by advocates of two 
other accounts: the ‘conceptual’ model and the ‘enlightenment’ model. Both 
criticisms of the rationalist model of research support a messier 
conceptualisation of policy-making. The conceptual model presents research 
use as “chang[ing] ways of thinking, alerting policy makers and practitioners 
to an issue or playing a more general ‘consciousness-raising’ role”.108 This 
perspective thus emphasises that research does not simply provide an 
answer or a number that will inform decisions – it often provokes deeper 
reflection than that, and perhaps complicates views of the range of issues 
under consideration. Some argue that this conceptual form of research use is 
more likely to occur than a linear form of research use109 – although it 
remains to be seen whether this is the case for research produced within 
government departments. 
  The second criticism of the rationalist account of research use is based upon 
Carol Weiss’s ‘enlightenment model’ of social science influence.110 On this 
account, social science research informs policy-makers not only in terms of 
research findings, but also through the gradual permeation of concepts and 
ideas through “unguided and unmediated channels”.111 Weiss adds that this 
form of influence is unpredictable, slow and “inefficient”, with a high 
likelihood for misconceptions and “distortions” to occur in the translation 
 
108 Nutley et al., 2007, p.36. 
109 Nutley et al., 2007, p.36. 
110 Weiss, 1979, p.429. 




process. As such, she notes that the process “may come to resemble 
"endarkenment" as much as enlightenment”.112  
  The enlightenment model has clear implications for the research presented 
here, as it suggests that we should not imagine social researchers to 
constitute a sole or privileged channel through which social science insights 
inform policy-making. Their work might provide a channel for academic 
insights to enter policy-makers’ discourses, but this will be one channel 
amongst others and may operate in unpredictable ways – a point emphasised 
by interviewees as well as in feedback following presentations that I have 
given throughout the course of this study. Nonetheless, we should not 
conclude that government social researchers’ own outputs will be more 
likely to enter policy processes through indirect and unpredictable channels 
rather than directly. As Katherine Smith notes, Weiss’s enlightenment model 
overlooks the fact that sometimes policy-makers are actively “on the look out 
for research evidence”.113 Under these circumstances it seems appropriate to 
expect that social researchers achieve more ‘direct’ and predictable forms of 
influence than external experts typically do.  
  Informed by these multiple perspectives, Susan Owens has identified five 
distinct forms of influence achieved by a particular group of experts – the 
Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution. These forms of influence are: 
‘visible, short-term responses’, ‘dormant seeds’, ‘slowly changing the frame’ 
‘doing good by stealth’, and ‘dogs that didn’t bark’.114  
  It is the first three of these that are particularly useful for this study. Visible, 
short-term responses occur in cases where the research recommendations 
 
112 Weiss, 1979, p.430. 
113 Smith, 2008, p.18; citing Boaz and Hayden, 2002. 
114 Owens, 2015, p.125-145. 
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correspond in a very straightforward sense with the actions of government, 
and this action occurs close to the time of reception of the commission’s 
advice. But it may be that government actors act upon the Royal 
Commission’s recommendations at a later time, under more favourable 
circumstances, and this is what is meant by the view of research insights as 
‘dormant seeds’. These first two forms of influence are more closely 
associated with single-loop learning. Intriguingly, Owen argues that 
occasionally the Royal Commission achieved influence through the gradual 
reframing of policy problems, as the result of long-term engagement between 
the Commission and policy-makers. Owens refers to this form of influence as 
‘slowly changing the frame’, emphasising the Royal Commission’s role as a 
persistent advocate of change, amongst other actors.  
  By ‘doing good by stealth’, Owens captures the more “invisible”, “gradual”, 
and “diffuse” means by which the experts influenced policy-makers. For 
instance, she notes that the Commission could raise the level of activity on a 
topic within a department just by making civil servants aware that they will 
be producing a report on it.115 This form of influence assumes that experts 
adopt a degree of independence from which they can hold government 
officials to account, and is not relevant here where social researchers operate 
as insiders. 
  Last, Owens identifies cases where the Commission’s advice never gained 
salience with policy-makers, even under changes in the broader 
circumstances, and these are referred to as “dogs that didn’t bark”.116 On a 
practical note, the author observes that it is not always easy to distinguish 
between those cases where influence is achieved over time – such as by 
 
115 Owens, 2015, p.140. 




slowly changing the frame or through dormant seeds117 - from those where 
no influence is achieved at all. Nonetheless, sometimes advice just went 
contrary to the “general direction of change”118 with no prospect of 
circumstances changing in the opposite way at the time of writing. Given 
that Owens’s analysis covers a 41-year history, the inference that a piece of 
research is a ‘dog that didn’t bark’ is more applicable in her study than in the 
more recent history being told here.    
  Owens’s account thus emphasises that close attention must be paid to the 
circumstances in which research use occurs. In this chapter, we have already 
considered a wide range of contextual factors that will be important for 
understanding the conditions in which social researchers can influence 
policy. We can expect, for instance, that the perceived value of their 
contribution amongst internal actors will vary at different stages of the policy 
cycle, and according to different actors’ interpretations of their own/ the 
organisation’s interests. We can also expect politicians’ perspectives and the 
nature of the interactions between actors (including relative status) to be 
important in shaping their influence. All of these contextual circumstances 
will be important for understanding the history of social research influence 




  In summary, this chapter has developed the two-part theoretical framework 
that is used in this thesis to understand changes in social research capacity 
and influence in DEFRA and DECC, since the two departments were formed 
 
117 Owens, 2015, p.132. 
118 Owens, 2015, p.144. 
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in 2001 and 2008 respectively. The first part of the framework, which 
concerns changes in social research capacity (i.e. in the number of 
researchers, their seniority, resources and the type of work they engage 
with), is premised on the idea that we can understand these changes by 
exploring how civil servants learn about social research. This draws our 
attention to key actors’ interactions which give rise to new understandings of 
the meanings, roles, and value in social research – and which must be 
understood in the given institutional, political, and epistemic context. It is in 
this way, I argue, that we can make sense of the changes in social research 
capacity in DEFRA and DECC. 
  After considering changes in social research capacity in these two 
departments, we will turn our attention to social researchers’ influence in 
specific policy areas. It is expected that similar dynamics will be at play in 
shaping how civil servants learn from social researchers: we will need to pay 
close attention to the social researchers’ interactions with other officials, and 
the institutional, political, and epistemic context that influences these. To 
make sense of their efforts, it is useful to distinguish between researchers’ 
attempts to inform policy-makers’ ideas within a particular research or 
policy framing, and attempts to inform the framing itself. Noting that 
influence can take place through a variety of means, and may happen 
immediately or gradually, Susan Owens’s categorisation of forms of 
influence can help to make sense of the various contributions social 














“We need more social researchers…” 
 
- This phrase was uttered by many interviewees when recounting the history of 




HEN DEFRA was formed in 2001, no government social researchers 
were employed. The fact that at the time of interviewing there were 
approximately twenty social researchers in DEFRA (led by a Head of 
Profession who is a senior civil servant) was frequently expressed as a sign of 
how far the department had come in building capacity for social research 
expertise. This is considerably fewer than the number of natural scientists, 
economists, and statisticians in the department, but it is nonetheless 
indicative of a department that houses diverse epistemic perspectives. 
 
1 In preparing for fieldwork I had read that after publishing the department’s first Evidence 
and Innovation Strategy report, entitled Delivering the Evidence, the Chief Scientist 
spontaneously and humorously referred to it as ‘Delivering the Elephants’ (Anthony, n.d.). 
Having come to the end of drafting this chapter I feel that I can understand how producing 
an extended piece of writing can be analogous to delivering an unruly beast. 
W 
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  This chapter addresses the first research question in this thesis by providing 
an account of how DEFRA’s capacity for social research expertise has 
changed since the department was established. To this end, the chapter 
provides a historical survey that explores actors’ efforts in creating 
opportunities, resources, and legitimacy for social research expertise. We will 
see that in doing so, they dynamically reconstitute “the forms of knowledge 
that are admitted and admissible in the scientific civil service”.2 The chapter 
explores how the department’s internal specialists and their external advisors 
approached a range of issues at the time, including what form the 
department’s engagement with social research expertise should take and 
how a persuasive case could be made. I show that civil servants’ perceptions 
of the meanings, roles, and value of social research expertise gradually 
changed over time. And I argue that it is through challenge that such changes 
were made possible.  
  The chapter proceeds by distinguishing three periods of DEFRA’s history. 
Section 2 shows that between 2001 and 2005 some important milestones were 
achieved in terms of the inclusion of social science experts on advisory 
committees and the hiring of government social researchers. Section 3 
focuses on the period between 2006 to 2008, when a community of social 
researchers, their internal colleagues, and external experts began to 
demonstrate the potential significance of social research expertise across the 
department’s remit – i.e. not just within specific policy areas such as rural 
policy, but as a form of expertise that could be relevant in even the most 
technical policy areas in the department’s portfolio. This provided the basis 
for which a persuasive case was made for further growth in capacity. The 
 
2 Webster, 2007b, p.474. 
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fourth section then highlights how, between 2009 and 2014, social research 
capacity was broadened out further across the department, with the support 
of a dynamic leader. The final section before the conclusion examines how 
these changes bring us to the most recent developments, with implications 
for social research in the service of DEFRA today. 
 
2. 2001-2005: Constructing DEFRA Ontologically and Epistemically  
 
  In June 2001, shortly after being elected for a second term, Tony Blair’s 
Labour Government established the Department for Environment, Food and 
Rural Affairs. This involved: growing the Ministry of Agriculture, Food and 
Fisheries (MAFF) staff to include the Environmental Protection team and the 
Wildlife and Countryside Directorate from the Department of the 
Environment, Transport and the Regions (DETR), a transfer of 
responsibilities for animal health and hunting from the Home Office to 
DEFRA,3 the formation of the Food Standards Agency, and a symbolic 
change of name.4 The new department now had additional responsibilities 
for environmental protection and for the wider governance of rural 
communities. This signalled a desire to move beyond MAFF’s perceived 
focus on agricultural production to take a more holistic approach to issues 
relating to rural communities, the environment, and food consumption.  
 
3 DEFRA [National Archives], 2001b. 
4 The acronym DEFRA reportedly left out any reference to agriculture or farming because 
ministers wanted to achieve some distance from accusations that MAFF was too strongly 
influenced by agricultural industry bodies (see House Of Commons Environment Food and 
Rural Affairs Select Committee, 2002). The acronym also reads as the Ancient (and Modern) 
Greek term for the ash remains from a fire. It is tempting to believe this was an intentional, 
albeit implicit reference, symbolising the department emerging from hotly contested issues. I 
could find no evidence of this link being explicitly made, however. 
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  These institutional changes were motivated in part by the public scrutiny 
that MAFF faced in managing the government response to recent epidemic 
diseases such as bovine spongiform encephalopathy (BSE) and foot-and-
mouth disease (FMD).5 After the ministry’s handling of the issues 
surrounding the BSE and FMD outbreaks, MAFF’s Labour Ministers 
(particularly Jack Cunningham and Jeff Rooker) sought to reform the 
ministry’s long-standing relationship with the agricultural industry. They 
wanted to restore public confidence by placing greater priority on 
consumers’ concerns. Indeed these politicians had already been critical of 
this relationship for many years and were openly discussing a change of 
name to reflect new government priorities from as early as May 1997, 
immediately after Labour had come to power. At this time ‘Department for 
Food and the Countryside’ was proposed.6 The 2001 Foot-and Mouth Disease 
outbreak escalated public attention on MAFF and provided an additional 
impetus for the Labour Government to dissolve the department. The new 
department would seek credibility from stakeholders concerned with these 
issues, with significant implications for the use of research – as we will see 
throughout this chapter. 
  Margaret Beckett was appointed the first Secretary of State for DEFRA. She 
had a vision for DEFRA to adopt better processes and different outcomes to 
those that MAFF had pursued. DEFRA was to use advice better and take a 
more inclusive, consumer-focused approach than its predecessor:  
 
We want to be a department which goes about its business with the benefit and 
knowledge of a wide range of interests – and is open about it. We will consult with 
the right people at the right time, recognising that we may need to target different 
 
5 See Taylor, 2003; Wilkinson, 2007.  
6 The Independent, 1997 and Farmers Weekly, 1997.  
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groups in different ways. Our strategy will put the theory of inclusive, outward-
facing, joined-up and customer-focused government into practice across all areas of 
our work.7 
 
Included in this vision was a commitment to expand the department’s ability 
to work with diverse bodies of expertise, across the broad range of issues in 
its new portfolio: 
  
We are raising the status and profile of science within DEFRA to deal with our 
challenges. We are also strengthening economic and social research to reflect our 
wide remit.8 
 
  In short, Beckett i) perceived a desire from concerned citizens and other 
stakeholders for substantive changes in output, ii) believed that change could 
be achieved and iii) saw science, economics, and social research as important 
tools for attaining better outcomes – which are the three conditions that 
Boswell identifies as conducive for a policy institution to be motivated to use 
research instrumentally (rather than symbolically).9 A promising start for the 
department to build social research capacity. 
  Interviewees recounted that the department’s newly appointed Chief 
Scientific Advisor, Howard Dalton, (and his team of civil servants who 
comprised the Science Directorate) shared the Secretary of State’s 
commitment to building a strong and diverse evidence portfolio. This team 
was aware that at the heart of MAFF’s perceived failings lay experts’ and 
citizens’ scrutiny of the ministry’s use of scientific advice, and so part of their 
role was to determine what good engagement with scientific advice would 
 
7 DEFRA, 2002, p.35. 
8 DEFRA, 2002, p.35. 
9 Boswell, 2009, pp.49-56. 
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look like. As the next three sections attest, resolving this matter would 
involve a great deal of challenge.  
  With strong encouragement from the Anderson and Phillips reviews of 
MAFF’s use of scientific advice on FMD and BSE,10 as well as new guidelines 
from the Office of Science and Technology, one of the first steps taken by the 
Chief Scientist and his team was to develop an interim Science Advisory 
Group. This was formed in October 2002. It comprised a range of academic 
scientists with biological, environmental, agricultural, and veterinary science 
expertise, along with an expert from the food industry, an advisor on 
consumer issues, and the then Chief Executives of the Biotechnology and 
Biological Research Council, the Natural Environment Research Council, and 
the Economics and Social Research Council.11 From the outset the Chief 
Scientific Advisor explicitly asked this group to provide a “challenge 
function” to the department,12 particularly in interrogating the claims in 
submissions from policy teams for the development of the department’s first 
science and innovation strategy – to be published in spring 2003.  
  With hindsight we can see that the resulting science and innovation strategy 
– the first of four published within the time period under consideration13 – 
identified objectives that would later be mobilised in efforts to develop social 






10 DEFRA SAC [National Archives], 2008.  
11 DEFRA SAC [National Archives], 2008. 
12 DEFRA SAC, 2006.  
13 DEFRA, 2003a.  








“to improve our understanding of the economic and social drivers of 




“to better understand rural communities, how they operate, how to 
achieve greater sustainability, and how to tackle social exclusion” 
 
p.17 
“to help DEFRA learn more about the social dimensions of risk” 
 
p.21 
“to investigate how institutional and technological changes are affecting 
the agricultural industry” 
 
p.24 
“to explore consumers’ attitudes to, as well as the social, economic and 




The document did not explicitly discuss these points in relation to social 
science expertise, but it did argue for greater collaboration across natural 
sciences and social sciences,14 and was seen by interviewees as endorsing the 
value of social science expertise. Notably, all of these objectives suggest a role 
for social science as the basis on which to make decisions at an early stage in 
policy design, rather than as an ‘end-of-pipe’15 tool for achieving public 
acceptance of predetermined policy ideas. 
  The Science and Innovation Strategy report was described as 
“aspirational”16 by one actor who had worked on it – in that it contained 
research opportunities which the team were not expecting to be able to find 
funding for in the near future. These were nonetheless included in order to 
 
14 DEFRA, 2003a, p.29. 
15 Lowe et al., 2008, p.230. 
16 A former scientist in the Science Directorate (1).  
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raise the profile of the issues across the department. In a favourable political 
climate in which evidence was valued by politicians and steps were taken 
across government to strengthen its role in policy-making, this could be 
interpreted as a legitimising gesture,17 backed by a commitment to make 
progress towards achieving these possibilities. In this way, this document 
was not the result of a settled debate on the evidence priorities of the 
department: it was just the start. Over the next few years, the Chief Scientist, 
the Science Directorate and other internal and external actors sought to 
develop a capacity for social research expertise, as part of a broader science 
and innovation strategy.   
  The Chief Scientist’s Science Advisory Group was replaced by a more 
permanent Science Advisory Council (SAC) in February 2004. Amongst 12 
natural scientists and a lay member, two social scientists were also appointed 
to this body of expert advisors. Their involvement helped to shape the 
meanings, roles, and value that came to be associated with social research 
expertise amongst different actors in DEFRA.  
  The two social scientists had little in common at first: they disagreed in their 
approach, concerns, and even judgements over what constituted appropriate 
attire. But over time they came to support and even influence each other’s 
stance on the committee.18 The next subsection delves a little deeper into 






17 Boswell, 2009, p.29. 
18 Both social scientists recalled this in interview.  




 SAC’s Social Scientists and Social Research Capacity 2.1
 
  One of the pair of social scientists on DEFRA’s SAC was a Professor of 
Science and Technology Policy. He had previously sat on similar science 
advisory committees, and was somewhat surprised to receive the invitation 
because of the critical stance he adopts: 
 
“I have a critical agenda, I come out of NGOs [non-governmental organisations], I’m 
really concerned about the kinds of things that happen in terms of the interpretation 
of science and policy, the suppression of uncertainty, the way power works to foster 
certain directions for science and innovation, and suppress others. I’m just really 
clear about what it is that I want to challenge. And that’s why I thought I would be 
chewed up on the first one, and that would be it.”19 
 
The surprise expressed by this social scientist is consistent with other reports 
from the early years of Labour Government, where policy-makers were 
reaching out to involve diverse perspectives in advisory processes. As Simon 
Jay Lock reports in his PhD thesis, a different social scientist (Alan Irwin) 
was just as surprised to be repeatedly invited by policy-makers to help them 
to “bridge a perceived gap in public trust in science”,20 sometimes with a 
minister in attendance: 
 
“It was a real shock to discover it was an absolute open door … by that point in 
time, [c.1999] there was this, ‘it’s fantastic, you’ve come to help us, that’s great, come 
in’.”21 
 
  The researcher saw his role on the SAC not so much as enabling an 
instrumental utilisation of social science insights. Rather he would ask 
 
19 An academic social scientist who is a former member of DEFRA’s SAC (1). 
20 Lock, 2008, p.163.  
21 Interview with Alan Irwin conducted in 2004, reported in Lock, 2008, p.163. 
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critical questions about how experts interpret and represent knowledge 
claims within the committee: 
 
“And I thought at the time that – why are they inviting someone like me? Because 
I’m totally not what they’ll want – the social science that they’ll want for that is 
different to the kind I am interested in. Because the social science that I’m interested 
in – and it’s been a feature through all of the advisory work that I’ve done, is not 
what goes on in society at one end of the telescope, it’s what social issues arise at the 
other end of the telescope, in the committee itself. So what kinds of social interaction 
and implications are there at play in the committee, and its immediate environment 
and its relations with the secretariat and its various stakeholders?”22 
 
  This social scientist was thus concerned more with ensuring that 
appropriate scrutiny is applied to the science advisory process, than with 
establishing a social research tradition across the department as a whole. He 
provoked deeper reflection on the evidence based policy agenda in general, 
and specific scientific knowledge claims in particular – from animal health to 
the use of toxic chemicals. He encouraged the opening up of debate to 
engage broader stakeholders (which was pursued in a large public 
consultation on the development of the department’s next Evidence and 
Innovation Strategy report (E&IS) in 2005/2006).23 And he used his position on 
the council (and related sub-committees) to ask critical questions about how 
a particular issue was framed, such as pesticide risk, to draw attention to 
issues that were receiving less attention than others were, and to investigate 
what uncertainties or assumptions were embedded in the science. 
  Over time, this social scientist found that his contribution to the committee 
was acknowledged as valuable, seemingly because of rather than in spite of his 
disagreements with senior government scientists: 
 
22 An academic social scientist who is a former member of DEFRA’s SAC (1). 
23 DEFRA, 2005. 




“There is in the system, appreciation, even when somebody disagrees with you – as 
for instance, [the then Chief Scientist in Government] David King really disagreed 
with my position on GM [genetically modified crops] – but he actually thought it 
was really useful to have it there at the table. Whether for the legitimatory purposes, 
to say, ‘look, we’ve got a guy in here and at least you can work with this guy’, or 
because actually on an intellectual level, because ‘well actually some of these 
questions are quite good to raise because I hadn’t thought of them before.’ So that 
was the kind of principle.”24 
 
Hence, it was not just social science expertise that was valued here, but also 
the provision of challenge from a social science perspective – although, as the 
interviewee notes, it is not clear whether the rationale to include someone 
with this perspective was instrumental, symbolic, or both. 
  This social scientist made an important contribution in this regard, but had 
little concern with the question of whether DEFRA should employ more 
social scientists. He explained in an interview that that would not be 
conducive to STS-informed scrutiny of science advice. As such, through his 
critical engagement with the SAC and with internal specialists and 
generalists he encountered, he encouraged the department’s engagement 
with social science in terms of opening up of debates to include a broader 
array of perspectives.  
  The other social scientist on the SAC was an academic rural researcher who 
was influential amongst Labour Party Ministers, particularly Jack 
Cunningham. He had previously suggested a name change for MAFF to 
include the term ‘rural affairs’, in order to widen the department’s remit 
beyond agricultural business so that it took responsibility for rural matters 
such as, for instance, issues around deprivation and social exclusion in rural 
 
24 An academic social scientist who is a former member of DEFRA’s SAC (1). 
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communities.25 To this end, he had also written to the Chief Scientist, prior to 
his selection for the SAC, to argue that the department needed to frame its 
remit around an agenda of social and environmental sustainability. This, he 
argued, would require a new blend of scientific capacities, pointing out that 
the new department would need to recruit social scientists to work along 
with the economists and ecological scientists in the teams inherited from 
DEFRA’s predecessors. For this actor then, a growth in social research 
capacity would be conterminous with the challenging of the agricultural 
economics paradigm that privileged agricultural issues above other social 
and environmental concerns in rural communities. After successfully 
competing for a place on the SAC, he was now eager to confront the internal 
barriers to the recruitment of social researchers in the department. The 
researcher explained in an interview that positioning himself thus would 
enable a more pluralistic, research-inclined conceptualisation of the social 
sciences to emerge, in contrast to what he saw as the dominant framing of 
deductivist welfare economics analysis characterising the department’s 
economics division at the time. His motivations for encouraging a growth in 
social research capacity were thus instrumental in Boswell’s sense,26 in that 
he wanted the research to form the basis for a different approach to policy-
making.  
  Some of the department’s economists were (understandably) hostile 
towards such a conception of social research expertise, and would dismiss 
the very idea of a social ‘science’, asking, for instance "why do we need social 
 
25 Some interviewees attributed the success of this argument in terms of its salience for 
Labour Ministers who wanted to hold on to the rural constituencies they had unexpectedly 
won in 1997. 
26 Boswell, 2009, p.29. 
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researchers because we [already] consult stakeholders?”.27 In response he 
would argue that social science can give policy-makers a more systematic 
understanding of stakeholders’ perceptions. He would also confront this 
challenge by reminding his ministerial contacts that agricultural economists 
were not always right – particularly in their stance against engaging with the 
European Union’s Common Agricultural Policy, pointing to existing 
academic literature that took an alternative social science perspective 
advocating reform.28 He thereby constructed different arguments to persuade 
different actors of the importance of DEFRA building capacity for social 
research expertise. All the while, he was devoting a lot of time towards 
helping to make rural social research more visible amongst civil servants and 
MPs, by working with them to set up a rural policy committee, 
commissioning academic research on the topic, and arranging a conference 
which was attended by the Minister Alun Michael to enable knowledge 
exchange. 
  Clearly then, the two social scientists on SAC differed in how they 
perceived the role of social science broadly, and their own roles in engaging 
with the committee in particular. The first saw little value in the idea of an in-
house social research capacity. From his perspective, by virtue of being 
‘insiders’, social researchers in DEFRA would be ill-positioned to scrutinise 
the claims and use of science by their elite colleagues. By contrast, the latter 
saw the development of an in-house capacity as essential for challenging the 
prevailing agricultural economics perspective at the time. The following 
subsection focuses on the steps taken towards building an in-house research 
 
27 An academic social scientist who is a former member of DEFRA’s SAC (2), recalling 
questions asked by the department’s economists who were hostile to the idea of increasing 
internal social research capacity. 
28 For instance Lowe et al., 1999. 
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capacity, as inspired in part by the work of the second social scientist. We 
will return to these social scientists’ divergent perspectives with the benefit 
of hindsight in Section 5 of this chapter. 
 
 Towards an In-house Social Research Capacity 2.2
 
  After a recruitment process supported by the Chief Scientist and involving 
the Head of the Government Social Research Service across Whitehall, 
DEFRA’s first in-house social researcher joined the department in 2004. The 
analyst was embedded within the Rural Policy Directorate, and given the 
task of commissioning research under the Rural Research Programme. This 
included research to better understand rural matters such as social exclusion, 
access to services and affordable housing in rural areas. This analyst, who 
held the role of Head of Profession until a social researcher was employed at 
the level of a senior civil servant in 2010, went on to build a team of three 
researchers within the rural policy team between 2004 and 2005.29 
  There was clearly a very precise interpretation of what is an acceptable role 
for social research invoked in the employment of this social researcher: it 
would provide evidence on the concerns and experiences of rural 
communities. In the light of previous hostility to the idea of this role from 
some economists, SAC’s rural social scientist (unsuccessfully) argued that the 
social researcher should report to the Head of Science rather than the Chief 
Economist. One reason for this might be that the Science Directorate wanted 
to encourage interdisciplinary work between economists and social 
researchers – a matter we will return to in Section 3.  
 
29 Unfortunately this individual was unavailable for interview.  
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  Given the way the department’s remit had been framed to address rural 
affairs, and the steps that were taken by the academic rural researcher as well 
as those by the science team in developing the department’s E&IS, I would 
suggest that it is little surprise that, by the time that the first social researcher 
was employed, rural policy was seen as ‘inherently’ an area for social 
research to contribute. As one former scientist in DEFRA recalled: 
 
 “So people could get their head around rural research – it’s rural, it’s about people, 
about communities, it’s socio-economic, there’s some social research needed here…It 
only would have been in the rural management where there was some ownership 
by social researchers, because it was inherently social research. In the other areas it 
was mostly big science projects.”30 
 
  The creation of posts for social researchers in that team did not, in itself, set 
a precedent for more social researchers to be employed across the 
department though.31 To many civil servants, the specific area of rural policy 
was seen as rather anomalous compared to the rest of the department in that 
it was about the concerns of citizens – and therefore not about scientific 
issues. A boundary seems to have been perceived between rural policy 
issues, which were seen as concerning people, and the rest of DEFRA’s remit 
which were more concerned with science issues (and not about people) such 
that it was not clear to see what social researchers might contribute in 
DEFRA’s more technical remits, as a policy official recalled:  
 
“We had [a natural scientist in the Science Directorate] running around and saying 
‘DEFRA needs more social researchers’…and my question always was – ‘and what 
 
30 A former scientist in DEFRA’s Science Directorate (1).  
31 Although these social researchers did train analysts and advisors in other teams on how 
best to commission, manage and use social research – see DEFRA SAC, 2006, p.8.  
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will they do?’….And [the natural scientist] would always go away. Not a very good 
case for what they would do.”32 
 
  For some in the department then, ‘social research’ lacked a clear function in 
other policy areas. This was confounded by the fact that, in the early DEFRA 
years, civil servants who had previously worked in MAFF held academic 
social scientists in low esteem. These issues, which were raised by multiple 
interviewees and are also consistent with the contemporary challenges to the 
credibility of social science from politicians as discussed in Chapter 3, are 
recounted concisely below by a natural scientist who worked hard in DEFRA 
to build capacity for social research expertise: 
 
“It was uphill for two particular reasons. One was – what’s always bugged me is the 
almost total inability of social scientists to talk in a language that was remotely 
related to English. And a lot of the concepts social scientists were using were strange 
to not just other scientists and economists for that matter, they were very strange to 
policy-makers. So there was a translation issue for a start. I think the other problem 
was a mind-set on the part of policy-makers. And that was a sort of line of thinking 
that said roughly well, social science is about social issues, and social issues are 
about policy, and policy is about what we do so we don’t need social scientists. It 
was roughly along that sort of thinking. And that was really quite deeply imbued. I 
heard that line put forward by more than one senior and intelligent policy colleague. 
Who were also of the thinking – particularly through the Thatcher period – that 
social scientists were all wearing sandals and had beards. Definitely not, you know, 
not just politically opposed to the Thatcher group, but not in the mind-set of what 
government was trying to do at that time. That was in reducing scale of government, 
reducing the scale of government interference in public life and privatisation and all 
of those sorts of things. And it just didn’t chime with a lot of what was coming out 
of social science.”33 
 
  In summary, social scientists had not provided a convincing argument to 
policy-makers that the latter ought to value the input of social scientists. In 
turn, this restricted their imagination of the ways in which social research 
could constructively contribute in the department. 
 
32 A DEFRA policy official (1). 
33 A former scientist in DEFRA’s Science Directorate (2). 
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  But there was now a growing body of actors, including the Chief Scientist, 
members of his SAC and the Science Directorate, as well as the new social 
researchers, who worked together to try to persuade policy-makers that 
social research expertise could contribute constructively to their own area of 
work. 
  An issue they faced was the magnitude and complexity of the department. 
Making the case for social research within DEFRA would require a 
multiplicity of conversations, engaging distinct communities within the 
department. This point is emphasised below by SAC’s former rural social 
scientist, who stresses the diversity across DEFRA: 
 
“The thing is so balkanised – you can’t say ‘the scientists who commission and 
manage the department’s research’. You can’t say ‘the civil servants who are the 
primary customers for the results of the research’. It’s a huge government 
department, including many policy communities ranging from fisheries to waste 
management to nature conservation to rural affairs, et cetera. The scientists who 
huddled round the Chief Veterinary Office had to be convinced separately from the 
scientists in different positions under the Chief Scientist. And then there were the 
economists. So all you could say at a sort of official level – in what DEFRA put in 
terms of its Evidence and Investment Strategy – was that it recognised the need for 
interdisciplinarity and more investment in social research. And you could say that 
the government accepted our report [on Increasing the Capacity and Uptake of Social 
Research – discussed in the next section]. It was accepted by the department… 
whatever ‘the department’ means.”34 
 
  The quotation also alludes to an important point regarding the scientists’ 
view of social research. While the Science Directorate were dedicated to the 
development of social research expertise and greater interdisciplinarity, they 
too would need to be convinced that social research could make meaningful 
contributions to science-based problems, rather than those questions 
concerning citizens’ attitudes. SAC’s rural researcher put it in the following 
terms: 
 
34 An academic social scientist who is a former member of DEFRA’s SAC (2). 




“They often naively assumed that social researchers could furnish the missing 
‘human dimension’ in the application of technical solutions to the problems that 
DEFRA had to resolve.”35  
 
This respondent emphasised that such views did not stem from antipathy, 
but rather from a lack of prior experience with social science that had made 
contributions in a more interdisciplinary way. He would try to work 
constructively with this interpretation of social science’s role, to make the 
case for more resources to be invested in understanding the socioeconomic 
implications of science, which typically gained support from the scientists. 
  Yet, at the same time, he would seek to move beyond this narrow 
conception of the role of social research as an “end-of-pipe” consideration.36 
A good case in point is the animal health policy area. The high-profile and 
politically sensitive matters of BSE, FMD, and bovine tuberculosis had 
emphasised that the department was susceptible to potentially destructive 
effects of public controversies, but there appeared to be no relevant social 
research that could help the department to address these issues in the future. 
SAC’s academic rural researcher recalled his own efforts to stimulate 
demand for social research in this domain: 
 
 “And all the time I was being plunged into fields that I knew nothing about. I 
volunteered to be a member of the DEFRA SAC sub-committee on ED – epidemic 
diseases – on animals and plants. And I knew nothing about diseases of animals and 
plants! But I had to say when they had a threat of flu amongst chickens, why would 
they need social research in relation to that. I’d say well our experience with foot-
and-mouth was that it was the social reaction of people – and I said that our 
economy is much more likely to suffer from what I would call ‘headless chicken 
phenomenon’ - rather, people panicking and not buying chicken…. And we’d seen 
 
35 An academic social scientist who is a former member of DEFRA’s SAC (2). 
36 Lowe et al., 2008, p.230. 
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that at the time of foot-and-mouth. It was a silly thing really. And they’d look at me 
and think ‘he doesn’t really think headless chicken’s a disease, does he?’” 37 
 
  In this particular instance then, the researcher sought to promote a role for 
social research in terms of exploring the economic implications of the spread 
of epidemic diseases – an issue in which the researcher himself had no 
directly relevant expertise. This researcher then went on to attempt to 
remedy the lack of social science attention to epidemic diseases by recruiting 
social scientists to work on interdisciplinary projects with natural scientists 
on epidemic diseases, through a research programme that he directed, with 
funding from the research councils: 
 
“And through that we commissioned interdisciplinary research on animal and plant 
diseases. And we had to attract people who’d never worked on the social science 
side on animal diseases and plant diseases, to work with natural scientists. As a sort 
of deliberate act of science policy initiative really. To stimulate a social science of 
animal and plant diseases. So you could understand, here I am trying to stimulate 
demand in DEFRA for social science, and saying what social science could do for 
you – while knowing that there wasn’t the social science out there to do anything! 
Because, there’d been never any demand for it.” 38 
 
  To encourage senior officials to build capacity for social research then, he 
not only sought to persuade officials of the roles that social science could 
play in the department and why it should be valued, but also to construct 
new interpretations of what social research is – in DEFRA as well as in 
academia.  
  Although it would be some time before a social researcher was recruited to 
contribute to the animal health and welfare policy team, we can see how a 
coalition of allies interested in building up social research capacity within 
 
37 An academic social scientist who is a former member of DEFRA’s SAC (2). 
38 An academic social scientist on DEFRA’s SAC (2).  
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DEFRA gradually grew. They achieved progress in terms of supportive 
statements in the Science Directorate’s reports39 and the recruitment of a 
handful of social researchers in rural policy. But it was clear to the actors 
involved, as I hope it is to the reader, that establishing a social research 
tradition across DEFRA would not happen overnight.  
  By the end of 2005 the only policy team to have secured a budget for 
embedded social researchers was the rural policy team. But in that year, 
during which the policy teams were assessing their upcoming evidence 
priorities for the 2006 E&IS,40 two social researchers were deployed to the 
department’s Central Analytical Directorate, where economists and 
statisticians were situated. These social researchers were employed there to 
provide support to the teams that requested it, and particularly focused on 
helping policy officials to identify evidence priorities. As part of this process, 
the design and commissioning of policy evaluations emerged as one key area 
where government social researchers hold expertise, and policy teams were 
encouraged to consider how this could be pursued within their area in line 
with best practice in other government departments.  
  At this time there was also an emerging interpretation of social science 
expertise in the sense of understanding peoples’ behaviours with a view of 
influencing them better than through the traditional levers available to 
government, such as taxation, regulation, and information provision. The 
emergence and development of this strand of social researchers’ work will be 
explored in depth in Chapter 6. It suffices to acknowledge here that by 2005 
academics’ and research consultants’ work in this area was becoming 
 
39 DEFRA, 2003a. 
40 Now termed ‘Evidence and Innovation Strategy’ rather than ‘Science and Innovation Strategy’, 
in a symbolic step to acknowledge the Science Directorate and Chief Scientist’s commitment 
to investing in evidence, rather than science for its own sake.  
   Chapter 4 
-117- 
 
increasingly valued by DEFRA’s policy-makers for its potential to contribute 
to the development, as well as evaluation, of policies. Such research was 
explicitly referred to in the department’s first Sustainable Development 
Strategy,41 and its significance was beginning to be particularly appreciated 
by the sustainable consumption and production (SCP) team.  
  The two social researchers in the Central Analytical Directorate played a 
pivotal role in pointing policy officials to interpretations of social science that 
they might not have previously considered. An interviewee who was 
formerly in the Science Directorate reported that in turn his team would 
encourage and endorse references to social research expertise in policy 
teams’ submissions to the directorate’s E&IS process. 
  In these ways we can understand how, by the end of 2005, social research 
expertise came to not only be imbued with new interpretations of how it 
could serve DEFRA, and why it should be valued, but also what it is. The 
scientists and social researchers inside and outside DEFRA contributed 
towards expanding the array of what is seen as constituting social research 
expertise to cover not only a deeper understanding of rural issues, but also 
the skills to design and implement policy evaluation, as well as competencies 
in understanding and influencing behaviours. And hence social research 
capacity had already changed considerably since 2001.  
  But the next period, 2006-2008, is arguably the time when government social 
researchers really began to make an impression on the department. The 
following section focuses on a key outcome of the efforts to promote social 
research through the production of the next E&IS, and subsequent 
developments.  
 
41 HM Government, 2005. 




3. 2006-2008: Expanding Social Research Capacity in DEFRA 
 
  By mid-2006 the Chief Scientist and Science Directorate staff completed the 
evidence investment strategy project. The end product, Our Approach to 
Evidence and Investment,42 celebrates the progress made thus far in bringing in 
social research capacity:  
 
Social Research. A recently established central social research advice and support 
capability has been working with policy areas on priority themes, as well as 
undertaking cross-cutting strategic research. This has contributed to a ‘people-based 
focus’ by linking specialist researchers and exemplar projects. Where specific social 
research skills – such as stakeholder involvement approaches – have not been 
available internally, we have drawn on external expertise through academic 
placements.43 
 
Within this document we can also glean an indication of scientists’ greater 
appreciation for the contribution played by the Professor of Science and 
Technology Policy on the SAC, as suggested by quotations such as the 
following:  
 
We have already developed guidelines to help assess how robust evidence is, but we 
recognise that evidence in most forms is open to interpretation and challenge, and 
this should be reflected in the evidence base for policy and the options put before 
ministers. External experts have a key role in helping Defra consider and evaluate 
different interpretations.44 
 
  Furthermore, the report’s authors reflect on the transformative effect that 
the process has had on their own epistemological outlook: 
 
 
42 DEFRA, 2006a.  
43 DEFRA, 2006a, p.10.  
44 DEFRA, 2006a, p.15. 
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Through the E&IS process we have increased awareness of a range of issues, 
including the value of the social sciences, the need to balance secondary analysis and 
interpretation with longer-term research, and the importance of policy monitoring 
and evaluation.45 
 
As suggested by these quotations and excerpts, by now there were tangible 
contributions associated with social science in the minds of the scientists and 
civil servants involved in the process by which evidence and innovation 
strategies were compiled. This was the case in both the critical and the more 
instrumental engagement of the two social scientists on DEFRA’s SAC. In an 
additional nod to the contribution made by the two social scientists on SAC, 
the SAC started a new term with new members in April 2006, but these two 
social scientists were amongst the few members who continued for a second 
term.  
  Yet, while policy teams across the department were beginning to 
acknowledge that social research expertise could contribute to their work, 
SAC observed that more could be done to ensure that the growth in social 
research capacity across DEFRA was recognised as a priority. Towards the 
end of 2006, the department’s social researchers, the science team and 
supporting colleagues sought to make a more compelling case for social 
research capacity to be increased across the entire DEFRA remit. In late 2006, 
a social researcher from the Central Analytical Directorate was invited to 
give a presentation to the newly reformed SAC and the SAC’s rural 
researcher also held a meeting with DEFRA’s first social research. 46 The 
agenda for both of these events was to discuss the barriers to the building of 
social research capacity in DEFRA. A team was established to explore the 
present situation and consider future actions that could help to improve 
 
45 DEFRA, 2006a, p.3. 
46 DEFRA SAC, 2006, p.1. 
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capacity and use. This team produced a report in December 2006, entitled 
Increasing the Capacity and Uptake of Social Research, in which the problem was 
defined thus: 
 
When Defra was formed in 2001, it represented a shift in policy objectives from one 
concerned primarily with production towards one geared more towards the 
consumer, environmental protection and the management of natural resources, 
calling for greater attention to social research and analysis. However, the divisions 
which were transferred from former government departments did not have 
significant in-house social science expertise (other than economists).47 
 
  The report notes that social researchers within DEFRA were particularly 
under-represented compared with other analytical professions such as 
natural scientists (approximately 200), economists (68), and statisticians 
(31).48 The authors go on to argue that where social research is commissioned 
without advice from social researchers, the research quality and usability is 
likely to be undermined: 
 
The majority of social research is contracted out, but in its specification, 
commissioning and subsequent use there is currently little direct input from 
recognised social research staff, not least because of capacity. This must raise 
concerns about whether the research is being well specified, whether directorates are 
drawing on the most appropriate type and the best sources of expertise, and 
whether they are adequately equipped to evaluate the work and interpret the 
results. 49 
 
  In this way, the authors call for not only greater appreciation for the roles 
and value that social research could have at all stages of the policy cycle but 
also for recognition of the value of expertise that government social 
 
47 DEFRA SAC, 2006, p.3. 
48 DEFRA, SAC, 2006, p.8. 
49 DEFRA, SAC, 2006, p.8. 
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researchers hold in designing, commissioning, and translating analysis for 
policy audiences.  
  Following this report’s publication, a SAC Social Science Sub-Group was 
formed in January 2007. Its purpose would be to more deeply investigate the 
current state of social research within DEFRA, and to put forward 
recommendations to address the barriers to developing social research 
capacity.50 The Sub-Group’s ambition was that social research evidence 
would achieve equal ‘epistemic recognition’51 as natural science and 
economics evidence: 
 
The sub-group note the excellent reputation currently enjoyed by economists within 
Defra’s Central Analytical Directorate. However, members were concerned that the 
potential for social science (specifically social research) to help answer policy 
questions was not given the same status as natural and physical science within 
Defra. It is the sub-group’s view that social sciences (particularly social research) 
need to be given equal rank, where appropriate, to the contribution of the evidence 
base as all other disciplines.52 
 
After completing an internal investigation amongst civil servants in different 
policy areas, the Sub-Group reported that a failure to recognise social 
research expertise and a lack of staff had hindered social research utilisation. 
This, they argued, risked the success of policies:  
 
There was a perception, expressed by some senior staff within core Defra, that 
anyone could be sufficiently expert at social research. This suggested to the sub-
group a lack of understanding of the wide range of distinct disciplines within social 
science and the value of specialist expertise in social research… Negative 
perceptions of the role and/or value of social research may have been the result of a 
naïve understanding or misconception, sometimes combined with an inherent 
resistance to what was regarded by senior Defra staff as a less important contributor 
to the evidence base. These negative cultural attitudes were, perhaps, not surprising 
 
50 DEFRA SAC, 2007a, Section 8. 
51 A term borrowed from Whooley, 2013, p.145. 
52 DEFRA SAC, 2007b, p4. 
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given the overwhelming focus on the natural science and economics evidence base 
in policy making in some parts of core Defra… Where social research inputs are not 
included in policy and research development, in the view of the sub-group, this can 
result in significant problems with implementation, effectiveness and public 
acceptance of policy decisions.53  
 
Moreover, the Sub-Group found that where social research was considered 
by policy teams, its role was too narrowly confined as a “bolt-on” at the end 
of the policy development process, typically to help secure public 
acceptability for an initiative.54 
  In short, the Sub-Group found that to increase the demand for social 
research, civil servants’ interpretations of the meanings, roles, and value of 
social research must all be addressed. Significantly, the authors used the 
FMD crisis as an example of a previous failure in which social research could 
have helped officials to understand the processes by which disease was 
spread and how it might have been controlled.55 
  The authors went on to argue that a series of steps must be taken by policy 
teams and by DEFRA’s senior civil servants: 
 
Social research inputs should be included at all key stages of the policy cycle. Social 
researchers in the Department must be integrated into policy and research 
development alongside other key professional groups including natural scientists 
and economists, from the outset…Defra must improve the status, visibility, and 
professional identity of social researchers in the Department, in order to raise 
awareness and increase the uptake of social research. Critically, this should include 
social research leadership and representation at senior management levels.56 
 
  The Sub-Group put forward 11 recommendations in 2007, placing particular 
emphasis on the need for senior management to take responsibility for: 
 
53 DEFRA SAC, 2007c, p.19. 
54 DEFRA SAC, 2007c, p.18. 
55 DEFRA, SAC, 2007c, p.19. 
56 DEFRA, SAC, 2007c, p.3. 
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encouraging appreciation and use of social research across the department, 
raising the number and status of internal social researchers, establishing 
processes of rigorous review and quality assurance, and ensuring that 
lessons are learnt from past experiences of using social research. 
  Concurrent with these developments were a series of changes which 
enabled changes to how the meanings, roles, and value of social research 
were perceived in the department. First, as will be discussed in Chapter 6, 
the sustainable consumption and production (SCP) policy team had already, 
in early 2006, brought in a social scientist to their team – at first as a 
temporary secondment from academia, but the role was later made 
permanent. In time, other social researchers joined as the need for social 
research expertise was perceived to grow in this team. 
  With hindsight, we can see that social researchers’ work on SCP would 
become crucial for understanding the subsequent expansion of internal social 
research capacity in DEFRA. Between 2006 and 2008, social researchers (and 
colleagues) produced and utilised a series of empirical projects that drew 
attention and engagement from across the department. In doing so, they 
showed what could be achieved with social research expertise if employed 
early in the policy development process, as one of the social researcher 
recalled:  
 
“It gave a different purpose to having social researchers in an evidence team around 
the department. The social researchers weren’t there solely to do the – how would you 
evaluate this?- actually the social researchers were there to think about policy 
implementation, to think about the most positive way of maximising return on 
activity on a policy, and making a difference – at a very different level. So it did 
definitely change the perception of social researchers, certainly in DEFRA – and I 
think across Whitehall as well.”57 
 
 
57 A social researcher in DEFRA (1).  
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 Moreover, unlike the empirical projects of the rural policy team, this team’s 
form of social research seemed to be more straightforwardly translatable to 
other policy areas – every team was working, in some sense, with people 
whose behaviours could be better understood.  
  By now, there was also a proposition to fund a research centre focused on 
sustainable behaviours. Civil servants were aware of a recent example of a 
funded research centre which was generally considered to have been a 
failure because the civil servants found themselves unable to apply the social 
science produced.58 The SAC Social-Science Sub-Group claimed that this was 
because of “DEFRA’s naivety as a social research contractor”.59 Social 
researchers and the Sub-Group therefore emphasised the need for lessons to 
be learned from the prior example – and, in particular, for future research 
projects to be managed by social researchers who could act as mediators 
between the policy teams and the external contractor.  
  Furthermore, the department’s staff were being reorganised under the 
banner of ‘Renew DEFRA’, which aimed to improve policy delivery and to 
strengthen the department’s economic credibility when working with other 
government departments. As part of this, the newly appointed ‘Chief 
Economist and Director of Analysis’ had proactively sought to improve 
understanding and collaboration between economists, statisticians, and 
social researchers so that within their respective policy teams each analyst 
could articulate the value in other professions’ expertise. In doing so, he built 
a strong working relationship with the Director of Science, and together they 
sought to promote interdisciplinary collaboration across the analytical 
services in the department.  
 
58 A point made in an interview with one of the actors involved with the sub-group’s report.  
59 DEFRA SAC, 2007c, p.30.  
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  Another element of this restructuring programme was a shift away from 
regulatory approaches, in favour of interventions that could enable or 
encourage voluntary change from individuals and stakeholder groups. The 
social researchers’ promise of a greater understanding of peoples’ behaviours 
and attitudes resonated with this new regulation-averse approach.60  
  Hence, by the time that the SAC’s Social Science Sub-Group published their 
recommendations, a gradual change in perceptions about what social 
research could mean for DEFRA, how it should be valued, and how it should 
be used to inform policy development was already occurring. Initial barriers 
to improving the in-house capacity and utilisation of social research (such as 
a lack of clarity over what social researchers could do for DEFRA beyond 
making pre-designed policies publicly acceptable, concerns over legitimacy 
and quality, and the low supply of social research) were being addressed 
through initiatives taken by civil servants and also through the gradual 
growth of academic research in areas related to DEFRA’s remit. As the SCP 
example shows, new roles for social research have helped to address the 
problem of what social research could mean for DEFRA and how it is valued. 
But, at the same time, scientists and civil servants – particularly through the 
SAC, the Chief Economist and Director of Analysis and other members of the 
senior civil service – were working to confront colleagues’ perceptions of 
social research, and thereby encourage greater recognition for social research. 
With all of these changes collectively knocking at the same door, social 
research capacity had reached a new peak within the department by the close 
of 2008. Momentum was now growing, with significant consequences to be 
realised in the next phase.  
 
60 Cabinet Office, 2007, pp.19-20. 




4. 2009-2014: Expanding Social Researchers’ Autonomy 
 
  During the third phase, 2009-2014, DEFRA’s internal social research 
capacity expanded out from rural affairs and work on promoting sustainable 
consumption amongst the public. By 2009, DEFRA employed six social 
researchers in diverse teams across the department, including in food and 
farming and natural environment, as well as in sustainable consumption and 
production. Their function typically included translating recent work on 
behaviour change into their respective policy areas, amongst other research 
projects (including policy evaluation). This rise in number of social 
researchers employed can therefore be seen as indicative of the significance 
that social research had gained in recent years. Having secured a reputation 
for social research in the realm of sustainable behaviours, social researchers 
now made a case for the same techniques to be applied to support policy 
development in other policy areas, at all stages of the policy cycle.61  
  With considerable change already achieved, the period 2009-2014 saw 
further expansion and reinforcement of social research capacity across 
DEFRA. Two related threads are important to take into account here: the 
move to centralise the SCP policy team’s behavioural experts so that social 
research capacity could reach policy teams across the department, and the 
inclusion of a social researcher in developing the department’s third E&IS in 
2009. These are examined in the next two subsections. 
 
61 A review was produced in early 2010, highlighting the social researchers’ approach to 
understanding and influencing behaviours, and presenting diverse case studies from 
farming, fishing, energy use, waste, water and personal carbon trading. This document 
emphasised the role that behavioural research has played in policy development and the 
translatable nature of a behavioural approach across DEFRA’s remit. – See Collier et al., 
2010. 




 The Centre of Expertise on Influencing Behaviour 4.1
 
  In Chapter 6, we will see that to persuade their SCP colleagues of the 
importance of social research, the researchers asserted their authority over 
the matter of what constitutes useful social research. Through challenge and 
close engagement, they came to be valued more by their colleagues within 
SCP. Their work drew attention from policy officials across the department, 
as these officials appreciated the potential value in using such research in 
their own policy area:  
 
“It was very well done qualitative research, and went down very well across the 
department. The policy customers across the department recognised the need for it, 
they bought into it, they got involved in things like steering groups and all of the 
rest of it to direct the project. That was important because by the time the project 
outputs were coming through – they were very short projects, about six months or 
so –all of those policy leads were going ‘actually I do now need to do something in 
this space, don’t I?’ And so it was a very influential moment – it was one of those 
moments which actually grabbed attention.”62 
 
  In recognition of the interest from diverse policy areas (particularly 
farming, fisheries, and natural environment teams, whose officials then 
wanted social researchers to produce similar work to that produced within 
the SCP team)63 and also from DEFRA’s wider stakeholder network,64 there 
was a move to centralise and build upon the SCP social researchers’ expertise 
so as to provide a more far-reaching function within the department. To this 
end, in 2010 the Sustainable Behaviours Unit in which they worked was 
 
62 A DEFRA social researcher (1). 
63 Darnton, 2013a, p.20. 
64 For example the Food Standards Agency, the Consumer Council for Water, the Forestry 
Commission, the National Farmers Union, the National Union of Students.  
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combined with a small team of ‘customer insight’ specialists from the 
Communications Directorate, to form a new ‘Centre for Expertise on 
Influencing Behaviours’ (henceforth CEIB).65 ‘Customer insight’ officials were 
a recently emerging body of civil service communications professionals who 
also claimed to have expertise in behaviour change.66 The aim of the new 
centralised team would be to continue commissioning behavioural research 
as before, but to serve policy teams across the department, and not just in the 
SCP.  
  The creation of the CEIB is indicative of the new status afforded to social 
researchers working on understanding behaviours. It gave the researchers 
greater independence from policy officials in deciding how to deploy their 
resources. The CEIB’s approach was to work with interested policy teams 
across the department, arranging training sessions for policy officials to learn 
how to apply behavioural insights in their own areas. This training function 
is consistent with the role associated with customer insight specialists and for 
this reason the merging of specialisms was initially seen by some social 
researchers as a threat to their authority in understanding and influencing 
behaviours. But the social researchers successfully argued that the training 
materials should be based on the highly valued social research that they had 
already been producing in the SCP team, rather than on generalised theory of 
behaviour change, like the MINDSPACE report67 - which the Cabinet Office 
encouraged (as we will see with DECC in Chapter 5, Subsection 4.1) and 
which was more typical for customer insight specialists at that time. In 
addition the CEIB gradually came to be dominated by social researchers, as 
 
65 Eppel et al., 2013, p.31. For more on the civil service’s distinctions between customer 
insight and social research, see Chapter 5, Subsection 2.2. 
66 Cabinet Office, 2006. 
67 Dolan et al., 2010. 
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the customer insight specialists who joined were either replaced by social 
researchers or converted by joining the Government Social Research Service 
(GSR).  
  Hence, the creation of the CEIB was a significant symbolic move for the 
status of social researchers in DEFRA. Yet, soon after the CEIB was created, 
the team found that the training sessions could not enable the application of 
behavioural insights in the way that they had hoped. Despite having 
achieved greater recognition and indeed the recruitment of more social 
researchers to broaden their capacity to engage with policy teams, the team 
experienced difficulties in helping policy colleagues across the department to 
apply their approach to the given policy area. Working with new policy 
officials from within a central team meant that it was difficult to establish a 
close, interactive relationship as they had previously done within the SCP 
team. It was therefore harder to provide the necessary challenge that would 
open opportunities for social research to contribute. But as one researcher 
explained, social researchers also found that they too suffered from a lack of 
challenge: 
 
“So, in the same way that, you know, evidence challenges what’s going on in policy, 
I think there’s also a really strong challenge from policy in terms of ‘well, this is 
really fascinating information you’re giving me, but actually practically what would 
I do as a result of that information?’. Which is an incredibly useful sort of challenge 
to an evidence sort of maker. You know, we look at the issues around sustainability 
and you know you can sort of say, ‘OK, well, what do we need to do to – what do 
we need to do in terms of the way we consume?’”68 
 
  In this sense, as a result of the CEIB’s formation, some social researchers 
reflect that they became a little too autonomous from their policy colleagues – 
in that the distance between them precluded the sort of close-knit working 
 
68 A DEFRA social researcher (2) 
“Challenge and Be Challenged” 
-130- 
 
that was deemed to have been so effective within the SCP team. Challenge, 
they found, is a two-way street.  
  Steps taken in recognition of social researchers’ expertise in understanding 
and influencing citizens’ behaviours were thus considered to have not been 
very effective in terms of enabling the application of expertise across the 
department. In splitting the social researchers from their SCP policy 
colleagues with a view to achieving greater impact across DEFRA, social 
researchers‘ capacity to collaborate with policy colleagues had been 
weakened. Given these difficulties, and in line with a broader shift within the 
department to replace centralised research functions (including the Central 
Analytical Directorate) with a model of embedded analysts within policy 
teams, the Centre for Expertise of Influencing Behaviours became a ‘virtual 
centre’ of embedded analysts across the department, before being disbanded 
in April 2012. The embedded model of analysis has since been dominant in 
DEFRA.  
  But while some in DEFRA described the CEIB as an ineffective initiative 
from which lessons were to be learned, others recalled its merits. One is that 
it enabled social researchers to work on longer term projects to develop, 
consolidate, and translate knowledge, which is reported to be valued less at 
the time that interviews were conducted (2014): 
 
“the bonus about working in the Centre for Expertise is that it was – because it was a 
bit of a step removed – there was probably more scope for doing more innovative, 
forward thinking research than there is now…And the problem with doing more 
reactive, smaller projects is that it’s extremely time consuming, resource-intensive, 
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  Consistent with Robert Walker’s account of social science research officers 
in government departments in the 1980s then (as discussed in Chapter 3), we 
see that the research products of social researchers are heavily influenced by 
institutional arrangements such as the location of the analysts within the 
organisation. Moreover, while Chapter 6 reveals that much of the social 
research associated with sustainable consumption was allowed to become 
obsolete from 2013 onwards, it is intriguing that at the same time in DEFRA 
other policy teams (such as biodiversity and woodlands management) began 
to explore the utility of such research for their own policy areas.70 
Furthermore, at the time of writing the action-based-research projects, which, 
as we will see in Chapter 6, were celebrated as a key component of 
researchers’ work, live on in the form of ‘sustainable business research 
initiatives’ under the policy area of ‘sustainable economy’.  
 
 The 2010 Evidence Investment Strategy 4.2
 
  In 2009, one of the SCP team’s social researchers took a post within the 
Strategic Evidence Team, with the role of contributing to the development of 
the 2010 Evidence Investment Strategy.71 This is both an indication of how far 
recognition of social researchers’ expertise had come, as well as a driver for 
further change. Whereas the 2003 Science and Innovation Strategy report hinted 
at opportunities for social research expertise to contribute, and the 2006 
document celebrated some recent contributions and emphasised the value of 
social research expertise for policy audiences, the 2010 report enabled social 
 
70 Darnton, 2013a. 
71 DEFRA, 2010. 
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researchers to articulate for themselves, for the first time, a tangible and 
achievable vision for the department’s near-term social research needs. 
  This report is striking for the prominence granted to social research 
throughout, with a section devoted to articulating the “critical” importance 
of including social research (especially in the form of understanding 
behaviours) even in technical policy areas like climate change, sustainable 
food supply, and protecting ecosystems services, because: 
 
it is people upon whom these policy actions will both impact and rely – as 
individuals, households, organisations, communities and society.72 [original 
emphasis]  
 
The same section highlights how social research can help policy officials to 
identify new ways of approaching a problem – a move clearly intended to 
address the tendency of officials to associate social research with an ‘end-of-
pipe’ function as discussed in the previous section.  
  The 2010 document then goes on to articulate a vision for expanding 
internal social research capacity, as the social researcher recalled:   
 
“I was working on the Evidence Investment Strategy and there was this bit that said 
‘here are the specialists that we need’ and there was a bit that said ‘we need natural 
scientists to do these things, and we need economists to do these things’. And so I 
said we need social researchers to do these things – and by the way we need more 
social researchers, and by the way by 2012 we need at least 15, including an SCS 
[senior civil service] person.”73 
 
This ambition for expansion of social research capacity was supported by 
evidence that social research was now in demand from diverse policy teams: 
 
 
72 DEFRA, 2010, p.12. 
73 A DEFRA social researcher (1).  
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25 of the 29 programmes stated they would benefit from additional social research 
expertise or wanted a better understanding of social research, especially as the 
profile of ‘behaviour change’ rises in the wider policy agenda.74 
 
  The vision was realised to a significant extent over the next couple of years. 
In 2011, 12 social researchers were employed. Furthermore, the Chief 
Economist and Director of Analysis had worked with the Director of Science 
to create a budget for a Head of Profession employed at the level of the 
senior civil service. The new Head of Profession would take leadership of 
social research across the department and advocate social research needs at 
the director level. The quotation below is typical of many social researchers’ 
reaction to the new Head of Profession: 
 
“[The new Head of Profession] in the department… really raised the profile because 
suddenly you’ve got SCS – representation who was quite inspirational – in fact very 
inspirational – and could hold [their] own against the other disciplines... You know, 
I don’t think it can be overstated, that actually that’s been really, really important - 
having [someone in that] role and being represented at the senior level, means that 
we are taken seriously and we are remembered…It is important that we are round 
the table just as much as economists are, and just as much as natural scientists are 
and operational researchers and statisticians and all the other types of researchers 
that we have in the department.”75 
 
The new Head of Profession was not only more senior than her predecessor 
was, but also considered more charismatic as a ‘champion’ for social 
research. And as the previous Head of Profession had been absent on 
personal grounds for much of the past couple of years, the new leader’s fresh 
and strong leadership was particularly appreciated.  
  As a senior civil servant, the new Head of Profession for social research was 
able to attend meetings that were inaccessible to other social researchers – 
 
74 DEFRA, 2010,p.42. 
75 A DEFRA social researcher (1). 
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and the Chief Economist and Director of Analysis and the Director of Science 
both made sure that she was invited to them. Buoyed by the positive impact 
that social research had made in DEFRA in recent years, the Head of 
Profession emphasised the importance of considering social research needs 
across DEFRA’s remit – including in areas which had no prior record of 
commissioning social research. As the Head of Profession recalled: 
 
 “There is a strategic evidence planning process in the department. And the centre of 
the department engages with the business to set out what are the evidence priorities. 
So my role as Chief Social Scientist here is to make sure in those discussions that 
social science is considered as a serious and important component in the overall 
evidence base. And some areas that’s more successful than other areas. Some areas 
have a natural understanding and need and demand for social science. Others less 
so and it’s taken a bit more persuasion.”76 
 
  This self-styled ‘Chief Social Scientist’ was thus better placed than the 
previous Head of Social Research to confront colleagues’ presumptions about 
social research, and thereby challenge them to engage with research early in 
the policy-making process.  
  Incidentally, the term ‘natural understanding’ should not be overlooked in 
the above quotation – what had been contested in the department’s recent 
history had now been afforded a seemingly ‘natural’ status. The Head of 
Profession’s own role in contributing to the understanding of farming 
behaviours in the animal health and welfare team was not considered 
possible by some just a few years earlier, as we saw in the discussions on the 
SAC sub-committee on epidemic diseases.  
  The strategic evidence planning process that this interviewee mentions 
contributed towards the department’s latest E&IS, which was published as 
the fieldwork for this research was drawing to a close (June 2014). Although 
 
76 A DEFRA social researcher (4).  
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this report articulates a vision of consolidating resources and making ‘more 
with less’,77 it is consistent with its predecessor in highlighting specific areas 
for social research to contribute as part of interdisciplinary projects. It places 
a considerable emphasis on behavioural approaches, but also identifies other 
roles, for instance in ‘systems thinking’ frameworks and in ‘co-owned’, ‘co-
designed’ and ‘co-funded’ projects.78 The action-based research programme 
was identified as a particularly effective scheme for co-funded projects. 
  Within the context of austerity, the Head of Profession nowadays holds 
relatively modest ambitions for expansion in the short-term given the 
growing recognition of social researchers’ valuable behaviour change work 
across a variety of DEFRA’s policy areas: 
 
“I think there are probably a few more key posts we need – and that’s probably a 
handful. And then there’s working together, working collaboratively with the other 
specialists, and the social science community. And then externally. And then we will 
be a more powerful force than we currently are. I mean I think we are already pretty 
significantly improved. It’s not reasonable to expect that we will have the same 
number at this stage, with all the reductions going on, of social scientists as natural 
scientists. In the future – whatever form DEFRA takes in the future, and as people 
understand really what behaviour change means and what it requires – you could 
imagine a world where you would have a much greater number of social scientists. 
But at the moment every post has to be fought for – because of the reduction in 
budgets.” 79 
 
Nonetheless, the Head of Profession did contribute towards persuading 
some policy officials to convert their available posts into social research posts 
– for instance in the area of international affairs and in flooding. Moreover, as 
a senior civil servant she could also create new embedded social researcher 
posts using the central evidence budget rather than from a specific policy 
team budget. This was used to create posts in policy teams which had no 
 
77 DEFRA, 2014, p.4. 
78 DEFRA, 2014, p.34.  
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prior history of employing social researchers, to ensure social research is 
included early in the policy process. 
 
  Subsections 4.1 and 4.2 have highlighted how far DEFRA’s officials had 
come in recognising new meanings, roles, and value in government social 
researchers’ expertise across the department’s remit. Supplementing this was 
a range of other mechanisms for social scientists to interact with DEFRA’s 
policy officials. According to data provided by an interviewee, between 2006 
and 2014, approximately ten social science research fellows were seconded 
from academia. These placements were designed to translate expertise on a 
combination of broad-spanning topics like policy evaluation or strategies for 
evidence-based-policy, as well as policy-specific topics such as animal health 
and welfare issues. Capacity also emerged in the form of a new Social Science 
Expert Panel, which was shared between DEFRA and DECC on the grounds 
that they had much overlap in their social science advisory needs. This panel 
was formed in 2011 and will be discussed in more depth in the next chapter, 
since it was conceived and first developed by DECC’s social researchers.  
  The social science fellowships and expert panel were described by actors as 
fulfilling important roles in building DEFRA’s capacity for social research, 
particularly when they provided opportunities for double-loop learning. For 
instance, one of the seconded social scientists was perceived as exemplary in 
translating a social-practices approach to understanding animal welfare 
issues.80 Likewise, the Social Science Expert Panel helped to introduce civil 
servants to the social amplification of risk model when they were struggling 
to understand citizens’ reactions to the chalara outbreak in 2012.81 If we add 
 
80 Escobar-Tello and Buller, 2014. 
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to this the many opportunities for interaction provided by the activities of 
social researchers (such as conferences and meetings with academic 
researchers), it is clear that by 2014 social research capacity in the broadest 
sense had come a long way in DEFRA since 2001. 
  It is also notable that throughout recent reconstitutions of the DEFRA 
Science Advisory Council (in 201182 and then again in 201383), its membership 
continues to include social scientists who are interested in the framing of 
environmental policy issues and the interplay between different 
epistemological perspectives therein. It therefore seems that the council may 
continue the “challenge function” in the same spirit as its predecessors, 
although this is an empirical question that extends beyond the scope of this 
thesis, and requires further research. Next we will consider some remaining 
issues in DEFRA’s social research capacity. 
 
5. Recent Developments 
 
  It is clear that over the years significant barriers have been overcome in the 
expansion of DEFRA’s capacity for social research expertise. Through the on-
going efforts of internal scientists, social researchers, the Chief Economist, 
and external actors, the recognised potential for social research expertise to 
contribute to policy areas in DEFRA has expanded considerably. 
  Nonetheless, issues persist with regards to social research capacity in the 
department. First, some policy areas are not served by social researchers, and 
barriers remain there for engendering an appreciation of what social research 
could do for those teams. It is particularly noticeable that policy officials who 
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have moved from policy areas rich in social research have not always 
demanded social researchers’ input in their new role in a different policy 
area nor have they been convinced that social researchers could contribute to 
that domain – suggesting that there remains work to be done, both internally 
and from the wider social science community, if social research is to 
contribute early in policy development across DEFRA.    
  In addition, all of the interviewees who were asked whether there is at 
present an epistemic hierarchy between the analytical professions within the 
department claimed that there is, and invariably reported that social research 
sits below natural science, economics, and statistics in that hierarchy. The 
hierarchy itself was variously described by respondents in terms of 
comparative numbers of analysts, the grade of those analysts, the amount of 
resources allocated to each profession, the preferential selection of types of 
analysis by policy analysts, and the ability to influence decisions.  
  Third, within some policy teams there remain remnants of the lack of 
appreciation of expertise that was identified in the SAC Social Science Sub-
Group’s 2006 report.84 This is particularly true of policy areas where social 
researchers are employed for the first time. One social researcher, whose post 
was funded directly by the Head of Profession and was based in a policy 
area with no prior history of employing social researchers, recalled that the 
policy team were initially sceptical of the utility and credibility of social 
research: 
 
“They had no idea of what social science was, and they were very, very sceptical of 
the value of the social science… so do you know, there was this huge amount of 
work to do, to get them to think about what could possibly be valuable. So it’s much 
more about building relationships, trying to have a proof of concept of where social 
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science can add value on quite a small scale, and so on… which means that you 
don’t have a very immediate or direct impact on a policy.” 85 
 
  At the same time, and across a number of policy areas, demand for social 
research exceeds resources – especially in recent years as budgets have been 
particularly constrained. This, coupled with the still-present perception in 
some policy areas that anybody could commission social research,86 poses 
another challenge for social researchers’ epistemic authority, as is told by one 
interviewee: 
 
 “Well it’s problematic when you have somebody commissioning a piece of work, 
completely from scratch without any social science input and they obviously have 
no idea of how to design a questionnaire or what is a meaningful answer to expect 
to get from a piece of social science, and like, what is the most appropriate method 
to get those answers… you know, if you don’t really know that then you can waste 
quite a lot of money trying to answer questions.”87 
 
  The situation poses a quandary for the social researcher in the policy team 
(who requested that the policy domain is not named for the protection of 
their working relationship). On the one hand, the researcher could argue that 
the research project should not go ahead, on the basis that it is unlikely to be 
credible – which ultimately could devalue social research within the 
department. On the other hand, the analyst could provide some basic input 
in order to maximise its quality as far as possible. In this case, the social 
researcher reluctantly opted to provide support to make the research projects 
as credible as possible. 
  Hence, in this particular case, a new recognition that social research can be 
useful for the team has not come hand-in-hand with an attribution of 
 
85 A DEFRA social researcher (5). 
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exclusive ‘epistemic authority’ to the social researcher. That is to say, the use 
of social research has been identified without an appreciation of the symbolic 
value associated with using researchers’ expertise for commissioning such 
research. This is a surprise finding. Drawing on Boswell’s analysis of the 
functions of research in policy institutions,88 the finding makes sense if these 
officials seek legitimacy not from a social science community but from other 
stakeholders, perhaps because they do not value the additional credibility 
that social scientists could potentially bestow on the work. 
  It is clear then, that while my respondents all acknowledge that recent 
structural changes (such as the employment of a social researcher at the level 
of the senior civil service, and also the rise in number of social researchers 
across the department) do suggest there is greater appreciation of the value 
of social research in the department, a range of challenges to social 
researchers’ contribution remain in some policy areas. But DEFRA’s social 
researchers are also better equipped to confront these issues than in the early 
DEFRA years. The embedded analyst model allows researchers to work 
closely with other analysts and policy teams to build a constructive 
relationship over time, which we have seen is considered important as a 
basis for providing a challenge function. There is, furthermore, an 
experienced and connected group of social researchers, who have strong 
leadership, influence over internal research strategy, a proven track record of 
contributing to policy development, experience of overcoming challenges to 
their epistemic authority and who benefit from wide-ranging internal and 
external support networks. So while there is still more to do to increase 
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DEFRA’s demand and capacity for social research, the department has 
clearly come a long way since its establishment in 2001. 
 
6. Concluding the DEFRA Story 
 
  The historical account presented in this chapter has highlighted how 
DEFRA’s social research capacity has been constructed over the years. We 
have seen that the roles that social research plays in the department have 
changed considerably since DEFRA’s establishment in 2001. Social research 
expertise is now recognised by many civil servants as having the potential to 
contribute to all policy areas at all stages of the policy development process. 
Its role is not limited to policy evaluation; there have emerged tangible, 
translatable examples of effective utilisation of social research at an early 
stage in policy development. Nor is its role limited to understanding rural 
communities; it has relevance across DEFRA’s remit – from pro-
environmental behaviours, to sustainable farming, to understanding the 
spread of epidemic diseases. Barriers do persist in influencing relevant 
actors’ conceptions of the meanings, roles, and value of social research 
expertise. And while some of these barriers may be familiar to experienced 
social researchers, none is to be understated. Yet, the story that this chapter 
tells does suggest that such barriers also present opportunities for social 
research to grow. 
  As is now clear, changes in how social research is understood and how it is 
valued have been key to the expansion of research capacity in DEFRA. In 
turn, changes in social research’s roles have influenced how the idea of social 
research is interpreted. In the first period, 2001-2005, we saw preliminary 
efforts to break down narrow conceptions of social research – where at best it 
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was associated with elucidating and tackling the concerns of rural 
communities, and at worst it was viewed as the irrelevant work of rebellious 
academics who opposed the government. As such, many civil servants were 
sceptical of the value of social research, and were cautious to engage social 
scientists – despite ambitions from senior staff and natural scientists to 
elevate its status in the department. 
   By the end of 2008 though, a confluence of changes (a new supply of 
relevant academic behavioural research, pressures from the Chief Scientist 
and his staff and committees, support from the new Chief Economist and 
Director of Analysis, as well as newly established roles for social researchers) 
had begun to change some civil servants’ understanding of what social 
research is, how it could contribute across the department’s wide remit, and 
how useful and credible it could be. This led to the creation of further social 
researcher posts to support the development of policy and to consider the 
strategic evidence needs across the department. These changes helped to 
further raise the profile and translatability of (particular types of) social 
research insights. This then supported the case for new roles for social 
researchers, including senior civil service representation. 
  While there ceased to be a critical social scientist providing challenge on the 
SAC in 2011, in the same year a senior social researcher was employed with 
responsibility for ensuring that social research is valued across DEFRA’s 
wide remit. This new Head of Profession has identified and created further 
opportunities for social research to be utilised. With the clout of a senior civil 
servant, and a charismatic persona, the analyst has had a significant impact 
in opening up further the conceivable functions, perceptions, and meanings 
of social research. Despite a context of austerity, there are now 
approximately twenty social researchers working in diverse areas of 
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DEFRA’s remit, there has been a proliferation of interpretations of social 
research (including in terms of understanding rural issues, influencing 
behaviours, action-based research, and policy evaluation), and social 
researchers’ expertise and relevance are acknowledged across the 
department’s wide remit. On the whole then, social research capacity has 
grown considerably since 2001.  
  Consistent with the lessons of finitism89 we have seen that the perceived 
meanings, roles, and value of social research expertise in DEFRA have been 
open and responsive to change. In particular, we have seen that changes are 
contingent upon developments in the epistemic, institutional, and political 
contexts. Some of the contestation surrounding social research’s contribution 
has settled, with the effect that topics where there was disagreement or a lack 
of clarity as to how social research could contribute are now seen as obvious 
or ‘natural’ areas in which capacity should be developed. Novel 
developments in the epistemic, political, and institutional circumstances will 
no doubt provide further stimulus for changes in social research capacity in 
the years to come. 
  It is also important to acknowledge that there was some variation amongst 
interviewees as to how to interpret the relative significance of different 
actors’ efforts towards expanding social research capacity. Some stressed the 
importance of actors’ continued efforts through long-term strategic processes 
as the most significant driver for the growth in capacity in social research 
expertise. This view is supported by some of the examples presented in this 
chapter – we have seen how different activities under the banner of 
developing the department’s evidence and innovation strategy had 
 
89 Bloor, 1997, p.70. 
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contributed, in multiple ways, to the emergence or mobilisation of new 
perceived meanings, roles, and value of social research expertise. Others do 
not deny that this contributed to the story. Yet, they emphasise more 
strongly the importance of actors operating in a more response-driven mode 
to make persuasive cases for social research capacity with the support of 
charismatic and influential individuals such as those on the SAC, in the 
Science Directorate, the Chief Scientist, the Chief Economist, and the Head of 
Profession for Social Research. This chapter has shown strong evidence that 
such short-term opportunism was important too. Rather than being drawn 
on the matter of whether the longer term strategic moves are more significant 
than responsive and serendipitous actions, it is more interesting to observe 
that on both accounts a crucial element is present: the provision of challenge 
as a mechanism for changing how social research expertise is perceived. 
  The provision of challenge has been a core driver in the events presented in 
this chapter. The challenge of civil servants’ ideas about social research has 
given rise to a dynamic epistemic context in DEFRA in which new 
interpretations of the meanings, roles, and value of social research gain 
traction.  
  How does the development of social research capacity in DEFRA compare 
with that in DECC? As will be clear by the end of the next chapter (and as 
will be further elaborated upon in Chapter 8), despite being a younger 










Social Research Capacity in DECC 
 
“So I asked myself what would be the most useful thing to do to send out a message 
that policy teams needed to have social sciences expertise. If one is thinking in terms 
of steps: the first step is acknowledging that behaviour change is what we do as 
government departments. The second step is to recognise the kind of 
expertise/knowledge needed to develop policies that will enable behaviour change. 
And when, internally, we took those steps, we then got the expertise that we needed 
in. And the final step was saying ‘OK, now that we have the expertise, the people 
who have subject knowledge in the social science area, how do we use those most 
efficiently to help develop better policies?’ – and that bit is still a work-in-progress.” 
   




HEN DECC was formed in 2008, no government social researchers 
were employed. This is interesting given that by then, as we have 
seen, social research expertise was valued in DEFRA, and was used to 
develop ideas for reducing carbon emissions associated with consumption 
and production. And it is particularly surprising given that DECC was 
created through the bringing together of DEFRA’s climate change teams with 
the energy teams from the Department for Business, Enterprise and 
Regulatory Reform (BERR). Given these connections, we might have 
expected that the perceived meanings, roles, and value associated with social 
W 
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research would have been translated in a straightforward sense from 
DEFRA, along with some tangible capacity. But this chapter reveals that 
while some translation took place, to a large extent DECC’s social research 
capacity was developed endogenously, and tailored to the specific epistemic, 
institutional, and political circumstances within DECC.  
  This chapter thus mirrors its predecessor by showing how DECC’s social 
research capacity was developed over the years, such that by the time 
interviews were conducted there were approximately twenty social 
researchers within DECC, supported by a network of external academic 
researchers. Once again, I show that it is through the use of challenge, on the 
part of various actors within and outwith DECC, that social research capacity 
has come to take the form it has.  
  The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 begins by describing how DECC 
was formed and its remit was framed. It goes on to explore how key actors 
conceived social science expertise in relation to this new department’s remit 
and explains how the department came to recruit its first social scientists in 
2010. The next couple of years saw those researchers decide their priorities 
and build their own teams, which is the focus of Section 3. The fourth section 
then explores how these social researchers worked with others within and 
around DECC to expand their capacity to use social research through 
engaging more widely with social science expertise. The chapter concludes 
with some reflections on DECC’s social research capacity today, and how its 









2. 2007-2010: Constructing DECC Ontologically and Epistemically 
 
  The Labour Government’s decision to form a new Department of Energy 
and Climate Change came as a surprise to many of DEFRA’s senior civil 
servants.1 It was widely expected, according to DEFRA’s former Chief 
Economist and Director of Analysis, that the energy teams from BERR would 
join DEFRA: 
 
“What we actually expected to happen was that DEFRA, having established its 
credibility as a serious economic department, would then take on responsibility for 
energy policy from what was then DTI [Department of Trade and Industry]2 – now 
BIS [Department for Business, Innovation and Skills]. So it caught most of us by 
surprise when Gordon Brown decided that he’d created this new department with 
Ed Miliband at the head. That said, by that stage we had firm enough foundations 
analytically, aligned to each of DEFRA’s policy remits, to just be able to split off the 
climate change mitigation analytical capacity into DECC, but also keep working well 
across the new departmental boundaries. Of course we felt we’d done a lot to 
strengthen DEFRA to take on energy making government simpler and better. But in 
the end political imperatives came first and we made the unexpected outcome 
work.”3 
 
The efforts to strengthen DEFRA’s economic analysis referred to by this 
interviewee were part of the ‘Renew Defra’ restructuring project, which took 
place in 2006-07, as discussed in the previous chapter. While these changes 
were in their infancy, the Parliamentary Environmental Audit Committee 
reported that DEFRA had limited success in making the economic case for 
including consideration of sustainable development across government 
decision-making processes.4 The Committee concluded that the formation of 
 
1 Kinver, 2008.  
2 More precisely, DTI’s energy policy teams were part of BERR before moving to DECC. 
3 DEFRA’s then Chief Economist and Director of Analysis. 
4 Environmental Audit Committee, 2007, p.Ev15. 
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a new department, run by a Secretary of State with responsibility for political 
leadership across government, would help to produce more coherent policy 
management in government.5 This was also said to be Gordon Brown’s 
preferred course of action, who chose Ed Miliband to be the first Secretary of 
State for Energy and Climate.  
  A process of negotiations followed to settle which DEFRA teams should 
move to the new department. As one former DEFRA civil servant recalled: 
 
 “The problem when you create a new department is that you don’t get any of the 
aligned support functions that need to go with it. People give you the minimum that 
they can get away with. So you don’t get lots of cross-cutting bits. …DEFRA sort of 
hung on to most of the bits. Slightly grudging in what we gave to DECC anyway.6 
 
  The retention of some teams in DEFRA was rationalised on the grounds that 
they still fitted within DEFRA’s newly defined remit and/or had direct links 
with other policy areas within the department such that separating them 
would duplicate work or create unnecessary barriers. DECC thus emerged 
with most of the responsibility for climate change, while resources that were 
said to support work on environment or sustainable development issues 
were kept in DEFRA – for example mitigating agricultural greenhouse gas 
emissions, UK climate change adaptation (such as flood defence measures), 
and work on promoting more environmentally-friendly behaviours amongst 
the public. The team that focused on energy-using appliances did not move 
to DECC until 2014.7 
  In striking contrast to the formation of DEFRA, references to social science 
or to understanding citizens were absent from incumbent politicians’ 
 
5 Environmental Audit Committee, 2007, p.41.  
6 A DEFRA policy official (1). 




discourse at the time.8 In the case of the sustainable consumption and 
production team (whose social research on pro-environmental behaviour 
change amongst the public was by now highly regarded within the 
department), DEFRA’s officials argued that the team held a cross-cutting 
role. The analysts were represented as important to the department as a 
whole – not just for the staff working on climate change. Thus the social 
researchers within the Sustainable Behaviours Unit, which was situated 
within the sustainable consumption and production team, would stay put: 
 
“[The Sustainable Behaviours Unit] was like a small analytical team – you didn’t, 
say, have one social researcher working in the Climate Change team. It was covering 
a broader area of stuff. And therefore it just didn’t go with the people.”9 
 
  From DEFRA, then, came climate change teams that focused on greenhouse 
gas emissions but lacked the social research expertise which had recently 
gained a footing in the department.  
  From BERR came the energy teams, who held responsibility for energy 
generation and supply networks. These teams’ remits were described by 
respondents as having been framed along predominantly economic and 
engineering lines – with no social researchers embedded in the teams, and 
for a long time they were situated in a department “with no meaningful 
social research capability”.10 
  DECC was thus established in October 2008 with: climate change teams 
divorced from sustainable development and environmental stewardship, 
energy teams in which economic and engineering perspectives historically 
 
8 Based on an analysis of press articles retrieved via online searches for the period 2007-2009. 
See, e.g., Kinver, 2008; Vidal and Jowit, 2008. 
9 A DEFRA social researcher (6). 
10 A DECC official who joined from BERR’s energy teams. 
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held epistemic dominance, an overall lack of social research capacity across 
the organisation, and new political and civil service leadership. 
Consequently, while part of the rationale for setting up DECC was to 
integrate energy and climate change teams to enable more coherence in 
policy-making, in fact we see that, at least initially, the department’s 
formation marked an epistemic reframing of climate change policy along 
economic lines. This was summarised by a respondent as follows: 
 
 “And then DECC deliberately pursued a differentiation strategy, to make clear that 
they were an economic department and not just an environmental department.”11 
 
  This shift is reflected in the department’s three original Departmental 
Strategic Objectives (DSOs), which were inherited from DEFRA and BERR: 
“to lead the global effort to avoid dangerous climate change”, to work with 
others so that “climate change [is] tackled internationally and through 
domestic action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions” and “to ensure the 
reliable supply and efficient use of clean, safe and competitively-priced 
energy”.12 Through subsidiary targets we see that these objectives were 
interpreted in predominantly economic and engineering terms – as 
commitments to growing ‘global carbon markets’, ‘reducing the greenhouse 
gas and CO2 intensity of the UK economy’, bringing down ‘energy 
consumption’ in the UK or securing the ‘competitiveness’ of energy prices. 
The language of these objectives and targets is notably different from some of 
DEFRA’s DSOs, which emphasised ‘sustainable development’, and a 
 
11 A DEFRA policy official (1). 




‘resilient’ economy and society, and which could have been transferred to or 
shared with DECC.13  
  DECC’s DSOs were then updated in late 2009,14 in a move that further 
cemented the economic framing of the department’s remit – with a narrow 
focus on greenhouse gases isolated from broader considerations of 
sustainability. DECC’s objectives were now to: ‘secure global commitments 
which prevent dangerous climate change’ ‘reduce greenhouse gas emissions 
in the UK’, ‘ensure secure energy supplies’, ‘promote fairness through 
climate and energy policies at home and abroad’ (by reducing the proportion 
of households spending more than 10% of their income on energy bills, 
securing low prices for energy consumers, and taking into account the 
‘shadow price of carbon’ in new policies),15 ‘ensure that the UK benefits from 
the business and employment opportunities of a low carbon future’, ‘manage 
energy liabilities effectively and safely’ and ‘develop the Department’s 
capability, delivery systems and relationships so that it serves the public 
effectively’.16 In this way, the department began with a relatively limited 
focus on energy consumption and energy supply, and sought the most cost-
effective means to reduce UK carbon emissions – divorced from the broader 
environmental implications of those courses of action. 
  Moreover, many interviewees pointed out that there remained, even at the 
time of the interviews, an open question as to whether the new department 
really did enable more coherent integration between the energy and climate 
change portfolios. It was pointed out that even then there was a fault-line 
 
13 DEFRA [National Archives], 2007.  
14 National Audit Office, 2009, p.36.  
15 National Audit Office, 2009, p.36.  
16 National Audit Office, 2009, p.37.  
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through the department, with minimal interaction occurring between the 
former DEFRA teams and the former BERR teams: 
 
“So you’ve got a situation where you got these two halves of DECC, and broadly the 
sort of Energy bit, and then the Energy Efficiency/Climate Change bit. So there’s the 
bit which came from DTI [the predecessor to BERR], which is the energy policy bit, 
and you’ve got a bit which came from DEFRA – so I think it’s an interesting question 
to ask whether social sciences are across that, they are certainly on the Energy 
Efficiency side.”17   
 
This division is most visible if one looks at the first available version of the 
department’s organisational chart (see Appendix 4, Figure A4-1). The 
‘Energy, Markets and Infrastructure’ Directorate consisted of teams from the 
former BERR, while the ‘National Climate Change and Consumer Support’ 
Directorate was comprised of teams from DEFRA. This divide is not just 
interesting to note, but as the interviewee suggests, it also had implications 
for how social research would be integrated in the new department and what 
roles the researchers would come to play. The institutional arrangements 
would have epistemic consequences.18 We will see this more clearly in the 
following sections. 
  With core aspects of the department settled, DECC appointed Professor 
David Mackay as its first Chief Scientific Advisor in October 2009.19 He then 
formed a Science Advisory Group (SAG) comprised of academic and 
industry researchers in July 2010.20 This was an interdisciplinary committee 
of experts, composed of engineers, natural scientists, economists, and one 
academic social scientist. The social scientist had spent much of his career 
 
17 A DECC policy official (1). 
18 Consistent with the literature discussed in Chapter 3 – e.g. Walker, 1987; Gummett, 1980. 
19 DECC, n.d.-a. 




researching public attitudes to scientific issues, including climate change. He 
had recently discussed with DECC’s scientists the issue of public trust in 
relation to the recent ‘Climate-Gate’ affair, in which the emails from 
researchers at the University of East Anglia were leaked and presented as 
evidence of scandal in science. This social scientist explained in an interview 
that it was on the basis of such conversations with DECC’s officials that he 
was appointed to DECC’s SAG. Interviewees reported that social science 
played a relatively marginal role in the topics discussed by the SAG, with 
little explicit concern paid to the department’s capacity for social science 
expertise. And although the social scientist in the SAG did encourage public 
engagement and openness in decision-making processes, there was nobody 
who adopted the critical role of the Professor of Science and Technology 
Policy in DEFRA’s Science Advisory Council – challenging assumptions and 
problem-framings from a social science perspective. This role (and others) 
would be reprised more prominently by the social scientists who were later 
appointed to the DEFRA-DECC Social Science Expert Panel, and which we 
will consider in more depth in Section 4 of this chapter. 
  Against this ontological and epistemic backdrop then, we can now examine 
how the new department came to establish its social research capacity. The 
following subsections explore how the cases for specific roles for social 
researchers were made during the early years of the department. 
 
  ‘A Large Clean Slate’ for Social Research 2.1
 
  So far, we have noted that DEFRA retained its social research community 
while other teams were transferred to DECC, such that the new department 
was formed with no social researchers in October 2008. Over the next year, 
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various individuals attempted to persuade DECC’s senior officials to recruit 
social researchers for the purposes of instrumentally contributing in policy 
development.21 DEFRA’s social researchers raised concerns to the then Head 
of the Government Social Research Service, who was based in the Cabinet 
Office, and who then wrote to DECC. A DEFRA social researcher recalled: 
 
“At the time, the Head of GSR wrote to the Permanent Secretary of DECC, saying 
‘how about getting some social researchers because you can’t do what you want to 
do without them’.” 
 
Interviewer: “And what was the response to that?” 
 
“The response was something along the lines of ‘we’ve got it covered for now but 
we’ll look at it in the future’. …I think the real question was quite why it took so 
long to get social researchers established in DECC... Because you would have 
thought they’d address it. Because I did say, they had to be written to; they could 
have addressed it sooner than what they did.”22 
 
In addition to the case made by DEFRA’s social researchers and the Head of 
the Government Social Research Service, DECC’s own Head of Science made 
a very specific case for social research expertise in terms of understanding 
public behaviours:  
 
“I did make a point at the time DECC was created that we had no social scientists in 
the new Department. At that time, we had lots of people like me - physical scientists 
- and lots of economists, but no social scientists. It soon became apparent that many 
of the policies that DECC wanted to pursue such as energy demand reduction, 
energy efficiency etc. could not be done by just taking a narrow economic 
perspective or a physical scientific perspective. Energy efficiency was about people 
and behaviour change. It took a while for the penny to drop that that was a gap in 
the Department’s capability. We had left all the social scientists behind in Defra 
when DECC was created. Although economists had their area of expertise, their 
understanding of human behaviour was necessarily quite simplified. So, for 
example, the expectation was that the Green Deal or some other policy on energy 
efficiency would work because over the long-term there would be a financial benefit 
 
21 Boswell, 2009, p.29. 




that would accrue to an individual who takes energy efficiency measures. That was 
what was shown by the various McKinsey cost curves and such analyses. However, 
the reality was that people didn’t take up the measures because of the high upfront 
costs. So many policies in DECC were based on fairly simple notions of behavioural 
change based on individuals directly responding to economic incentive… Although 
very soon, in less than a year, senior managers in DECC realised that without social 
science input, a lot of the policy – especially on the energy efficiency, would not 
work without a richer understanding of how people can change their behaviours.”23 
 
An instrumental case for DECC to create roles for government social 
researchers was therefore being voiced not only externally, but also by the 
department’s own Science and Innovation Group. And, as is clear from the 
above quotation, the delineation of this case was heavily path dependent – 
the meaning of social research being invoked was grounded in the 
experiences and understandings of those who worked with social research in 
DEFRA. Thus, the dominant rationale for employing social researchers was 
based on their expertise in understanding behaviour change. The idea of a 
social research agenda in the former BERR side of the department, which had 
no history of employing social researchers, was less apparent at this point.  
  Despite multiple attempts, the case for recruiting social researchers – even 
for behaviour change research in particular – was initially rejected by senior 
officials in DECC. On the account of a former Head of the Government Social 
Research Service, this was because the Permanent Secretary personally 
opposed the idea. This interviewee had previously worked in the same 
department as the Permanent Secretary, and the acrimony between them 
may help to explain the latter’s reluctance to include social research capacity 
on the first day. This point could not be confirmed nor rejected in subsequent 
interviews, but it is nonetheless clear that if DECC was to develop its own 
community of social researchers then a more compelling case would need to 
 
23 DECC’s former Head of Science. 
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be offered to explain why social research should be valued by the 
department.  
  Now aware that a recruitment process for social researchers would not be 
forthcoming, DECC’s Head of Science approached DEFRA’s social 
researchers, who formally agreed to serve DECC’s policy teams’ 
requirements too – a surprising exception to the Permanent Secretary’s stated 
conviction that “DECC had to be a department that wrote its own cheques”.24 
The agreement failed to bear fruit however. DEFRA’s social researchers were 
in high demand within DEFRA and in prioritising their own department’s 
needs above those of another’s they were unable to deliver on their 
agreement: 
 
“So because they had their priorities, our requests from DECC for social science 
support always seemed to get “bumped down”. So after a while, we thought we 
needed our own in-house team.”25  
 
  The case for DECC to have its own social research capacity gained a boost of 
credibility in December 2009, when the then Cabinet Secretary and Head of 
the Home Civil Service, Sir Gus O’Donnell, delivered the department’s first 
Capability Review.26 The reviewers set the department’s civil servants and 
stakeholders a range of questions to evaluate its leadership, strategy and 
delivery capabilities, including questions about whether the department 
“base[s] choices on evidence”.27  
 
24 A DEFRA policy official (1). 
25 DECC’s former Head of Science. 
26 Cabinet Office, 2009.  




   This document, produced by the highest ranks of the civil service, 
reinforced the Head of Science’s case for acquiring behaviour change 
expertise:  
 
Stakeholders and staff told us that DECC’s knowledge of customers is weak and the 
Department is badly in need of social and behavioural research capability. The 
Department recognises that an in-depth understanding of consumer behaviour and 
how to influence it is an essential prerequisite for meeting the consumer-related 
targets on climate change.28  
 
The review carried considerable weight and was described as significant by 
multiple civil servants as a key document – akin to a “Head Teacher’s 
report”29 on one account. Senior civil servants accepted the recommendations 
in full.30 It was now acknowledged amongst senior staff that social and 
behavioural research would be useful particularly in aiding policy teams to 
think about how to encourage the public to reduce their energy 
consumption.  
  Intriguingly, while DECC’s review was being conducted, the capability 
reviews team was also updating the procedure for future assessments.31 After 
encouragement from a new ‘Customer Insight Forum’ in the Cabinet Office,32 
the next round of assessments would place greater emphasis on a 
department’s use of ‘customer insight’, with the strategic capabilities criteria 
reworded to include questions about whether the department in question 
“base[s] choices on evidence and customer insight”. Before we can 
understand how DECC’s first Capability Review contributed to a significant 
change in the department’s capacity for social research expertise, we must 
 
28 Cabinet Office, 2009, p.8. 
29 A DECC social researcher (3).  
30 Cabinet Office, 2009, p.11.  
31 Cabinet Office, 2009  
32 Cabinet Office, n.d. slide 11.  
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first consider the relationship between ‘customer insight’ and government 
social research, as described by the ‘Customer Insight Forum’ and the 
Government Social Research Unit, both led from the Cabinet Office. In doing 
so, we will see that the Capability Review did not provide as clear-cut a case 
for the recruitment of government social researchers as it might seem at first 
glance.  
 
 Customer Insight or Social Research Expertise? 2.2
 
  While the extract from the Capability Review at the end of the previous 
subsection presents ‘knowledge of customers’, ‘social and behavioural 
research’ and ‘an in-depth understanding of consumer behaviour and how to 
influence it’ as the same type of expertise, there were now two distinct civil 
service groups of specialists who claimed to possess relevant expertise in this 
area: ‘customer insight’ specialists on the one hand, who were part of the 
Government Communications Network (GCN), and government social 
researchers on the other. It is important to understand how distinctions 
between social research and customer insight are drawn in government in 
order to understand subsequent developments in DECC. 
  The Customer Insight Forum (who tasked themselves with embedding 
‘customer insight’ across government departments) defines customer insight 
in contradistinction to social research, as follows: 
 
Customer insight is not raw customer data. Nor is it the same thing as social 
research although it may be sourced from qualitative or quantitative research 




data, traditional social research and what we call ‘insight’; there is a leap that must 
be made to bridge it.33 
 
‘Customer insight’, then, is presented as a more tacit and yet ‘deeper’ 
understanding about customers than is found in research findings. It is “a 
deep truth about the customer” which “‘rings bells’ with target people”.34 
The Customer Insight Forum claims that customer insight should serve a 
reminder to officials that citizens have rights and expectations related to 
public services and that these should be taken into account by government as 
if its services are not provided by a “monopoly”.35  
  Here we can see an important difference in the way customer insight 
specialists and government social researchers’ identities are formally defined 
by their supporting bodies. The role of customer insight specialists is 
described as empowering citizens by enabling citizens’ views and needs to 
directly inform policy ideas in such a way that resonates with citizens,36 
while social researchers are more concerned with understanding social 
phenomena.37 Still, as government employees, customer insight specialists 
are, like social researchers, expected to commit to the Civil Service Code,38 
and are particularly careful to not cause any embarrassment to the 
department or its ministers. As such, both groups face similar difficulties in 
terms of gaining traction for their perspective within government 
organisations.  
 
33 Cabinet Office, 2006, p.9. 
34 Cabinet Office, 2006, p.9.  
35 Cabinet Office, 2006, p.7. 
36 Cabinet Office, 2006, p.6. 
37 Analytical Coordination Working Group, 2011, p.2.  
38 Civil Service Commission, 2014. 
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  A second difference between the two groupings concerns their methods. 
While customer insights may emerge from empirical quantitative or 
qualitative data, other sources are also used, including the narratives of those 
with first-hand experience in service provision, salient media stories and 
anecdotal experiences.39 As a result, some civil servants have come to view 
customer insight as a less methodologically robust form of knowledge than 
social research: 
 
“And within government, people would look at social researchers as somehow 
possessing of more intellect and somehow more robust credentials. And customer 
insight was a little fluffy, a little bit softer really.”40 
 
  Last, social researchers view themselves as government analysts and take 
their commitment to providing a ‘challenge function’ “seriously”41 – as noted 
by a DECC policy official.42 By contrast, customer insight specialists and their 
support network do not describe their role in terms of providing challenge.  
  Hence, while social researchers and customer insight professionals each 
make claims to expertise in understanding and influencing behaviours, there 
is some potential for tension as well as collaboration between them. And the 
Capability Review left open the question of which body of expertise should fill 
the gap – leaving the decision in the hands of DECC’s officials.  
  Reportedly inspired by his prior experience in an organisation which had a 
‘Customer Insight Team’, the Director General for the National Climate 
Change and Consumer Support Directorate at the time opted to build a 
Customer Insight Team (CIT), led by a Head of Customer Insight who was 
 
39 Cabinet Office, 2006, p.10. 
40 A social researcher in DECC (1). 
41 A DECC policy official in the Smart Meters Implementation Programme team.  




recruited from industry. As is clear from the differences between social 
research and customer insight discussed above, this is not quite what civil 
servants were arguing for in 2008/9, and would not necessarily help to build 
social research capacity. But as a matter of chance, the formation of the CIT 
did contribute to the development of DECC’s social research capacity, as we 
will see in the next subsection.  
 
  Customer Insight and Social Research Expertise 2.3
 
  The Head of Customer Insight (HCI) was employed from a research 
company in June 2010. This was just after the election of a Conservative-
Liberal Democrat Coalition Government in May, in which Chris Huhne was 
made Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change.43 As an external 
appointee, the HCI did not have GSR accreditation, and since this was not 
formally designated as a GSR post, attaining GSR accreditation was not a 
priority – nor was any accreditation by the Government Communications 
Network necessary for customer insight specialists. But the HCI did have a 
well-regarded track record of applying social research methods in the private 
sector, and had previously worked on social research projects for DEFRA 
and other government organisations.  
  Concurrently and independently of the events leading to the formation of a 
CIT, a case for a different interpretation of social research’s contribution was 
being made. The Deputy Head of Economics was concerned that the 
department was not evaluating its policies and recognised that, alongside 
economists, social researchers also claim expertise in evaluation. An 
experienced government social researcher was soon recruited from the 
 
43 BBC News, 2010b. 
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Cabinet Office’s Government Social Research Unit, where she had spent a 
few years developing guidance for GSR members across Whitehall, and had 
a particular interest in evaluation methods. She joined the department in 
May 2010 as Head of Policy Evaluation (HPE) and, as the department’s first 
social researcher she also became the Head of Profession for Social Research. 
  Very soon, the HCI and the HPE saw eye-to-eye: 
 
 “And basically, not to put too fine a point on it, we kind of met and realised that we 
probably saw the world in the same way, and that there was relatively little point 
splitting the difference between social research and customer insight. Because 
basically, I see it as a spectrum – there’s a big overlap in the middle, in terms of the 
type of work that gets done, and then there are some things that social researchers 
do that customer insight people don’t do, mainly around policy evaluation, and 
there are some things that customer insight people do that social researchers don’t 
do, primarily around getting involved in helping to inform communications – 
although some social researchers will do that too – and also around what I would 
describe as capability-building, which is really trying to basically get the 
organisation to think people more readily than it already does. Essentially the core 
picture is customer insight and social research are the same thing – which is that it’s 
about helping policy-makers understand people and organisations and communities 
and why they think and feel and behave the way they do. And to use that evidence 
and insight to lead to better policy-making and ultimately to better outcomes. It’s 
virtually the same pitch, really.”44  
 
As we saw in the introduction, DECC’s responsibilities had been framed in 
largely economic and engineering terms. In this context, these two actors saw 
a common cause: to get the organisation to ‘think people’ more.  
  In the context of limited resources, the fact that the HCI and HPE shared an 
analytical perspective and also a commitment to quality through robust 
research methods enabled them to work together to build social research 
(and customer insight) capacity across the department. Supported by the 
weight of the Capability Review and a mutual understanding between them, 
 




the department’s two ‘social scientists’45 could go on to expand the 
department’s social research capacity. 
  In this light, some respondents argued that starting with a clean sheet of 
zero social researchers was in fact advantageous. In building up a team from 
scratch, DECC’s social research community could be developed to suit the 
department’s particular requirements. Its perceived meanings, roles, and 
value could be moulded to fit the perceived needs of the department: 
 
“I think we’ve been lucky in DECC in that because we started off with a zero-base 
we’ve been able to start with a large clean slate and then identify where we think 
there’s value in doing social research. And it then being useful, and people seeing 
that it’s useful, and other people are wanting it and so it’s kind of built up rather 
than something people think they have to do – there is a genuine want to do it now. 
And that’s been really useful. And that’s how our culture has developed.”46 
 
  But the transformation described by the respondent was not 
straightforward. So far, specific interpretations of social research had gained 
traction amongst DECC’s officials – particularly with regards to consumer 
behaviour change and the designing of policy evaluations. The HCI and HPE 
would now have to build their teams and prove the value of their expertise. 
How they went about doing this is the focus of the next section.  
 
3. 2010-2014: Building Social Research Capacity in the Customer 
Insight Team and Policy Evaluation Team  
 
  Having established a working relationship, the HCI and HPE gradually 
began to build social research capacity in DECC over the next couple of years 
– by making social research meaningful to officials across the department,  
 
45 Many social researchers called themselves and each other social scientists.  
46 A DECC social researcher - Head of Policy Evaluation. 
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creating new roles for researchers, proving the value of research. As we 
might expect following the previous chapter, achieving support from senior 
officials, scientists, and economists helped to establish a social research 
capacity in DECC, but the case would still need to be won amongst specific 
policy officials. The HCI and HPE began in their roles with no budget of their 
own – and while this was certainly limiting for them, it also meant that their 
success relied upon their working together with other officials to define 
research projects that would be seen as relevant and valuable to policy teams. 
  To identify possible research needs and priorities, the two social scientists 
met with each policy team soon after starting at DECC.47 They decided to 
prioritise work for those proposals included in the Coalition Agreement48 – 
such as the Green Deal and the installation of smart meters in UK homes– 
which were treated as high priority within the department and were being 
developed at high pace and intensity (both examined in depth in Chapter 7). 
  Intriguingly, by the time interviews were conducted, specialists and 
generalists described the two teams of analysts as a single coherent 
community of approximately 20 social researchers/customer insight 
specialists, with many individual researchers (but not all) self- identifying as 
a member of one collective community rather than distinguishing between 
them. But originally, the two analysts forged an amicable demarcation 
between their remits: the HPE and the Policy Evaluation Team that she 
would build (henceforth ‘PET’) focused on designing and delivering policy 
evaluation, while the CIT would support teams to use social research at 
earlier stages in the policy process – for the design, delivery, and 
implementation of policy ideas.  
 
47 Government Office for Science, 2012, Annex A: p.23. 




  They also set out to build their teams in different ways. The HPE was based 
in the Deputy Chief Economist’s analytical team, and proceeded by making 
the case for policy teams to fund their own evaluation projects, arguing that 
the studies would be in the interest of improving the policy work in the 
given area. As such, she gradually built a network of social researchers 
across different policy teams in DECC. She could also bid into the 
economists’ budget for methodological projects with no one policy team in 
mind. They initially focused their efforts on developing evaluation strategies 
with the Green Deal and smart meters teams,49 but as their capacity 
expanded from 2012 onwards they engaged policy teams across the 
department, including those working on energy market reform and 
international climate change work.  
  By contrast, the HCI was, from the start, situated with the department’s 
‘flagship’ Green Deal team. There, officials had identified an immediate need 
for a deeper understanding of their potential customers. The HCI was 
eventually allocated her own budget in 2012, but in the meantime she would 
need to bid for funding from the Green Deal team, other policy teams, or 
alternatively try the Chief Economist’s and Head of Science’s budgets. She 
took a flexible approach to building the CIT, by either embedding a 
researcher in a policy team if a full-time analyst was required for an 
extended period of time, or else generalists could resource her CIT to carry 
out specific projects. The latter arrangement meant that the CIT could play a 
cross-cutting role across the department despite being situated within the 
Green Deal team.  
 
49 Government Office for Science, 2012, Annex A: p.44. 
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  During the first couple of years, the CIT worked mainly with those teams 
who focused on the Coalition Government’s new initiatives – particularly for 
energy efficiency and energy demand, such as the Green Deal, smart meters, 
and the renewable heat incentive. But as the team expanded – and in 
conjunction with the HCI gaining a budget and creating a contracting 
framework for research projects – the CIT could, from 2011 onwards, 
broaden the role it played in the department. They did this by working with 
a greater variety of policy teams (including those for nuclear energy,50 district 
heating,51 and heat strategy52), commissioning more foundational or longer 
term research projects which were intended for strategic purposes rather 
than immediate policy relevance (akin to those produced in DEFRA’s 
sustainable consumption and production team),53 and building capacity to 
use social research insights across the department (as will be explored in 
more depth in Subsection 4.1).  
  By the end of 2013, recognition for both aspects of social researchers’ 
expertise had grown substantially, with approximately nine policy 
evaluation researchers embedded in policy teams across the department, and 
11 members in the CIT (most of whom were also accredited government 
social researchers).54 The Deputy Head of Customer Insight was one of these 
accredited government social researchers, and in mid-2013 was made Joint-
 
50 For instance, a recent public engagement exercise in which members of the public were 
invited to inform the development of a White Paper on decision-making processes regarding 
geological disposal of nuclear waste (Icarus, 2015) has been cited by a researcher as a 
particularly important example where social researchers have enabled citizens to 
substantially influence decision-making processes in DECC (Sciencewise, 2016), and is 
viewed as potentially setting a precedent for working with policy-makers on energy 
infrastructure issues. 
51 E.g. DECC, 2013a. 
52 See Brook Lyndhurst, 2012. Work on heat strategy is discussed further in Chapter 7. 
53 Such as this study on non-domestic energy use: DECC, 2012a.  




Head of Profession for Government Social Research along with the HPE. 
And notably at the time of interviewing, the HCI reported that the CIT had 
worked with every policy team, in some sense, at least once so far. The next 
subsection goes some way to explaining this relatively rapid growth, by 
highlighting how social researchers secured an appreciation of the value of 
their work from colleagues. 
 
 Valuing Social Research Expertise in DECC 3.1
 
  In what has been described as a heavily ‘technocratic’ department,55 where 
engineering, scientific, and economic forms of knowledge (and quantitative 
methods in particular) are dominant, it is striking that DECC’s social 
researchers have not experienced a great degree of challenge or resistance 
from colleagues over the robustness of social research methodologies. This 
seems to be due to a combination of factors, which are considered in this 
subsection.  
  First, the HCI and HPE ensured that officials and researchers were in 
agreement over what social research could deliver in a given project, and this 
managerial oversight ensured that the senior researchers who delivered tasks 
for policy teams encountered little contestation over what they should be 
doing or the value of their work or experience, as one former researcher in 
the CIT recalled: 
 
“There were very good links between [the HCI and] the people who were leading 
up the other teams – and it was very integrated. So kind of from the top, [the HCI] 
had a very good idea of what she felt we should be doing to be answering the needs 
 
55 MacKerron, 2009, p.87. 
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of everybody else. So you had a much clearer steer of what was needed – and it was 
clearer to us because there was that much better kind of join up.”56 
    
  Second, the HCI and HPE had taken a few steps to secure their teams’ 
reputations across the department as being committed to producing research 
of the highest quality possible. To this end, they both ensured members of 
their teams would commit to the GSR Code,57 and aimed to build their 
respective teams by mainly recruiting accredited social researchers for 
designated social research roles (alongside roles which either lacked a 
research component and were identified for customer insight specialists, or 
require expertise in a different type of analysis). Furthermore, the HCI and 
HPE’s teams would support each other – for instance, if a social researcher is 
working on a policy evaluation project for a team, they would be encouraged 
to explore broader ways in which social research could contribute to that 
team, thereby potentially creating projects for the CIT, and vice versa. The 
CIT and PET also helped each other by peer reviewing each other’s outputs. 
Last, the HPE set up an interdisciplinary Evaluation Board of Experts (which 
included the Chief Economist and Chief Statistician) to identify priority 
projects and to review their work,58 and likewise the CIT had an Evidence 
Board to review their projects. 
  These efforts to ensure validity in their work and build appreciation for 
their expertise coincided with a cross-departmental drive towards improving 
analytical capacity which included the formation of a new Research and 
Development Approvals Committee. Despite the HPE not yet becoming a 
 
56 A social researcher in DECC (2). Although working closely with policy teams did involve 
some negotiation to produce research products which would be seen as credible – see the 
section on the heat strategy in Chapter 7 for an example of this.  
57 GSR Unit, 2009. 




senior civil servant, she and the HCI were both included on this committee. 
This body of officials was described by interviewees as doubly important for 
shaping how colleagues perceived the quality and value of social research. It 
enabled them to challenge their colleagues’ assumptions about social 
research and thereby highlight the importance of including a social research 
component. Moreover, it enabled them to receive feedback from other 
analysts in the department, who would then not only provide their analytical 
challenge on a given proposal, but also learn about the project, gain an 
interest in its findings, and in some cases explore opportunities to work 
together. The HPE summarised the importance of this committee thus: 
 
“So even if it’s a piece of modelling work there’s still social scientists sitting round 
that table – so myself and the Head of Customer Insight sit around that table and 
give our opinions on it. And I think that’s really adding value to the quality of the 
work that we’re commissioning. And equally getting some kind of – a core bit of 
social science and getting the economists and scientists to say ‘really?’ and question 
it and inquisite it again really adds value. So that’s – from an analytical point of view 
I think we really are working quite well in our multidisciplinary way.”59 
 
  As with the social researchers in DEFRA’s Centre of Expertise on 
Influencing Behaviour, interviewees emphasised the importance of two-way 
challenge between social researchers and their colleagues.  
  All of these steps helped to secure an appreciation of the social researchers’ 
expertise from other officials in the department and, for the CIT in particular, 
served to distance the team from negative perceptions over customer insight 
elsewhere in government. A former social researcher emphasised the CIT’s 
stress on the importance of quality in the research they produced: 
  
 
59 DECC’s HPE. 
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“Even though [the HCI] wasn’t a member of the Government Social Research 
Service at the time, it was a very evidence-focused team. And there was a massive 
focus on quality and you know, it was an analytical team.”60 
 
  The HCI herself chose to gain accreditation in winter 2013. As she was more 
senior than the HPE and her Deputy at the time, this also meant that she 
would become the Head of Profession for Social Research. She held this post 
until she left in mid-2014.  
  In addition to the collaborative approach from the social researchers’ team 
leaders and the simultaneous building of internal appreciation of 
researchers’ expertise, another factor that helped to influence the growth of 
social research capacity in DECC was an unprecedented level of appreciation 
for behavioural research across government. This was typified by David 
Cameron’s creation of a Behavioural Insights Team (BIT) in July 2010.61 This 
group of behavioural experts was situated in the Cabinet Office, with a 
budget and a remit to design and deliver research projects in collaboration 
with government bodies. In this context, DECC’s ministers and policy 
officials were eager to show that the department utilised behavioural 
research, especially the quantitative trials advocated by the BIT. Ed Davey, 
who became Secretary of State for Energy and Climate Change in February 
2012 (and who was still in this post at the time of the interviews), was a 
prominent supporter.62 An interviewee noted the importance of his 
enthusiasm in the department:  
 
 “One of the advantages we’ve got is that our Secretary of State [Ed Davey] is really 
into social science…he had the [MINDSPACE] poster up on his wall when he first 
started – when he first came into Secretary of State here. And so we’ve been doing a 
 
60 A social researcher in DECC (2). 
61 BBC News, 2010a. 




number of behavioural trials which he’s really interested in – we’re doing one in 
collaboration with John Lewis... Ed Davey was there on the first day of the John 
Lewis trial, kind of launching it. He’s very keen, he wants updates all the time on 
how we’re getting on. So that helps as well because it also raises the profile of that 
work. And adds to its value, because if the Minister thinks it is valuable then it is 
valuable. So that’s all quite helpful. It’s kind of – it doesn’t make any of it easy but it 
does help when there’s that high level of support.”63  
 
  The ministerial backing brought greater attention and credence to the work 
of social researchers, and fed demand for behavioural trials across DECC. 
Thus, while there may have been a symbolic component to the minister’s 
interest in behavioural research, it provided a more fruitful context in which 
instrumental uses of research could be pursued. 
  It is also intriguing to note that despite working on similar questions as 
DEFRA’s sustainable consumption and production team a few years earlier, 
DECC’s social research tradition developed with a larger emphasis on 
behavioural trials than DEFRA’s.64 This highlights how political, 
institutional, and epistemic influences can combine to shape the meanings 
and roles of social research in ways that reflect circumstances at the time.  
  In combination then, the HPE and HCI’s managerial approach, along with 
their efforts to secure recognition for their expertise, and in the context of 
new government-wide support for behavioural research (with randomised 
controlled trials (RCTs) viewed as a ‘gold standard’),65 DECC’s PET and CIT 
designed research projects that secured interest from policy officials, with 
minimal tensions over the quality of their research.  
  Thus, within a predominantly quantitative epistemic environment, and 
despite some officials’ initial qualms over the robustness of customer insight, 
 
63 A social researcher in DECC (4). 
64 E.g. DECC & Energy Saving Trust, 2011; DECC, 2014a.  
65 Cartwright, 2007. 
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the HPE and HCI grew their teams rapidly in just a couple of years to meet 
unanticipated levels of demand for their services. Interviewees in both the 
CIT and PET revealed that, on the whole, their work was valued by their 
colleagues, and there was comparatively little resistance of the sort faced by 
some embedded analysts in DEFRA. But while there were few epistemic 
challenges,66 the building of the CIT in particular faced some institutional 
barriers before it could grow. These are briefly considered next. 
 
 Limits to Growth of Capacity in the Customer Insight Team 3.2
 
  So far we have seen that after some initial teething problems, strong interest 
and appreciation for a particular form of social research expertise emerged 
across DECC – especially in the teams working on energy efficiency and 
energy demand policies. Following from the department’s response to the 
Capability Review, the HCI was tasked with building the CIT almost 
immediately, and therefore began to grow her team before the HPE (whose 
PET consisted of two researchers until 2012). In doing so, she confronted 
institutional and epistemic barriers that limited the team’s ability to grow in 
the first couple of years. These were barriers in institutional procedures, gaps 
in knowledge, and a perception amongst some policy staff that the team 
lacked relevance for their specific remit. They are discussed below in turn.  
  It is not surprising that when the HCI and HPE first joined DECC they 
found that they would need to put in place certain institutional arrangements 
before they could achieve the social research capacity they would value. But 
doing so took time and inhibited their progress during an intense period 
 
66 This is not to say that social researchers never experienced methodological challenges – 




when the rest of the department was already proceeding at a fast pace to 
deliver policies in the Coalition Agreement. One such set of arrangements 
was a contracting framework, which lists a set of external research bodies 
that are pre-authorised to carry out projects for government. The social 
scientists could at first use other government contracts, such as that of the 
Central Office of Information, but creating their own enabled them to more 
conveniently commission projects from recognised social research expert 
bodies – especially those who produce qualitative studies, which were not 
well represented on existing contracts.  
  A second set of institutional arrangements relates to recruitment. In 
recognition that the organisation was under-resourced since its formation, 
DECC’s spending limits were not reduced as significantly as those of other 
departments in the 2010 spending review.67 Moreover, the reductions that 
were imposed were achieved through a decrease in the size of the budgets of 
arms-length bodies, thereby protecting the core department’s staff and 
resources, and indeed allowing the core to grow to fill gaps in capacity as 
identified in the Capability Review and elsewhere. Nonetheless, the spending 
review did bring a government-wide freeze on all external recruitment,68 
which restricted the HCI such that she could only recruit from within the 
civil service. This by itself was not an issue – the HCI did not initially intend 
to recruit externally. As discussed above, as part of a commitment to what 
she perceived to be robust methods, she initially sought to fill research posts 
with GSR-accredited researchers.69 However, at this time DECC could not 
match what other departments offered analysts in similar posts. Other 
 
67 According to a social researcher in DECC (4).  
68 BBC News, 2010c.  
69 Government Office of Science, 2012, Annex A, p.96.  
“Challenge and Be Challenged” 
-174- 
 
departments had a ‘pay allowance agreement’ in place to ensure that 
analysts’ salaries would be matched for the same post across government 
departments, and while DECC had these established with other government 
analytical service bodies, this was not yet created for government social 
researchers. This restricted their ability to attract staff that satisfied the HCI’s 
standards,70 and it would take time before an agreement with the 
Government Social Research Service was obtained – this was eventually 
done in 2012.  
  Given the difficulties of recruiting social researchers from within 
government, DECC’s social scientists convinced senior civil servants to allow 
an external recruitment campaign to take place from 2011.71 Consequently, 
the CIT began to expand with a mix of accredited government social 
researchers and social researchers from industry whose qualifications and 
experience satisfied the HCI, and would be encouraged to later attain GSR 
accreditation. 
  To achieve a social research capacity that satisfied the HCI and HPE’s 
standards then, and which they believed could produce credible research, 
these two analysts had to introduce institutional changes in the department. 
By the time of interviewing, the CIT was predominantly formed of accredited 
social researchers as those without accreditation either acquired it, or had 
moved on and were in time replaced by researchers who were accredited.  
  Recruiting from the government social research community was important 
for affirming the CIT’s social science credentials, but using the competency-
based approach advocated by the GSR also contributed to the second barrier 
the team faced, regarding a lack of topic-specific knowledge. As we saw in 
 
70 Government Office of Science, 2012, Annex A, p.96. 




the introduction to this thesis, government analysts typically move posts 
every two years in order to progress in their career. Under this system, it 
arguably makes little sense for analysts to be assessed on their topic-specific 
knowledge as part of a recruitment exercise, so the GSR competency 
framework,72 which is used for recruitment guidance, focuses on 
methodological competencies and transferable skills. This may make for a 
more versatile workforce, but it also means that researchers lack topic-specific 
knowledge that might be helpful if the analysts are then to constructively 
contribute within a policy framing, or to provide evidence-based challenge to 
their colleagues. The HCI explained how this initially posed an issue: 
 
“I was thinking ‘oh, why aren’t they raising these things in meetings? These things 
are really obvious. And then I thought – the reason they are really obvious to me is 
that I’ve spent five years talking to people about them! And my team haven’t! And 
then I set about trying to close some of that gap so that my team had a bit more of 
the knowledge that I had.”73 
 
As such, the limits of researchers’ own perceptions of the meaning of social 
research was, for a brief period of time, seen as a barrier to the growth of 
social research capacity in DECC. This quote also emphasises the significance 
of the HCI’s background in private social research companies as this 
experience enabled her to build in-depth knowledge about environmental 
and energy issues from a variety of social science perspectives (including, for 
instance, the literatures on behaviour change, citizens’ engagement with 
science and technology, and trends in public attitudes towards particular 
issues) which she could then translate into her work and the department. It 
would be rare for a social researcher from within government to achieve the 
 
72 E.g. Government Social Research Service, 2010. 
73 DECC’s Head of Customer Insight. 
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same level of in-depth knowledge given the tendency to rotate roles in the 
civil service. While the HCI was able to address the knowledge gap issue for 
DECC’s social researchers, it highlights a tension in the arrangement for 
government analysts, and a gap in the structures of social science advice in 
terms of familiarity and expertise in specific topics. 
  Another limitation that the CIT had to overcome in its expansion was 
arguably a result of its own early success. By late 2011 there was a prevalent 
perception that the team could do more to explore the social science 
dimensions of policy areas which were less overtly concerned with consumer 
behaviours, as is clear in the below extract from a Government Office of 
Science review: 
 
The aim of the CI team is to help policy colleagues understand their ‘customers’, 
who include individuals, households and organisations, covering their beliefs, 
experiences and circumstances. So far there have been ‘easy wins’ for CI in that there 
is recognition that policies rely on customer behaviour. Other parts of the 
department may be harder to persuade. When the next round of policy ideas comes 
through, Customer Insight will get more involved in policy formulation from the 
outset.74  
 
 The predominance of behavioural research, in circumstances where 
researchers could not grow their capacity as quickly as they liked, had the 
effect of limiting their researchers’ potential to work with officials who did 
not see consumer behaviours as relevant for their work, such as in the former 
BERR teams. This point is articulated below by the Office of Renewable 
Energy Development (ORED): 
 
ORED has not used the social sciences / customer insight very much: they are more 
focused on individuals and households and we focus more on commercial 
awareness at a company or industry level. We have talked to the Customer Insight 
 




Team but they have not yet had the resources to help us yet. We used to sponsor 
work on on-shore acceptability but not the behavioural analysis.75  
 
The BERR teams were also situated in a different part of the department than 
the CIT, which was situated in the Energy Efficiency Deployment Office 
division. This reinforces the point made in the previous chapter and in 
Walker’s analysis of social science research officers: the location of 
researchers within an institution has a powerful epistemic influence over the 
sort of work that is produced.  
  As the CIT overcame initial recruitment difficulties and built further 
capacity, it did develop projects with the energy generation and supply 
policy teams from what was formerly BERR. But as one respondent noted in 
spring 2014, there remained a sense that the CIT served those policy teams 
which had a clearer sense of a ‘customer’ who needed to be brought on board 
(i.e. policy areas associated with energy efficiency and energy demand),  
 
“I think we are making too little use of them. I think those parts of DECC that are 
very much about changing behaviours of the public and are seeking the individuals 
of the public - those are having far more engagement with our CI unit, for example, 
than we do. So our energy efficiency/home improvements/climate change –type 
people have far more engagement than what I would call the bit of DECC that is 
‘generation-led’. The big kit.”76 
 
The same respondent added:  
 
“So I think we need to build that capability but I think the value in a resource-
constrained world is for our Customer Insight Team, for example, to prove to us that 
they can enrich our policy-making process rather than being seen as a burden.” 77 
 
 
75 Government Office of Science, 2012, Annex A, p.31. 
76 A policy official in an energy generation team in DECC. 
77 A policy official in an energy generation team in DECC. 
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  Here it was emphasised that social research could be seen as a ‘burden’ in 
terms of creating extra work for busy officials, because while energy 
generation and supply teams had a firm obligation to engage with the legal 
team and with economists who carry out impact assessments, there is no 
such procedural obligation to engage social researchers. 
  The latter point regarding officials’ lacking an institutional requirement to 
seek out social researchers was used in interviews as an example of the 
epistemic hierarchy operating within DECC.78 Despite clear growth in recent 
years, DECC’s social researchers reported at the time that interviews were 
conducted (2013-2014) that they were at (or near) the bottom of this 
hierarchy, and this made it more difficult for their case for more capacity to 
gain influence. Similarly with the epistemic hierarchy described by DEFRA’s 
social researchers, the epistemic hierarchy in DECC was variously described 
by DECC’s specialists in terms of size of budget, number of researchers, 
seniority of staff and how officials framed problems in the first place. 
Economists were described at the top of this hierarchy – followed by 
engineers, scientists, statisticians, with social researchers and operational 
researchers at the bottom. 
  Aware of these epistemic issues, during these years the HCI, HPE, and 
Head of Science sought to prove the salience of social research for policy 
areas across the department’s broad remit – and not just limited to 
behavioural insights or policy evaluation. As one of the researchers recalled, 
there were hitherto limited internal resources or opportunity to do so within 
the CIT and PET: 
 
 




“So when we started it was just us and we gradually grew our respective teams and 
we knew we couldn’t – we didn’t have enough capacity to do all the outward 
looking stuff we wanted to do. We were just so busy trying to run to stand still.”79 
 
The lack of engagement with external researchers was noticed particularly by 
research consultants who had previously worked on climate change policies 
in DEFRA, two of whom reported that DECC was a colder and less open 
institution than DEFRA was.  
  From 2011, the HCI, HPE, and Head of Science collaborated on a variety of 
activities to strengthen DECC’s social research capacity by eliciting external 
support. Four examples of this are identified in the next section, two of 
which are concerned with supporting work within the ‘consumer behaviour’ 
framing of social research, while the other two were intended to broaden the 
repertoire of social research expertise that was available to DECC. Together, 
they helped to build social research capacity by expanding how social 
research was conceived in DECC, what roles it was deemed to be 
appropriate for, and how useful it is perceived to be.  
 
4. 2010-2014: External Support for DECC’s Social Research 
Community 
 
  To supplement social research resources within DECC, and in the light of 
growing internal demand, the HPE, HCI, and Head of Science explored ways 
of working with external actors to develop DECC’s social research capacity, 
particularly with regards to instrumentally contributing towards policy 
 
79 DECC’s HPE. 
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development. Aside from hiring staff on temporary contracts,80 four options 
were pursued: 
 
 Seconding an academic social scientist into DECC 
 Working with the Cabinet Office’s Behavioural Insights Team 
 Establishing a Social Science Expert Panel 
 Placing a GSR member in the Science and Innovation Group 
 
As we will see, the first two of these helped to develop the behavioural 
strand of social research, by creating new roles and an appreciation for it, 
while the latter two did more to expand the meanings associated with social 
research in DECC. Let us briefly consider each in turn.  
 
 A Seconded Social Scientist 4.1
 
  Prior to the recruitment of the two social scientists, the Head of Science 
agreed with the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) to arrange for 
a research fellow to be seconded into the department. Before starting the 
year-long post in February 2010, the research fellow expected to work on set 
projects, but instead he found that he was only person in the department 
with a remit to work on social science issues. As such, he was asked to 
engage civil servants across the department. Referring to the job description 
he was given by the Head of Science, he explained in an interview that his 
purpose was to “challenge and be challenged” – a phrase which resonates 
with DEFRA’s first Chief Scientist’s commitment to providing challenge, 
with whom DECC’s Head of Science previously worked. 
 




  The research fellow spent the start of his fellowship familiarising himself 
with DEFRA’s social science projects, and engaged with civil servants in an 
informal way. He worked particularly closely with the Head of Science, who 
was sceptical about social practice theory at first, but gradually warmed to 
the idea – and even began encouraging colleagues to read a key text for social 
practice theory, Converging Conventions of Comfort, Cleanliness and 
Convenience.81  
  Then, when the HCI joined DECC, the HCI and research fellow decided to 
work together to develop a social science toolkit for policy-makers to use. 
After consulting with academic researchers, they decided to do this by 
summarising a range of existing social science frameworks that policy-
makers could use, to aid civil servants in “thinking through the policy 
challenge that you are trying to address, and the sorts of things that might 
work”.82 The purpose of this was framed in terms of disseminating the 
Cabinet Office’s MINDSPACE approach to understanding and influencing 
behaviours, as DECC’s officials felt a strong pressure to be seen as engaging 
with the Cabinet Office’s recent report.83 Aware of the unpalatability of social 
practices research amongst DEFRA officials (discussed in the next chapter), 
the resulting literature review, published in December 2011,84 could be seen 
as a means of exposing civil servants to the perspective in a de-politicised 
way, via a Trojan horse. It is also noteworthy that the report did not feature 
the sociotechnical transitions literature, since it was felt that policy officials 
and scientists were already engaged with this – although I found no mention 
of it from social researchers.  
 
81 Shove, 2003. 
82 DECC’s HCI. 
83 Dolan et al., 2010. 
84 DECC, 2011a.  
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  The literature review was used as the foundation for workshops to train 
civil servants in applying different models of energy use. They were 
designed to help policy-makers and analysts to look beyond behavioural 
psychology or economic approaches, and to explore social practice theory 
approaches amongst others. These workshops had significant reach across 
the department, and enabled policy-makers to engage with the different 
models directly: 
 
“So in the training we run we do some kind of hands-on work where we get people, 
where we kind of present them with a behaviour change problem, but we get them 
to think it through using MINDSPACE [Dolan et al., 2010] and then we get them to 
think it through using practice theory, and see if they come out with different ideas. 
And very often they do. And it is quite helpful because it shows that using two 
approaches is often good because it helps you to generate more ideas, and different 
ideas, than you’d have had if you only looked at it through one lens.”85 
  
The events thereby helped to enhance the appreciation of the value of 
different types of thinking about people and energy use. But they were found 
to be constrained, for three specific reasons. First, as we will examine in more 
depth in Chapter 7, at this point in time many key decisions about the 
leading energy efficiency and energy demand policies (such as the Green 
Deal, smart meters) had already been made and committed to: 
 
“In practice the opportunities to use that kind of behavioural model right at the start 
of a policy thinking when the territory is really open are really few and far between 
– because that’s not how [the policy process works]… in theory the policy process 
should go, ‘right, we need to, in this instance, reduce carbon emissions by X amount, 
how should we do it? Ah, well in that case, let’s think about…’ You know, you can 
see that kind of structured approach. We have done that back in our past and we do 
it around the Carbon Plans. But actually mostly, that’s not how policy is born. 
Mostly, most of what we’re doing now is what was in the Coalition Plan for 
 




Government. And then you’ve got to work out – where there are choices to be made – 
where can we apply what we know to that.”86 
 
Thus, the opportunity for this sort of social research expertise to contribute in 
a meaningful sense to key policy teams in DECC had been diminished 
because they had already progressed to a later stage of the policy process. It 
was simply the wrong time for this sort of research to be valued. 
  Second, the seconded research fellow recalled that economists who 
attended the workshop remained unconvinced by the idea. He described a 
conversation he had with an economist following a recent workshop, whose 
words were paraphrased as “it’s quite interesting but I just don’t see the need 
for any of this. I mean, what’s wrong with maximised utility functions?”. 
Some economists thus remained sceptical of the value of this form of social 
research. 
  Third, those who attended the workshops were typically relatively low in 
the organisation. And so even if they valued the approach, they lacked the 
influence to reframe energy demand reduction policies to focus instead on 
the reconfiguration of routines and practices, in the way suggested by social 
practice theory: 
 
“You know, to what extent, even with a grade 7 [a ‘middle manager’],87 do they have 
to actually deploy any of these things in practice? Because there are so many 
institutional constraints that prevent them from being able to use them. Unless, the 
point is, that the solution is so effective, that doing all of the additional work is 
worthwhile. So you’ve got to convince a lot of additional people first. And to 
convince a lot of people probably means getting a lot of resource on-board to 
actually make the argument that you can have those people spend their time on this 
policy rather than that – so you know, those are the kinds of trade-offs you face. So 
the point is yes, it’s really useful to see [the December 2011 literature review], and I 
think that’s probably the foundation of the training, but the training can only take 
 
86 DECC’s HCI. 
87 See Chapter 1, Section 4 on grades in the civil service.  
“Challenge and Be Challenged” 
-184- 
 
you so far. And then institutional frameworks can rule against the deployment of 
it.”88 
 
The secondment thus supported the social scientists in expanding how social 
research was understood in the department, but at this time there was little 
opportunity for a new policy to be developed from a social practices 
perspective, or for existing policies to be fundamentally altered.   
 
 Working with the Cabinet Office’s Behavioural Insights Team 4.2
 
  Another option for bringing in social research was to work with the Cabinet 
Office’s then newly formed Behavioural Insights Team (BIT), established by 
David Cameron in July 2010.89 The BIT, also known as the ‘Nudge Unit’,90 
was a well-funded body of researchers – drawing particularly on the 
behavioural sciences (psychology, economics, and social psychology), as 
popularised in the 2008 book, Nudge.91 Indeed one of the book’s authors, 
Richard Thaler, was prominent in the unit’s creation. 
  The BIT were eager to work with DECC to explore ways of reducing the 
public’s energy use. For DECC’s HCI this was an opportunity to bring 
additional social research resource and credibility into the department fast. 
DECC’s growing CIT and the BIT worked together on a variety of studies 
over the next few years. Their first study together was intended to support 
the Green Deal team by investigating whether offering homeowners a loft 
 
88 DECC’s Head of Social Science Engagement. 
89 BBC News, 2010a. 
90 BBC News, 2010a. 




clearance service alongside a loft insulation service would help to increase 
the uptake of the loft insulation service.92  
  In order to make the most of their collaboration, DECC’s researchers 
initially had to challenge their behavioural research colleagues’ preference 
for RCTs above all other methods. As one social researcher who worked with 
the BIT recalled, there are advantages and disadvantages to different social 
science methods, and while RCTs might be afforded a gold standard status 
by some analysts, they have limitations when applied to the policy 
construction process: 
 
“Simply knowing whether your hypothesis is true or not is certainly very useful but 
if you don’t know why, or how or any of those other things, then replicating those 
results and particularly scaling up those results is probably going to be very difficult 
to achieve.”93  
 
  DECC’s social scientists were thus more inclined to decide what social 
research methods would be appropriate for a given problem on a case-by-
case basis. To this end, they argued that along with quantitative data 
collection, qualitative methods should be used to glean an insight into how 
the interventions were having an impact. Qualitative methods were not used 
in the loft insulation service trial discussed above – in which too few people 
signed up for any loft insulation service, rendering the trial inconclusive. But 
qualitative methods were used in a subsequent trial which was run with John 
Lewis, exploring whether energy use labels that include information on the 
lifetime energy use of a white good would be effective in promoting more 
energy efficient products.94  
 
92 DECC, 2013b. 
93 A DECC social researcher (4). 
94 DECC, 2014a. 
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  Working with the BIT was therefore not straightforward. Indeed the success 
of their collaboration cannot straightforwardly be explained, as Peter John 
has argued, in terms of the BIT’s willingness to engage in flexible and ‘non-
hierarchical’ collaborations.95 Rather, in this case, we see that the 
collaboration only became effective when the BIT stopped imposing an 
epistemic preference. Indeed the tensions that arose due to this in the initial 
stages resulted in what one analyst described as a relationship with "us 
managing them”.96 
  Nonetheless, the collaborations did get DECC’s social researchers working 
on RCTs for the first time, and this has since become a staple component of 
the work of social researchers in DECC.97 Working with the BIT did therefore 
help to make social research more visible in the department – particularly 
after it was endorsed by the Secretary of State, as discussed in Subsection 3.1. 
  While respondents pointed out that the BIT have matured in their approach 
to collaborations with government departments, it is striking that no formal 
relationship was established between the BIT and the Government Social 
Research Service before the former was privatised. This raises questions 
about the degree to which the Government Social Research Service was 
recognised as an expert institution during the Coalition Government years.  
 
 Establishing a Social Science Expert Panel  4.3
 
  In a move to expand the possibilities for social research input in DECC’s 
remit, the HPE approached DEFRA’s social researchers to explore the 
 
95 John, 2014, p.258. 
96 A social researcher in DECC (5). 




feasibility of setting up a joint DEFRA-DECC Social Science Expert Panel 
(SSEP). In a context of limited resources, the social researchers from the two 
departments saw benefits in sharing resources to capitalise on the ‘natural 
synergies’ shared between the two departments.98 The funding for this was 
won in 2011. The group had multiple purposes, including to support the 
departments in developing their internal capacity for using social science, 
advising them on how they collect and make use of evidence and advice, 
reviewing research designs and reports, keeping the officials in touch with 
relevant research in the UK and elsewhere, and contributing input into 
specific projects or conducting reviews on an ad-hoc basis.99  
  The panel was established in 2012 with twelve academic social science 
experts, drawing on a diverse body of expertise. This provided an 
opportunity to expand further how social science’s contribution was 
understood in the two departments. As a social researcher described below, 
the panel was valued for its advice - and challenge – with respect to the use 
of evidence in the two departments. This involved meetings every three 
months, as well as producing peer review reports, the occasional literature 
review and, importantly, more ad-hoc conversations with policy officials as 
deemed necessary: 
 
“The first is we have set piece meetings – two or three a year, and we come and 
discuss things that are mutually of interest. So we’ve discussed the DECC Evidence 
Strategy, the DEFRA Evidence Strategy, our model for evaluation, various things 
like that. Which is good, it’s useful, it’s really engaging, interesting conversations we 
have. But almost more importantly, each of them are on our framework of call-off 
contracts. So we can – individual policy teams within each department – can go to 
them for two or three days’ work. So say ‘what do we know about X?’ and they will 
come and – they will put together a paper and come back and deliver it for us. Or, 
‘we’re not quite sure about this piece of work, can you peer review it for us?’ – 
 
98 DEFRA, n.d.(a). 
99 DEFRA, n.d.(a). 
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they’ll go away and do it. So that kind of really responsive… Or come and talk to 
our policy colleagues about a certain issue because they’ll really like to kind of 
discuss it. Because it’s so much more useful discussing something rather than 
reading – especially an academic paper. And so that’s been a really useful model.”100 
 
  The SSEP, then, was seemingly valued by social researchers and policy-
makers as a novel way of bringing social science expertise into the 
departments, particularly in areas where the social dimension had been little 
considered. For instance, it provided resources for social researchers to 
discuss Nimbyism with colleagues in the Electricity, Markets, and 
Infrastructures side of the department (see Subsection 4.4 below). It thus 
informed and legitimised social researchers’ policy discussions with 
colleagues. In this way, it could be drawn upon to help expand the possible 
meanings associated with social research in both departments. The panel also 
provided a symbolic function as, in one researcher’s terms, a ‘boundary 
object’ which “plants a large flag in peoples’ minds”,101 highlighting that the 
department values and engages with social science. In these ways, it was 
seen by interviewees as an important intellectual resource for the 
department’s capacity to provide social research and associated challenge to 
policy teams as well as a symbolic achievement for the recognition of roles 
for social science in energy, food, and environment policy. 
 
 The Head of Social Science Engagement 4.4
 
  In addition to the above efforts to expand the applications of social research 
in DECC, the social scientists arranged with the Head of Science to place a 
GSR-accredited social researcher within the Science and Innovation Group’s 
 
100 DECC’s HPE.  




Evidence team. Here, the researcher would work with DECC’s sympathetic 
Head of Science, in the office of the Chief Scientist. The position would be 
called ‘Head of Social Science Engagement’, and would be a more externally-
facing role to engage academic researchers in an attempt to widen the types 
of social science evidence that would be considered and applied in the 
department’s work. The post was filled by a GSR accredited government 
social researcher in October 2011.  
  Placing the social researcher in the Science and Innovation Group was 
significant. It afforded a perception of distance from the other social 
researchers in the Customer Insight Team or Policy Evaluation Team who, as 
we have seen, were narrowly associated with either consumer demand issues 
or policy evaluation – both of which seemed alien to the minds of those in 
the energy infrastructure teams of the department. The move had its 
drawbacks though, in that there were clear tensions as the actors tried to 
make sense of what he was to do: 
 
“It was a bit of a coup-de-grâce in the sense that there’s a team under the [Chief 
Scientific Advisor] – so neither the [Head of Customer Insight] nor the [Head of 
Policy Evaluation/GSR] were in teams under [the Chief Scientific Advisor]… so I 
had no line management links to either of them [the social researchers]. So I was 
kind of put, in some senses, the worst possible situation. Which is to work to a team 
who doesn’t know what you are doing, and have no formal line management links 
to people who want you to do things… So the line management links to people who 
should have a sense of what I should do did not know what I should do, and the 
people who had no real line management control over me, you know, were the ones 
that wanted me to do things. Yeah, it was not ideal – it has to be said. But they know 
that, and of course I knew that.”102 
 
  The Head of Social Science Engagement saw his role as doubly innovative – 
first in the sense of changing, through challenge, the sorts of questions asked 
 
102 DECC’s Head of Social Science Engagement. 
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by DECC’s policy-makers. This would enable the social sciences to contribute 
more to the policy development process. The second sense in which he saw 
the role as innovative was in regard to his relationship with external 
researchers – he would challenge them to think about addressing DECC’s 
social research requirements:  
 
“There was a sentiment – just from the fact that they had a post with that name – 
that this was a distinctive type of role from your kind of standard cookie-cutter in a 
government department whose job is to work with the policy team, to commission 
social research projects to address specific policy issues – be that either for policy 
development purposes or for policy evaluation purposes. You know, so the usual 
thing is that sort of framework. And this was actually much more of a strategic role, 
influencing internally the sort of questions that are asked. So that the questions that 
are asked involve the ability – or enable the ability – for social sciences to feed in. As 
well as then saying well, are you creating a demand, if you like, for social science? 
And then to look outwards to actually try and meet that demand, you know, by 
bringing in people who are already working in that area or to influence people who 
are working on other topics in climate change so that can be brought to bear on 
energy and climate change in some way.”103 
 
  In this way, the social researcher played a similar function to the rural 
researcher on DEFRA’s Science Advisory Council in 2004, as we saw in the 
previous chapter. There, the rural researcher sought to simultaneously 
convince the animal health sub-committee to consider the contribution of 
social science, and at the same time convince academic social scientists to 
conduct policy-relevant research on this topic. Yet, as a civil servant placed in 
the Science and Innovation Group with a remit to engage policy-makers 
directly from across DECC’s policy portfolio, DECC’s Head of Social Science 
Engagement had greater scope for instilling an appreciation of the potential 
value of social science insights amongst civil servants, by challenging 
 




embedded assumptions and drawing on the latest research from academic 
researchers he encountered.  
  The analyst focused his efforts on engaging officials in the Energy, Markets, 
and Infrastructure Directorate where it was yet to be shown how social 
research could support policy teams in policy construction. In doing so, he 
found it especially useful to draw on the Social Science Expert Panel. For 
instance, he invoked Patrick Devine-Wright’s work104 in a conversation with 
the Head of the Infrastructure Planning Team, who wanted to address the 
Minister’s concern over how to tackle ‘Nimbyism’:  
  
“So I thought ahh, well that’s interesting because of course we had Patrick Devine-
Wright who is the man on Nimbyism in the energy field, who had written a book 
and done lots of research to show that Nimbyism isn’t really what you think. It’s this 
really interesting conundrum around you know how different groups of people, 
their expectations and ownership of energy and things like this play out in 
particular areas. And so not about people disliking [wind turbines] per se but the 
way in which the [wind turbines] are put up – and who’s doing it, and how they do 
it. So there are simple - potentially really obvious ways of tackling Nimbyism that’ll 
be entirely effective and save people lots of money. So I set out as briefly as I could – 
because it’s quite a complex thing to describe – the nature of that kind of problem 
and how good social research in that context could actually solve Nimbyism, or at 
least a good serious chunk of it and then enable planning to look ahead.”105 
 
It is unclear to what extent this particular conversation was followed up by 
the Infrastructure Planning Team.106 Nonetheless, it is clear that such 
conversations did begin to happen, and enabled staff to engage with social 
research insights which could inform a more reflexive approach to current 
and future policy-making processes. 
 
104 E.g. Devine-Wright, 2011. 
105 DECC’s Head of Social Science Engagement. 
106 Possible ‘impact’ in terms of Ed Davey’s decision to increase the money a community 
receives for hosting windfarms, and a possible reduction in energy bills. This was 
introduced at same time as greater powers were granted to local groups to reject wind 
turbines, – see Channel 4 News, 2013. 
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  With his free reining post in a high-status cross-cutting team, the social 
researcher was able to explore opportunities to increase the capacity and 
demand for social research across the department. Perhaps his most 
significant contribution in this post was to work on the department’s Evidence 
Investment Strategy, published in 2014.107 Many of the social researchers 
interviewed deemed this document to be particularly significant, 
highlighting a broad array of areas where social researchers can collaborate 
with technical experts and policy-makers in order to contribute to the 
department’s work. It was thought to symbolise a large step forward in 
expanding how social research was understood within the department – 
moving away from just focusing on policy evaluation and behaviour change. 
  To see this it is striking to compare this document against the 2012 Science 
and Innovation Strategy,108 to gain an insight into the extent of the change in 
conceptualising the meanings, roles, and value of social research over this 
time period – at least within the team of scientists. The 2014 Evidence 
Investment Strategy presented a broader conception of social research’s role, 
highlighting the need to develop research on how investment decisions are 
made with respect to energy generation and distribution, how policy areas 
interact, and how positive community engagement could be achieved.109 By 
contrast, the 2012 Science and Innovation Strategy110 presented a much 
narrower sense of the contribution of social research. At that time, the CIT’s 
role was described in relatively narrow terms – supporting DECC’s 
‘customer facing’ policies, supporting energy efficiency work and building 
customer insight capacity across the department.  
 
107 DECC, 2014c.  
108 DECC, 2012b.  
109 DECC, 2014c, p.14. 




  In the 2014 document then, we see signs of expansion in the interpretations 
of what social research is and what social researchers’ roles in the 
department are. In particular, it points to ways in which social research can 
contribute constructively to the supply side of the department, through 
providing a deeper understanding of how investment decisions might be 
influenced and insights into how the sociotechnical systems of energy supply 
and energy efficiency operate.  
  Reflecting on his experiences, the Head of Social Science Engagement 
reported that, much like the CIT and PET analysts, he did not encounter 
prejudice from colleagues towards the social sciences per se. Consistent with 
the CIT and PET researchers, he claimed that DECC’s policy staff did not 
pose barriers to social research: 
 
“The kind of evidence that they want is evidence about how the world works. That’s 
as much as I could say – they don’t really care – or differentiate very often – about 
whether it’s engineering evidence, whether it’s social research evidence, whether it’s 
economics evidence. You know, some of them will be sceptical if it’s social science, 
because some of them maybe are sceptical of social science – not many, one or two. 
But generally if it looks credible then they’ll go, ‘OK, that’s useful stuff’, they’ll take 
that on board. So pretty much policy officials don’t really care, as long as it’s good – 
credible to them, or it ticks boxes, in so far as it looks like the right kind of stuff. So 
to help them you need to persuade somebody else.”111 
 
  Rather than finding a stigma associated with social research (as some 
analysts reported in DEFRA) it seems that in DECC’s case the major barrier 
remained in conceptualising what social researchers could do to help the 
energy markets and infrastructure side of the department – a question which 
was slowly beginning to be answered.  
 
111 DECC’s Head of Social Science Engagement. 
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  However, this researcher did experience some opposition in the form of 
naivety, stemming from a lack of prior engagement with social research. He 
reported that this was especially the case with the then Chief Scientist, who 
led his team: 
 
“You know, some technical scientists can be – you know they’re nice people, really 
smart people, but just don’t know what a social scientist does. And/or think they 
know what they do and that they can do it – which is the other annoying thing. So, 
yes senior staff essentially talking for you, or talking over you, because they think 
they know social science, is probably the single hardest thing to manage…So you 
kinda have to read between the lines a little bit and look at how they are acting, and 
whether they are taking on board anything you are saying as an indication of 
whether or not they value your contribution.”112 
 
In this way, senior individuals in the department were able to – perhaps 
unwittingly – limit opportunities for social researchers to challenge 
preconceived assumptions. In this researcher’s experience, academic 
scientists and engineers were more likely to need convincing of the value of 
social researchers’ contributions than policy officials were. This is perhaps an 
indication of how far recognition for social research expertise had already 
come in DECC prior to this official’s arrival.  
  The Head of Social Science Engagement post was abolished in late 2014 
when the researcher left the position. The former Head of Social Science 
Engagement reflects ambivalently on his efforts. He notes that nobody 
replaced him in that post, which implies that his tenure of it was probably 
seen as unsuccessful. But this fact could also be seen as indicative of its 
success in fulfilling a specific function, of raising the profile of social research 
expertise across DECC, as was required at that particular time. It is in any 
case clear that during his time he did stimulate conversations which could, 
 




subsequently, enable a more reflexive approach to DECC’s remit. And if 
these insights are taken further in DECC’s successor, the Department for 
Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (DBEIS), then significant progress 
can be made towards using social science as a basis from which to develop 
policies – which was described by the former Head of Science as ‘a work-in-
progress’ in the epigraph for this chapter. 
 
5. Recent Developments 
 
  The period between mid-2014 and spring 2016 saw some big changes in 
DECC’s social research capacity. The first Head of Customer Insight left 
DECC in spring 2014, and was replaced by a government social researcher 
within the team. This HCI and the Head of Policy Evaluation (HPE) split the 
role of Head of Profession for Government Social Research until the latter left 
in spring 2016. Over this time, the social research community continued to 
engage across both sides of the divide in the department – not only on policy 
development and evaluation projects related to energy demand and energy 
efficiency (as we will see in the next chapter), but also in the side concerned 
with the ‘big kit’. This includes completing an evaluation of the electricity 
market reform under the Coalition Government113 – which was described in 
an interview as an innovative project for social research in terms of the scale 
and wide-ranging nature of the policy project under evaluation.114 They also 
worked closely with the Office for Nuclear Development in the 
commissioning and subsequent evaluation of public dialogues and 
stakeholder workshops on the siting of geological disposal facilities for 
 
113 Grant Thornton, 2015. 
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nuclear waste.115 Social researchers’ engagement was described to be highly 
regarded and influential – in terms of shaping not only a white paper on the 
topic, but also for potentially setting a precedent in the department for using 
such approaches again.116 As such, nuclear energy officials’ instrumental 
rationales to deliver the minister’s commitments have resulted in early 
engagement with social research with the opportunity for citizens to have a 
greater say in decisions. 
  The social research community’s capacity to work in even the most 
technical areas of department’s remit was reportedly aided further in the 
department’s final year by a succession of restructuring moves. Directorates 
were reorganised to enable better integration of the energy demand and 
energy efficiency teams with the energy supply, infrastructure, and markets 
teams. The steps are particularly notable between around heat policy and 
energy efficiency in the final organisational chart (April 2016)117 before DECC 
was dissolved so that DBEIS could be formed. 
  Perhaps more significantly for the work of DECC’s social research 
community in general, the PET and CIT were merged in July 2015.118 They 
were situated together along with economists and other analysts under the 
Corporate Services Division. At first glance, this move had two benefits: first, 
it enabled social researchers from the CIT and PET to provide better support 
for each other. As a result, they were better placed, as a community, to 
flexibly manage the department’s social research portfolio as a whole – such 
that staff can be spread across evaluation and customer insight projects as 
required. Second, the move enabled social researchers to collaborate more 
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closely with other analysts in the department – including economists who, as 
we saw in Subsection 3.2, policy officials felt a stronger obligation to work 
with due to their need to conduct economic impact assessments. If this 
arrangement has been continued in DBEIS then it may provide greater scope 
for closer interdisciplinary working between analysts.   
  Yet, this restructuring also has the corollary of taking social researchers 
away from their policy colleagues. As we saw when this happened with 
DEFRA’s community of sustainable consumption and production 
researchers in 2010 (Chapter 4, Section 4), this runs the risk that they may 
find it harder to maintain the rapport that they previously enjoyed, and 
consequently struggle to provide a challenge function to policy teams. This 
risk is further confounded by additional changes. As we saw in Section 2 of 
this chapter, the core department did not have its budget reduced in the 
spending review of 2010, enabling the social research community to grow to 
meet (and shape) the demands of policy teams over the next few years. In the 
spending review of November 2015 however, DECC’s ‘day-to-day’ budget 
was reduced by 22%,119 placing pressure on staff to justify each post and 
project. In this context, the new structure would make it harder for the social 
research community to expand its reach and influence, and not aid the 
creation of posts for social researchers within the senior civil service. As 
such, there is an additional risk that the subject knowledge expertise that the 
social research community has accumulated over the years may be lost in the 
changes between staff - which in turn may weaken their ability to provide 
challenge. 
 
119 HM Government, 2015b. 
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  In addition to this, we may point to two further threats to the sustainability 
of DECC’s social research capacity: the fact that the former Head of Social 
Science Engagement was not replaced, and the dissolving of DEFRA-DECC 
Social Science Expert Panel in 2016. As we have seen in the previous section, 
these were both important in supporting the internal social research 
community to provide a challenge function, in part by providing new 
interpretations of the meanings and value of social research in the subject 
knowledge they translated to officials. However, while the expert panel was 
dissolved, the reported reason for this is that the social researchers decided 
that they could better proceed with separate social science advisory bodies to 
reflect their distinct approaches, interests, and remits. This external 
engagement is therefore expected to continue, and while the Head of Social 
Science Engagement was not replaced, there is an open question as to 
whether this role is still necessary in a department where social research 
input is more valued, in an instrumental sense, across the department than it 
was when the department first opened. 
  Clearly then, despite some institutional and financial pressures, DECC’s 
social research capacity was in a relatively strong position when the 
department closed in July 2016. And while social researchers still occupied 
less senior posts, were fewer in number, and held smaller budgets than other 
analysts in DECC, it is striking that since the first couple of years the 
legitimacy of their expertise has not been threatened. Indeed in contrast to 
DEFRA’s social researchers (Chapter 4, Section 5) no researchers in DECC 
claimed that their colleagues failed to appreciate the value of their 





  In this sense, we can understand the optimism expressed by one social 
researcher before the 2015 reductions in the department’s spending limits 
were announced: 
 
“I think in DECC unless something goes horribly wrong – from an evaluation 
perspective, which again, is kind of my thing, we could kind of crash and burn if 
some of our big set-piece things don’t actually deliver anything useful, but I think 
we’ve designed them in such a way that they will. And it very much is built into the 
policy development and delivery project and programme management – it’s built 
into that. So I think, touch wood, it should go from strength to strength actually. 
Because I think we’re delivering something genuinely useful as opposed to telling 
people you have to do this and they don’t actually see the value – I think we 
genuinely see the value of it… possibly.”120 
  
The next few years may well see social researchers build on this progress by 
contributing earlier in policy design and development processes across the 
new department’s wide remit, and working more with teams concerned with 
energy supply and infrastructure issues.  
 
6. Concluding the DECC Story 
 
  In summary, it is clear that after a tumultuous start where senior staffs’ 
preconceptions and institutional barriers conspired to prevent the initial 
growth of social research capacity, social research came to be appreciated 
and resourced across DECC. 
  Much like in the previous chapter on DEFRA, the growth in social research 
capacity within DECC is more complicated than we might have assumed. It 
was not the case that policy officials simply took note of research conducted 
in academia or elsewhere and recruited social researchers to translate 
findings or to commission related projects for their own purposes – far from 
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it. Instead we see that internal demand for social research was stimulated 
after years of effort from internal and external social scientists to create 
internal capacity for what they saw as relevant social science expertise for the 
department, as well as to spur external interest and research agendas that 
could support the department. In this department, which initially framed its 
remit in narrowly economic and engineering terms, it was only after internal 
capacity was established that many policy officials started to see how social 
research could be relevant for their remit, and thus began to appreciate the 
value of commissioning social research. 
  Gradually, the social research community grew in resource, size, and reach. 
Starting from a clean slate and with external support, the analysts overcame 
structural adversity to develop a distinctly DECC-flavoured social research 
tradition. In an epistemic context that favoured economic and engineering 
perspectives over others, and against a backdrop of growing prominence in 
behavioural trials across government, DECC’s social research community 
earned a reputation for understanding peoples’ behaviours, and were 
particularly associated with the use of behavioural trials. But the HCI and 
HPE then used their roles to reframe understandings of social research, for 
example by developing a Social Science Expert Panel and embedding a social 
researcher amongst the scientists. Notably, it is chiefly amongst other 
analysts, not generalists, that social researchers claimed to have encountered 
contestation over their expertise in recent times – in contrast to DEFRA 
which, as we saw in the previous chapter, had some policy teams which 
remained suspicious of social researchers.  
  Last, on the evidence presented so far of the inner workings in DEFRA and 
DECC, these departments do not resemble the depictions of UK policy 




scientistic.121 In both, challenge from social science was, on the whole, 
acknowledged as an important contribution of internal and external social 
scientists. But what we have yet to establish is to what extent, and how, 
social researchers have actually influenced policy-making processes. The 
next two chapters address this problem by focusing on policy areas in which 
social researchers have been particularly active. These chapters will expose a 
great variety of social researchers’ influence under different conditions. 
  
 













Influencing Behaviours in DEFRA? Social 
Researchers and Sustainable Consumption 
 
“Start where the people are at” 
 
- A phrase that was used particularly by social researchers in the SCP area to 





AVING CONSIDERED efforts to expand capacity at the department-wide 
level, this chapter and the next focus on how social researchers’ 
influence has been socially negotiated within specific policy areas in DEFRA 
and DECC. While capacity has clearly grown, what forms of influence have 
social researchers exercised, and under what conditions?  
  This chapter addresses these questions by studying the case of social 
researchers’ engagement with DEFRA’s work on sustainable consumption 
and production (SCP), which hosted DEFRA’s work on pro-environmental 
behaviour change for approximately a decade. The next chapter considers 
social researchers’ influence in DECC’s work on energy efficiency and 
demand reduction. Both policy domains have a significant component 
H 
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associated with influencing how citizens live their everyday lives, and 
comparisons between the departments will be drawn in the final chapter.  
  The introduction to this thesis highlighted that the Government Social 
Research Unit identifies ‘behaviour change’ as an area of expertise held by 
social researchers, although its interpretation within distinct departments is 
open-ended and likely to vary over time. Government can attempt to change 
what citizens do in various ways: by providing financial incentives and 
information provision, by making alterations in the context in which choices 
are made, and/or by disrupting particular patterns of practice and 
reinforcing others. Each of these approaches affords claims to expertise from 
actors from a wide range of disciplines: economists, behavioural economists, 
behavioural psychologists, communications experts, marketing experts, 
social scientists, geographers, and others. Within government departments 
economists, statisticians, communication staff, social researchers, and even 
generalists may claim epistemic authority over how best to change citizens’ 
behaviour. A key concern in this chapter, then, is to understand and 
contextualise the influence that social researchers achieved while working in 
SCP policy. As we will see, DEFRA’s work on promoting environmentally 
friendly behaviours did not begin with the arrival of social researchers but it 
came to be increasingly shaped by them. Moreover the idea of social research 
came to be associated with the idea of behaviour change – not only in 
DEFRA but, as we will see in the next chapter, also in DECC. 
  This chapter therefore provides an answer to research question three: 
 
Research Question 3: How have social researchers influenced work on specific policy 





  To address this question, the chapter begins by setting out changes in the 
political, institutional, and epistemic context which preceded the arrival of 
the first social researcher in the SCP team. Section 3 then investigates how 
social researchers’ behaviour change work gradually gained significance 
since 2006, highlighting increasingly reflexive ways in which social research 
insights were applied within SCP policy development and implementation. 
Section 4 reflects on the subsequent expansion and then decline of social 
researchers’ (and colleagues’) work on sustainable consumption between 
2009 and 2015, and Section 5 links the discussion back to the research 
questions – suggesting that we should rethink reflexivity in the light of the 
data presented in this chapter.  
  The next chapter will address the same research question with respect to 
social researchers’ engagement with social researchers’ involvement in key 
energy efficiency and demand reduction policy areas in DECC.  
 
2. 2001-06: After Are You Doing Your Bit? 
 
  The aim of this section is to outline the context in which a ‘window of 
opportunity’ emerged,1 in which social research expertise came to be 
increasingly influential within the SCP, between 2001 and 2006.  
  Since the 1980s, successive UK Governments have sought to encourage 
citizens to act in more environmentally friendly ways – using, amongst other 
tools, national communications campaigns.2 Prior to DEFRA’s formation 
 
1 Kingdon, 1995. 
2 Another important mechanism for this is the Environmental Action Fund, which provided 
support to community groups and organisations to deliver sustainable development projects 
at a local or regional level. The fund began in 1992 in DETR, and continued in DEFRA until 
2008 (Brook Lyndhurst, 2009).  
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these campaigns were managed by the Department of the Environment 
(subsequently Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions) 
and the Department of Energy.3 Campaigns included, under the 
Conservative Government, Helping the Earth Begins at Home (1991- c.1996), 
and Going for Green (1995-1998), and under the Labour Government, Are You 
Doing Your Bit? (1998-2001).4  
  At the time of DEFRA’s creation, Are You Doing Your Bit? was a live 
campaign. It was, at first, deemed internally to be well-grounded in research 
insights. At an Environmental Futures Forum session on ‘Domestic Best 
Practices Addressing Climate Change’ at the G8 Summit in February 2000, 
the campaign’s coordinator in the Department of the Environment, Transport 
and the Regions presented the campaign as an example of UK Government 
best practice, using qualitative research to “help shape its direction” (by 
focusing on specific, positive messages about what people could do) and 
quantitative research to monitor its success.5 Yet, over the next year, policy 
officials would question whether Are You Doing Your Bit? really was an 
example of ‘best practice’. A qualitative study commissioned in late 2000 - at 
the peak of the campaign – found that it had achieved a great level of 
awareness using national media campaigns and a roadshow which toured 
the country promoting sustainable action within local communities.6 But the 
study also found that the campaign had little impact beyond raising 
awareness. As one former DEFRA generalist (with expertise in marketing 
 
3 Until 1992 when most of the Department of Energy’s portfolio was moved back into the 
Department of Trade and Industry, excluding the Energy Efficiency Office which found its 
way into the Department of the Environment (Barr, 2008, pp.88-89), and eventually into 
DEFRA, and then DECC. 
4 Barr, 2008, p.90. 
5 Environment Agency (Japan), 2000. 




and communications) recalled, in terms of actions adopted by members of 
the public, the project had “achieved sweet f*** all”.7  
  Aware that Are You Doing Your Bit? had achieved little by means of 
motivating action, and in the midst of crisis surrounding DEFRA’s portfolio 
when the department was established, £5 million of the campaign’s 2001 
budget was diverted towards managing the FMD crisis.8 As a result, the 
campaign team dropped media advertising and the remaining budget was 
spent on maintaining the travelling roadshow.  
  It was not long, however, before the idea of promoting sustainable living to 
citizens was revived. Following the World Summit on Sustainable 
Development in Johannesburg in August/September 2002, sustainable 
consumption and production emerged as a policy priority for DEFRA.9 
There, the Secretary of State for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, 
Margaret Beckett, committed to ambitious targets to make consumption and 
production more sustainable. There was now a renewed focus on promoting 
sustainable action across society, with a drive to ensure that any new 
initiatives move beyond awareness-raising and achieve substantive change.  
  In this context where improved outcomes were desired, and despite an 
absence of social researchers within DEFRA at the time, social research 
projects were commissioned by different policy teams between 2003 and 2005 
to aid policy-makers to think through how best to make consumption and 
production more sustainable in the UK. As we will see, this provided an 
 
7 A former DEFRA civil servant with prior experience in marketing, based in the 
Communications Directorate; self-styled ‘behaviour change expert’ – a title reflected on his 
DEFRA business cards. 
8 House of Commons Environment Food and Rural Affairs Select Committee, 2001.  
9 DEFRA, 2003b, p.18. 
“Challenge and Be Challenged” 
-208- 
 
opportunity for qualitative research to contribute at an early stage in 
identifying options within SCP policy. 
 One of the first qualitative research outputs was a report commissioned by 
the Sustainable Development Commission (SDC), a quango which worked 
closely with DEFRA’s SCP policy team. The SDC asked its economics 
commissioner, Tim Jackson from Surrey University, and Laurie Michaelis 
from Oxford University, to review the academic literature on sustainable 
consumption. Their report challenged government and stakeholders to 
reconceive the role of government in shaping consumption patterns, arguing 
that ‘conventional approaches’ (such as education and information provision, 
regulation and fiscal interventions) are neither effective tools nor the limits of 
the resources available to government for influencing individual behaviour.10 
To this end, the researchers emphasised the importance of understanding 
how consumption behaviours get ‘locked-in’, the significance of 
exemplifying good practice where it has occurred already, and the value of 
working with, influencing, and learning from a broad community of actors.  
  This analysis was intended to feed into DEFRA’s and the Department of 
Trade and Industry’s joint SCP framework. Both the research project and 
framework were published in September 2003.11 The framework does not 
draw heavily on the insights from Jackson and Michaelis’s report, instead 
framing the main drivers for achieving sustainable consumption in the 
relatively narrow terms of information, prices, regulation, or barriers to 
competition.12 However, the framework report did show some signs of 
 
10 Jackson and Michaelis, 2003, pp.57-65.  
11 HM Government, 2005. 




conceptual use of research,13 in emphasising that academic research on 
sustainable consumption is ‘highly complicated’ and heavily contested, but is 
nonetheless worthy of policy-makers’ attention because “policy interventions 
will not be fully effective unless the drivers for consumer behaviour are 
better understood and taken into account.”14 It was hoped that by grappling 
with this research better, the team could improve on Are You Doing Your Bit? 
in terms of influencing citizens’ behaviours.  
  The following month a similar analysis on sustainable consumption was 
commissioned – this time by DEFRA’s Communications Directorate.15 The 
research project was tendered via the Central Office of Information (COI), 
and was won by a research consultancy with experience in marketing, led by 
Andrew Darnton. Two studies were produced, which focused on 
communicating sustainable development to the public. This research is 
particularly notable for (i) emphasising that qualitative research (which is 
argued to be most appropriate for understanding public levels of 
understanding) shows that very few people can explain the concept of 
sustainable development, with many ‘going blank’ or fishing for clues when 
asked16 and ii) for proposing that DEFRA should consider adopting a market 
segmentation approach to public campaigns, noting that segmenting the 
public and tailoring messages for specific audiences is typically not done by 
those seeking to promote sustainable development.17 Darnton’s analysis also 
reinforced Jackson and Michaelis’s suggestion that government should 
 
13 Nutley et al., 2007, p.36. 
14 DEFRA, 2003b, p.16. 
15 Darnton, 2004a, p.3. 
16 Darnton, 2004a, p.6. 
17 Darnton, 2004b, p.26. 
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support community groups and non-governmental organisations that can 
drive collective action.18  
  DEFRA thus began to engage with qualitative research on sustainable 
consumption in 2003 and 2004 – with some signs of conceptual learning 
taking place at this time. As we saw in Chapter 4, in January 2005 the Central 
Analytical Directorate hired its first Government Social Research (GSR) 
accredited government social researcher. This analyst had a cross-cutting role 
across the department’s remit, but also helped the sustainable development 
strategy team to translate academic insights into ideas in their forthcoming 
sustainable development strategy document, Securing the Future – published 
in March 2005.19 
  A close reading shows that by the time this strategy document was 
produced, DEFRA’s approach to behaviour change had undergone a marked 
shift since the 2003 SCP framework. Now, under the heading of ‘helping 
people make better choices’,20 there was a wider discussion of the range of 
tools at government’s disposal, including attention paid to communities and 
interaction, as well as a recognition that government has a role to play in 
leading, managing and exemplifying change. This was summarised in the 
4Es model (see Figure 3 on the next page), which was designed as a tool for 
policy-makers to use when considering how to achieve policy goals which 
hinge upon a change in the public’s behaviours.21 
 
 
18 Darnton, 2004b, p.14. 
19 HM Government, 2005. 
20 HM Government, 2005, p.24. 








  Informed by the previously discussed literature reviews, this model 
encourages policy-makers to consider a broad repertoire of instruments for 
catalysing pro-environmental behaviour change, including government’s 
capacity to work with community groups and social networks, to encourage 
skills development, and to reflect on institutional relationships (including 
those involving government itself) – all with a view of achieving a 
considerable degree of change in citizens’ actions. It is clear, then, that the 
strategy was shaped, in rather ‘direct’22 ways, by the sorts of qualitative 
 
22 Owens, 2015, p.127. 
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analyses considered thus far – although, as we will see, Darnton’s advice to 
develop a public segmentation model was not heeded until a later time. 
    The influence of social science at this time must be understood within a 
broader and changing epistemic context within DEFRA and also more 
widely across the civil service. We saw in Chapter 4 that from 2003 onwards 
DEFRA’s Science Directorate and the Science Advisory Council highlighted 
the value that social research can bring across the department – for instance 
“to improve our understanding of the economic and social drivers of change 
in resource use and assess different ways of influencing behaviour”.23 
Alongside this, there was a broader shift towards appreciating behavioural 
research in government, fuelled by a report produced David Halpern and 
colleagues for the Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit. This was published in 
February 2004, and helped to further attract interest in behaviour change 
expertise across Whitehall – reframing how civil servants conceived what 
they did. This report represented all government activity as an effort to 
produce, in one way or another, behaviour change in society.24 As this 
quotation from a former senior official in DEFRA suggests, this perspective 
began to percolate into senior officials’ conversations in DEFRA: 
 
“Certainly in DEFRA it came to a point when we recognised that we couldn’t just 
invent new policies and put them out and just expect them to be implemented and 
followed. At that time,  there was quite a lot of fundamental thinking being done 
asking the basic question ‘what are we really trying to do?’. So, what do we do? 
When you think about what government departments actually do, they prohibit 
certain things; and then they subsidise certain things; they also give out advice. 
There are other things they do but basically that is it. Prohibitions are criminal/legal 
sanctions, so there’ll be a law saying you can’t do this or that – so if you take fishing 
policy for example, there’d be a law saying that you can’t catch certain species of 
fish at certain times of the year – and if you do, you would be fined or go to prison. 
 
23 DEFRA, 2003a, p.12. 




And then there are the support schemes – for example, under the common 
agricultural policy – the Government will give you, depending on the crop, a certain 
amount of money per hectare for growing that crop. And then there’s advice – and 
there is a huge number of advisory notes that government departments produce 
each year. But then various people started asking the basic question ‘well actually 
what is this all for?’. And then the penny dropped and somebody said, “well it’s all 
about effecting behaviour change”. And that was the first time it was said explicitly: 
“we’re in the business of behaviour change”. “Well, do we have anybody in the 
department who understands how to effect behaviour change?” “Nope!” “Well 
we’d better get some people in!” And that’s when DEFRA started getting social 
scientists involved.””25 
 
Within this epistemic context, and a time of strong political commitment and 
a desire to move beyond the failings of previous information campaign, 
Securing the Future resonated with the changing epistemic context in DEFRA 
by endorsing the view that policy-makers must better understand how to 
change behaviour – and indeed by going further than the other reports to 
claim that it should be treated as a “core policy skill”.26 Where previously it 
was taken for granted that economists and communications managers 
possessed the relevant expertise for developing communications campaigns, 
the new behaviour change paradigm27 made it possible for others’ claims to 
expertise to be considered legitimate.  
  Shortly after Securing the Future was published, DEFRA’s waste policy team 
published a report which was intended to set out a direction for the team’s 
work on behaviour change. This project was commissioned from a social 
marketing research consultancy.28 Consistent with Darnton’s previous review 
for the Communications Directorate, the authors advocated a segmentation-
based approach to better target public communications on waste issues. The 
research consultants later collaborated with Andrew Darnton to develop a 
 
25 A former scientist in DEFRA (3). 
26 HM Government, 2005, p.27.  
27 In the sense of an epistemic worldview – Kuhn, 1970.  
28 The Social Marketing Practice, 2005.  
“Challenge and Be Challenged” 
-214- 
 
prototype segmentation model – without funding – confidently anticipating 
the direction they believed that DEFRA was moving towards. Given the 
failure of previous campaigns and the social marketing evidence that was 
mounting within and around DEFRA, it seemed obvious to these consultants 
that a segmentation model would come next. Looking back at how DEFRA 
used this work in later years (as we will see in Section 3), these researchers 
conclude that their instinct was vindicated: 
 
“And I know that when they started to look at this and the earlier workers picked 
up our work on this they said ‘this is great, thank you, this is exactly what we 
needed to start feeding into our own segmentation model’, which they then 
developed.” 29 
 
  This section has therefore shown that within and around DEFRA, actors 
gradually warmed to the idea that social marketing expertise in 
segmentation models on the one hand, and academic social scientists’ deeper 
appreciation of the symbolic status that consumption holds in society on the 
other, would aid the department to go beyond the shortcomings of Are You 
Doing Your Bit?. Dormant seeds30 were being planted which would, in time, 
reshape how the SCP team would seek to engage citizens. In late 2005, the 
policy team found a marketing and communications expert to help them 
implement these ideas in practice, and also decided to temporarily embed a 
seconded academic social scientist within their policy team. The social 
researcher was to be a research manager, who would help the team to build 
the evidence base for interventions on sustainable consumption. Experience 
with academic research on sustainable consumption was deemed necessary 
for this role. 
 
29 A research consultant (1). 




 The next section focuses on the work of the SCP team between 2006 and 
2009, highlighting how social researchers worked with colleagues to 
negotiate the influence of social research within that policy area.   
  
3. 2006-2009: Twelve Behaviours for Seven Publics 
   
  The SCP team’s social research post was filled in early 2006, just before 
David Miliband became the Secretary of State leading DEFRA. Although the 
previous section highlighted that social research was already having some 
influence on the work of the SCP team, we will see that the team’s new 
researcher enabled the influence of social research to be elevated to a new 
level. There are two key reasons for this. One is that the first analyst’s 
addition to the team marks a shift towards commissioning empirical research 
projects as opposed to reviews of existing literature. The second is that being 
placed within the team enabled social researchers to work closely with the 
generalists, and to challenge assumptions they held about citizens’ 
engagement with environmental issues. Before we consider social 
researchers’ contribution however, we must explore the work that the SCP 
team was already developing at this time. The first subsection addresses this 
by outlining how it was decided what behaviours the Government should 
promote to the public. The second subsection discusses how the analyst was 
able to negotiate their influence within the team. The third subsection then 
considers how the researcher’s projects were translated into policy 
development during that time. This will reveal that through a gradual 
process of contestation and collaboration, social research expertise came to be 
increasingly influential within SCP policy, such that behaviour change came 
to be seen as synonymous with social research expertise – affording social 
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researchers a greater role to play not only in evidence gathering, but also in 
the early stages of policy development. 
 
 Selecting Behaviours 3.1
 
  When David Miliband replaced Margaret Beckett as Secretary of State in 
May 2006,31 he placed tackling climate change at the top of DEFRA’s 
priorities, and called for ‘one planet living’.32 This was significant not only 
because it reinforced the standing of work on sustainable consumption 
within the department, but also because it clarified DEFRA’s stance on 
conflicting issues within the department’s remit. In a political context where 
DEFRA had very recently disappointed many farmers in its implementation 
of the European Union’s single payment scheme,33 there were emerging 
tensions between DEFRA’s commitment to supporting the agriculture 
industry on the one hand and its ambitions to reducing the environmental 
impacts of consumption and production in the UK. A lack of clarity over 
how the department should proceed became a hurdle for the SCP team’s 
initial work such that a planned citizens’ forum on food behaviours was 
aborted during Beckett’s leadership, as a research consultant remembers: 
  
“The food project that never went anywhere was launched when she [Margaret 
Beckett] was Secretary of State…One of the reasons that that project never got off the 
ground was because of the conflicts and tensions. And then David Miliband came in 
and he said ‘right, we’re about climate change. That trumps everything, off you go 
folks!’ And then that must have resolved some of the tensions – I mean, not got rid 
of them entirely, but at least gave clear guidance from the top of the shop about 
what the priorities were.”34 
 
31 BBC News, 2006. 
32 Miliband, 2006a.  
33 Owens, 2015, p.253. 




  In addition to setting climate change and SCP as top priorities under his 
leadership, David Miliband saw government’s role as “empowering and 
enabling citizens”.35 This was at a time of reportedly widespread public 
concern with preventing environmental damage and climate change, 
according to surveys and focus groups.36 His stated reason for addressing 
sustainable consumption was the high environmental impact of 
consumption, although at the same time the Government also recognised 
that encouraging greater awareness and participation in reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions amongst citizens could help to build support for 
more ambitious policies.37 In this way, the politician’s epistemic worldview 
was closely aligned with the new epistemic context within DEFRA: both 
framed the problem in terms of influencing individual citizens’ behaviours.  
  Soon after his appointment, Miliband instructed the SCP team to identify a 
small number of steps that the Government could recommend people take, 
via the Directgov website, to reduce the environmental impact of particular 
behaviours.38 DEFRA’s SCP team then commissioned Green Alliance to host 
and report on three workshops in Autumn 2006, bringing a broad variety of 
stakeholder groups together to collectively agree on the priority pro-
environmental activities that Government should promote to members of the 
public so as to achieve ‘a step-change’ in sustainable action.39 It was believed 
that this approach would enable DEFRA to learn from the experiences of 
environmental organisations, and also achieve some ‘buy-in’ from those 
 
35 Green Alliance, 2006, p.6.  
36 Sustainable Consumption Roundtable, 2006, p.10. 
37 HM Government, 2006, p.121.  
38 A former SCP policy official (1). 
39 Green Alliance, 2006.  
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groups, who volunteered their time to contribute to the process.40 As such, 
the SCP team’s social researcher and social marketing official did not 
propose projects for this aspect of the team’s work. However the group did 
single out social marketing expertise as important for subsequently ‘selling’ 
the actions to citizens, and literature on sustainable consumption was cited to 
make the point that DEFRA must move beyond information campaigns and 
tackle the structures that ‘lock-in’ particular behaviours.41  
  The workshop participants eventually agreed upon the shortlist of key 
behaviours (see Appendix 4, Figure A4-2).42 After consultation with other 
policy teams (within DEFRA and also within the Department for Transport), 
DEFRA’s SCP team settled on twelve key behaviours, spanning across home 
resource use, transport, and products – as noted in the diagram in Figure 4 
on the next pages. 
  Two observations from this process are worth highlighting here. First, the 
workshop participants considered the likely public acceptability of particular 
behaviours as part of their criteria for the shortlist. But with no empirical 
evidence on UK citizens’ current views on the acceptability of different 
actions under consideration, the ensuing discussion involved high levels of 
disagreement and it was agreed that the shortlist might have looked different 
otherwise.43 Second, it is clear that the impact of meat consumption remained 
a difficult issue at this time. Some workshop participants argued that ‘low 
impact diet’ should be placed higher on the y-axis in recognition of the 
relatively high carbon emissions associated with eating animal protein. In 
response it was claimed that the impact was somewhat counterbalanced by 
 
40 Green Alliance, 2006, p.4. 
41 Green Alliance, 2006, pp.7-8. 
42 Green Alliance, 2006, p.62. 




negative ‘knock on effects’ that reduced meat consumption would likely 
have on UK fishing stocks.44 Besides this, there was also the question of 
whether it should be removed from the shortlist because of its likely 
unpopularity with citizens, while others rejected this on the basis that they 
should not be afraid of making difficult decisions for the environment. The 
result was thus clearly a negotiated and highly contingent outcome, but 
nonetheless succeeded in its aims to identify key behaviours and to achieve 
buy-in for these from environmental groups. 
   
  In retrospect, this process can be considered a missed opportunity for 
empirical social research to inform the selection of target behaviours. But 
over the same time period that these workshops were taking place, the SCP 
team was exploring how best they could promote particular behaviours to 
 
44 Green Alliance, 2006, p.37. 
Figure 4: Twelve Target Behaviours (DEFRA, 2008a, p.5) 
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citizens, and here social research was able to play a more instrumental role. 
We will consider this next. 
  
 From Informing to Understanding…? 3.2
 
  While the policy team were eager to learn from academic and social 
marketing expertise about behaviour change – and despite a growing 
recognition across DEFRA of social marketing and sustainable consumption 
researchers’ expertise in understanding behaviour – the new social 
researcher perceived that the officials held problematic preconceived notions 
of the public and of what was required in order to engage citizens. Drawing 
on her expertise as an academic social scientist working on sustainable 
consumption, the seconded researcher (soon to become a permanent social 
researcher) recalled that a lot of work went into revealing and challenging 
the policy officials’ ‘scientistic’45 assumptions about the power of a top-down 
message to influence citizens’ behaviours: 
 
“I don’t think you should underestimate the size of the step that was being taken. 
Because at the time it was still a ‘we need a comms campaign that tells people what 
to do’. And it’ll be a one message, one campaign, way of doing things – and a 
complete assumption of an information deficit: that if we could just get people to 
understand what we understand then they will do this other thing…and I would sit 
there in the meeting and say ‘why? If I told you what I know about whatever it is, 
would you do something different?’ … ‘Well no, but that’s because I am like this’. I 
said ‘OK, so if I told your mum, would she do something different?’ ‘Well no 
because that’s like…’ …‘OK, tell me one person that you can think of that if you 
persuaded them what you said was right, and all of this evidence you’ve got is right, 
would they do anything different? One example that they’ll do something different?’ 
And it’s things like that, to actually be able to clarify what was different about this 
approach, that really worked. So from there we – well, [my colleague], set forth on a 
segmentation model – she had a marketing background so she was very focused on 
how to segment – and a really good understanding of ‘well if we’re going to 
 




segment, what are we going to segment, what does that mean? And how are we 
going to do it?’ And again, that was very, very different thinking and moved things 
forward right across the behaviour work that we were doing.”46 
 
  Confrontations such as these enabled assumptions to be revealed and 
challenged within the department, providing an opportunity for double-loop 
learning.47 And, as the social researcher emphasises, the internal challenging 
of assumptions paved the way for the commissioning of a research 
programme that would provide an empirical basis for the SCP team’s 
engagement activities. Arguably, the social researcher’s intervention here 
aided the policy officials to shift from seeking to use social science in a 
symbolic way, to seeing how empirical research could play a more 
instrumental function.48 
  Consistent with recommendations from the research reviews analysed in 
Section 2, between 2006 and 2007 the SCP commissioned a pro-
environmental behaviours segmentation model that would enable policy-
makers to go beyond awareness-raising, and instead understand what drives 
people towards particular behaviours. The research contractors developed a 
public attitudes survey to form the basis of the model – and this was carried 
out in spring 2007.49 Given the SCP team’s concern with behaviours (rather 
than attitudes or values) it may seem surprising that the survey did not focus 
on participants’ take-up of specific behaviours. But this was because officials 
recognised that people who adopt one environmentally-friendly behaviour 
(e.g. recycling regularly) do not necessarily partake in another (e.g. avoiding 
unnecessary flights). It was therefore decided that the segmentation model 
 
46 A social researcher in DEFRA (1). 
47 Schön and Rein, 1994. 
48 Boswell, 2009, p.124. 
49 DEFRA, 2006b, p.32. 
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should be based on attitudes and beliefs towards the environment in general 
and towards a range of actions that would be indicative, to a degree, of their 
potential to take-up the twelve behaviours discussed in the previous section. 
For example, participants would be asked whether they agree with 
statements such as “‘the Earth has very limited room and resources’”, and 
“‘people have a duty to recycle’”.50 Researchers argued that this would 
provide more ‘real’ segments – in the sense that they would capture deeper 
attitudes and ‘worldviews’ which motivate consumption and not be biased 
by the adoption of particular behaviours – although as a consequence the 
model would not be especially strong in terms of predictions for any one 
behaviour in particular.51 The resulting segmentation model identified seven 
segments, and can be found in Appendix 4, Figure A4-3.52  
  To an extent, this segmentation model reflects the institutional context in 
which it was commissioned. By the end of 2006, it was recognised that there 
were at least four DEFRA teams funding work associated with promoting 
changes in peoples’ behaviours: the Environment Business and Consumers 
team (where the social researcher was based, within the SCP team), the 
Sustainable Development Unit, the Climate and Energy: Households and 
Markets team, and the Communications Directorate.53 Ahead of an imminent 
cross-government comprehensive spending review, a ‘knowledge hub’54 was 
established in early 2007, to consolidate knowledge and expertise on 
behaviour change. This hub was named the ‘Sustainable Behaviours Unit’ 
(SBU) and was housed within the Sustainable Consumption and Production 
 
50 Darnton, 2013a, p.8. 
51 Darnton, 2013a, p.8. 
52 Eppel et al., 2013, p.38. 
53 DEFRA, 2006b, p.19. 




team. In addition to the SCP team’s social researcher and marketing expert, 
an additional social researcher was recruited. It is this team who 
commissioned the segmentation model, with an eye to satisfy the 
requirements from colleagues across the department. Thus, with a broad 
scope across policy issues and grounding in ‘real’ segments (i.e. segments 
that are based on attitudes and behaviours in general, and less contingent on 
particular policy initiatives), the segmentation model was a sufficiently 
flexible tool to enable policy makers to develop ideas starting from their 
understanding of publics, as well as allow communications specialists to 
infer what sorts of techniques might work best for different audiences.  
 To complement the segmentation model, the SBU also commissioned a set of 
qualitative studies under the theme ‘Public Understanding of Sustainable 
Lifestyles’. The purpose of these research projects would be to glean deeper 
insights into citizens’ diverse views, knowledge and willingness to adopt 
changes with respect to sustainability in food,55 banking,56 energy 
consumption,57 and leisure activities58. The team’s first social researcher 
recalled commissioning them thus: 
 
“The way that I came to the Public Understanding series – that first series of work 
that we did on that programme – was basically me saying “well, we need to 
understand where people are at”. Now if we take a social marketing approach – 
which was the trendy term at the time – a social marketing approach means you 
start where people are at, you understand the barriers/motivators for their current 
actions, you understand the barriers/ motivators of what would cause / what would 
help them to change, or what are the 4Es that would enable them to change.”59  
 
 
55 Owen et al., 2007. 
56 Dawkins et al., 2007. 
57 Brook Lyndhurst, 2007.  
58 Miller et al., 2007. 
59 A social researcher in DEFRA (1). 
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  As this quote makes clear, although the social researcher was openly critical 
of policy colleagues’ assumptions, she did not question the social marketing 
framing. Rather, in her view it was key that she worked closely with the 
social marketing expert in the SBU to strengthen connections not only 
between research and communications expertise, but also to collaborate in 
challenging the generalists in the team: 
 
“It was very important to have comms colleagues working with us – it was very 
important to have [the social marketing colleague] working with us – she was part-
comms, part-research. And so you know, for both her and I it was very much a sort 
of a bridging role between the research and comms…but also between the research 
and the policy development – so saying to the policy people ‘are you asking the 
right question in the first place?’ ‘Are you setting about this in the right way?’”60 
 
A former SCP policy official reiterated the importance of the close 
collaboration between the social researcher, social marketing expert, and 
policy team: 
 
“Oh it was great! No it worked very well and well I mean I think from my 
perspective it worked very well because between them and me we were each 
bringing something different in. And you know, mine might have been the slightly 
dumbed down, what is it that people might find helpful in looking for, you know, 
which wouldn’t necessarily pass a strict academic test. But it was prompted by 
[David Miliband’s] talk of ‘what are the five things people could do?’”61 
 
  In this collaborative vein, the social researcher specified that the Public 
Understanding set of research projects should purposefully recruit 
participants to be representative of the seven different segments. This 
allowed comparisons to be made across the groups, and emphasised that 
officials should expect to find diverse perspectives amongst different 
 
60A social researcher in DEFRA (1). 




citizens. Significantly, it enabled them to use the qualitative research to infer 
how acceptable each of the twelve target behaviours would be to each 
segment, as shown in Figure A4-4 of Appendix 4. From this, they could 
develop targeted campaigns and engagement activities that would be 
tailored to the expected responsiveness of each group, rather than a universal 
campaign for all audiences.  
  Furthermore, through the superimposition of the 4Es model on top of the 
seven segments (as can be seen in Appendix 4, Figure A4-5), the idea that 
information campaigns alone would not be sufficient to influence peoples’ 
consumption choices was ‘inscribed’62 into the Framework for Pro-
Environmental Behaviours, published in January 2008. Hence, ‘positive greens’ 
were identified as people who could be persuaded to adopt any 
environmental behaviour, from eating less meat to flying less.63 For them (as 
well as for the ‘concerned consumers’ and ‘sideline supporters’), the best 
strategy was thought to be to enable them (by ‘removing barriers’) and to 
engage them through communication campaigns or targeting them through 
the use of influential leaders. By contrast, for ‘waste watchers’ and ‘cautious 
participants’, researchers advocated a greater emphasis on encouragement 
(through fiscal incentives) and exemplifying government’s commitments to 
change.  
  Clearly then, the SCP team had made some conceptual shift from focusing 
on information campaigns that were imagined as being able to achieve 
universal appeal across society towards engaging in broader and more 
salient ways with citizens. Through close collaboration on research projects 
 
62 For more on the role of inscribed knowledge in policy see Freeman and Sturdy, 2015, p.10 
– citing Latour, 1987. 
63 Although in practice neither of these issues were addressed explicitly by government 
campaigns, because of internal tensions.  
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such as these, the social researcher was able to constructively influence how 
SCP policy generalists conceived of the public. Indeed, in a recent review for 
DEFRA, Andrew Darnton has argued that this reframing of ‘the public’ was 
the most substantial contribution from the model: 
 
The biggest impact of the P-E Model [pro-environmental behaviours segmentation 
model] was on policy makers: fundamentally demonstrating that they should be 
developing policy with multiple publics (not a single public) in mind.64 
 
Leaving aside the subtext that implies the model did not achieve policy 
impact (an issue we will return to in Subsections 3.3 and 3.4 below); it is clear 
from the quotations that the social researcher was able to develop a degree of 
‘double-loop’ learning within the policy team.65 By confronting colleagues’ 
‘information deficit’ assumptions,66 the social researcher made it possible for 
social research to be commissioned which would enable the team to explore 
policy ideas more in-tune with ‘where people are at’. This was achieved 
through embracing rather than critiquing the given marketing framing as it 
allowed the social researcher to prove the utility of social research insights 
within the high-profile team.  
  By commissioning empirical projects (along with the provision of grants to 
community action groups via the Environmental Action Fund), and 
organising workshops and conferences, DEFRA’s SBU nurtured a broad 
stakeholder network of behaviour change specialists with diverse 
perspectives and skills – including research consultants, non-government 
 
64 Darnton, 2013a, p.1. 
65 Schön and Rein, 1994. 
66 It is also interesting to note that DEFRA’s notion of the ‘information deficit’ model has its 
roots in the deficit model described by STS scholars (with what appears to have been 
minimal influence from STS), and can be traced in the references back to Alan Irwin and 




organisations, companies, action groups, and academic researchers, who all 
supported DEFRA’s SCP to translate research into practice. Interviewees 
recall a sense of excitement amongst the network throughout what is now 
considered to have been the ‘golden days’67 of DEFRA’s pro-environmental 
behaviour change work (between 2003 and 2011): 
 
“It was really vibrant, new tenders coming out, there was a kind of buzz – from the 
whole research community, you know, what’s the next route, what’s coming up 
next, what opportunities will be coming – because everyone knew there will be 
opportunities to bid into, so there was that, and the expectation that there would be 
research to do.”68 
 
 Hence, although the process in which behaviours were selected could be 
criticised for failing to utilise empirical social research, there was a clear 
conceptual shift between 2006 and 2008 in terms of how citizens are 
understood. A more reflexive framing of publics emerged, which recognised 
diversity in society, and the need to engage with different citizens 
differently. The key question now is to ask if and how this deeper 
understanding translated into more reflexive policy ideas – this is explored 
in the following two sections. 
 
 And Back to Informing Again? 3.3
 
  It is tempting to conclude that despite the SBU’s best efforts, the most 
significant impact of their work between 2006 and 2008 was to support a 
better understanding of how to inform the public about sustainable 
consumption. That view is consistent with a critical reading of the quotation 
 
67 A research consultant (3).  
68 A research consultant (1).  
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in Subsection 3.2 suggesting that the biggest impact of the segmentation 
model was to change how policy officials viewed citizens. Yet, this and the 
following subsection show that the research was in fact far-reaching across 
the SCP remit.   
 
Twelve publics as an audience for public communications 
  As noted at the start of Section 3, the SCP team initially intended to use 
research insights to develop advice for the public to find on the Directgov 
website. Having decided that DEFRA should advocate a reduction in meat 
consumption, policy officials remained concerned about the citizens’ likely 
reaction to being told to eat less meat.69 This concern was substantiated by 
findings from the Public Understanding of Food research project, which found 
low support for government promotion of meat-free diets amongst most 
segments (apart from ‘positive greens’): 
 
Meat and dairy feature prominently in participants’ ideal menus, are favoured for 
their taste and are both foods on which participants are reluctant to compromise. As 
a result, when reducing consumption of meat and dairy products is discussed 
explicitly, most participants are resistant to this goal.70  
 
The research consultants recommended a more low-key approach: 
 
In terms of direct communication around this goal, there is a delicate balance to 
strike. Being explicit about what this goal means in practice works for a small 
minority. Some environmentally committed participants pledge to eat vegetarian 
once a week after hearing the case made. However, there is also a risk of alienating 
other audiences, who reject this goal because they feel that it is too interventionist 
and ‘nanny state’ and counter-cultural.71 
 
 
69 A research consultant (2).  
70 Owen et al., 2007, p.39.  




The researchers argued that instead of explicitly advising citizens to eat less 
meat, a more salient message would be to promote a balanced healthy diet. 
This would be associated with reduced environmental impacts because it 
would provide alternative sources of protein than meat. This 
recommendation, which is consistent with ideas previously put forward at 
the Green Alliance workshops discussed in Subsection 3.1,72 appears to have 
been taken on-board in the development of content for the Directgov 
website. As such, the site did not explicitly discuss the impacts of meat 
production or the importance of reducing its consumption – instead 
presenting a broad case for a change of diet.73  
  In addition to content for the Directgov website, David Miliband wanted a 
high-profile public communications campaign on climate change that would 
both inform and enable citizens to take action.74 A campaign called ‘Act on 
CO2’ was launched in 200775 and was initially jointly funded with the 
Department for Transport, with DECC agreeing to part-fund the campaign 
when the department was formed.76 Act on CO2 used the pro-environmental 
behaviours segmentation model to target particular groups with specific 
messages which, according to the model, would be most salient to them.77 An 
example targeting the ‘waste watchers’ segment is provided below. 
 
72 Green Alliance, 2006, p.37. 
73 Directgov [National Archives], 2009a.  
74 A communications official in DEFRA. 
75 Whitmarsh et al., 2011, p.202.  
76 Directgov [National Archives], 2009b. 
77 Although there remains a divide in the behaviour change community as to whether it is 
more effective to engage citizens with climate change on terms that would be most salient to 
them, or to appeal to environmentalist values. The latter may not resonate with many 
citizens, but the former is likely to reinforce the notion that it is acceptable to take action only 
insofar as one’s quality of life is not diminished – see Crompton, 2008.  




Figure 5: ‘Save Money Save Fuel’ – An Advertisement Encouraging Citizens to Reduce 
Their Fuel Consumption (screenshot taken from a television advertisement, accessed from 
HM Government [National Archives], 2009). 
 
But the campaign was intended to move beyond the deficit model by using 
advertisements such as the one above to direct the audience to an online tool, 
which they could use to measure and take control of their carbon footprint.78 
In this sense, it was considered an enabling device rather than an awareness-
raising campaign. 
  Amid a government-wide ban to all ‘non-essential’ communications 
budgets,79 the campaign was interrupted in 2010 after 357 complaints about 
the frightening nature of the advert and the extent of future environmental 
disaster attributed to climate change.80 Then in 2011, the initiative was 
criticised by the House of Lords for failing to take into account evidence on 
 
78 A communications official in DEFRA. See also Directgov, [National Archives], 2007.  
79 Sanders, 2013. 




the grounds that the ineffectiveness of information deficit models “is now 
widely known”81 – despite the fact that information provision was only 
planned to be one aspect of the campaign. 
 
Twelve publics as research subjects 
  Besides communications campaigns, the segmentation model was also used 
as a recruitment framework for sampling participants for qualitative research 
projects to understand ‘where the people are at’ on particular issues. It was 
used, for example, to recruit participants for a very influential research 
project on the public acceptability of introducing personal carbon allowances 
– an initiative that David Miliband had publicly endorsed in July 2006 as 
having potential in the future.82 The key idea would be that the greenhouse 
gas emissions associated with everyday fuel consumption (e.g. travel or 
domestic energy use) would be priced, and individuals would be allocated a 
limited number of ‘free’ emissions, beyond which they would buy more 
permits.  
  The social researchers’ project on public acceptability83 was one amongst 
four ‘pre-feasibility’ studies commissioned to explore the potential of a 
carbon allowance scheme - with others analysing how effective it would be 
for reducing carbon emissions,84 the likely distribution of the scheme’s 
impacts,85 and its technical and financial feasibility.86 All reports identified 
issues for the initiative, but its likely cost and extremely low levels of public 
acceptability were cited as the reasons why DEFRA terminated work on the 
 
81 House Of Lords Science and Technology Committee, 2011, p.21.  
82 Miliband, 2006b. 
83 Owen et al., 2008. 
84 DEFRA, 2008b. 
85 Thumim and White,2008. 
86 Lane et al., 2008. 
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policy idea. The research contractors exploring its public acceptability found 
the idea was resisted by all seven segments.87 One researcher who ran focus 
groups for the project recalled that “it was officially the least popular thing I 
have ever talked to anybody about. And that, by the way, includes badger 
culling!”88 Some of the focus group respondents likened the idea to wartime 
rationing or the poll tax.89 
  The policy team concluded that the personal carbon allowance idea was 
‘ahead of its time’90 and therefore they would maintain interest in the scheme 
but not progress with policy development at that stage. Social researchers 
cite this as an example where social research was particularly influential in 
the policy process,91 achieving visible and short-term influence with their 
challenging research – although economists reportedly claim full credit for 
the idea’s abandonment too.  
  Another application of the research involved the SBU insisting that a survey 
with 17 ‘golden questions’ should be used by contracted researchers in order 
to monitor and evaluate community-based environmental behaviour change 
projects funded by the department (including the action-based research 
projects, see Subsection 3.4). The golden questions would reportedly enable 
researchers to determine, with 75% certainty,92 the proportion of people who 
participated in a given initiative who fit into the different segments. Some 
stakeholders, such as the National Union of Students, found this to be a more 
helpful tool than others did.93  
 
87 Owen et al., 2008, pp.20-41. 
88 A research consultant (2).  
89 Owen et al., 2008, p.22.  
90 DEFRA, 2008c, p.4. 
91 Collier et al., 2010, p. 29. 
92 According to a research consultant (3).  




  Moreover, policy officials recalled that the social research commissioned by 
the SCP team often had implications for their work on sustainable 
production too – for example by highlighting that consumers expected 
producers to be dissuaded from selling unsustainable products. In this way, 
social research was a core part of the team’s work as a whole. 
  This is not to say that social research was used at every opportunity. One 
respondent noted that research on citizens’ views could have informed the 
2008 Climate Change Act. Nonetheless, it is clear from the examples 
considered in this subsection that between 2006 and 2008 the research and 
segmentation model commissioned by the SBU was not only used for top-
down communications purposes. Through making their case and 
challenging their colleagues’ assumptions, social researchers and the social 
marketing officials were able to move beyond an end-of-pipe function, and 
instead created novel ways for social research to influence the team’s work. 
As such, their work was used at an early stage in policy development to 
consider the feasibility of a personalised carbon allowance scheme, as well as 
to monitor and learn from third sector projects the team funded. It was not, 
however, until 2009 that social researchers would mobilise their insights to 
develop new (and arguably more reflexive) policy ideas – in the form of 
action-based research projects (ABRPs).94 As we will see next, these projects 
have been particularly resilient amid the department’s changing epistemic 




94 Grounded in the idea of action research, where researchers participate in the design and 
development of a project, and their research insights are utilised in the process – for more on 
this see, for example, PSI & SEED Foundation, 2013, p.16. 




 Action-Based Research Projects  3.4
 
  While social researchers did not choose the marketing framing which the 
first research projects contributed to, they adopted more of a leadership role 
in setting the direction from 2009 onwards. The research and pro-
environmental behaviours segmentation model had highlighted a great 
degree of diversity amongst citizens, and argued that different approaches 
should be taken for influencing different people. In addition, the team’s latest 
Environmental Action Fund round ended in 2008. Social researchers 
commissioned an evaluation of the fund, which was produced in January 
2009.95 Among other points of improvement, it was highlighted that many of 
the projects funded during the three-year scheme could have been more 
effective if the community groups operated with a better understanding of 
their target audience – i.e. if they “start from where the people are at”96 – and 
if they achieve “buy-in” from influential actors within organisations and 
community groups.97 With these points in mind, the social researchers 
proposed the use of pilot studies to try out novel means of promoting 
sustainable behaviour: 
 
“So the action-based research projects, they came about as a way of piloting, testing, 
the framework…. Let’s try it and see what happens.”98  
 
The idea was to take theoretical concepts from the vast research on 
influencing behaviours that they had commissioned before then and test 
 
95 Brook Lyndhurst, 2009. 
96 Brook Lyndhurst, 2009, p.145. 
97 Brook Lyndhurst, 2009, p.147. 




their effectiveness in influencing citizens’ behaviours in small-scale 
sustainability projects.99 If the pilots were successful, they might then be 
scaled up for a larger audience. Instead of preparing a strict specification for 
the projects, the SBU selected thematic concepts to be explored through in-
depth analysis of projects in practice.100 
  Examples from the first round of projects are listed in Figure 6 below.  
 
 
Each of the projects was intended to test the application of different 
theoretical concepts in practice. And each would be collaboratively designed 
and delivered by businesses, non-profit organisations and members of the 
public, with funding from DEFRA. Importantly, the projects would have to 
be designed to be sufficiently salient to all stakeholders involved, such that 
 
99 Eppel et al., 2013, p.36.  
100 A DEFRA social researcher (3).  
Figure 6: DEFRA’s First Round of Action-Based Research Projects (image from Eppel et 
al., 2013, p.37) 
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everyone taking part is motivated to see the success of the project – as 
opposed to a government-led top-down imposition of sustainable ways of 
life upon the public. Moreover, to be eligible for funding, the social 
researchers required applicants to test a concept from the literature, and 
insisted that the reviewers of the project use the pro-environmental 
behaviours segmentation model to glean a deeper understanding of the 
actors involved, with implications for how it might be scaled-up.101  
  Let us examine two of these projects in greater depth – the ‘food loop’ and 
‘plug-it’ projects. These two projects were chosen for this analysis as they 
were explicitly referred to in interviews, and because there is more 
information available about them in documents than the others.  
  The ‘food loop’ project sought to test the idea of engaging stakeholders to 
collectively design a system for a local residential community in council 
housing to use their food waste to produce compost, which in turn would be 
used to grow their own food. The initiative was intended to build on insights 
from previous research funded by DEFRA102 which posits that composting 
schemes would be more effective if stakeholders are engaged early in the 
initiative’s development process – although the research report notes that in 
practice the residents were only invited in after the local authority and 
service provider had agreed on key aspects of the design.103  
  The project, which was run in a council estate in Camden in London, was 
also intended to help address a specific problem in that engagement with 
recycling and composting initiatives was particularly low amongst lower 
 
101 A DEFRA social researcher (3). 
102 Slater et al., 2010. 




socio-economic groups across the UK.104 If the UK was to hit its recycling and 
waste targets then DEFRA and its partners would need to find a better way 
to engage these actors. Prior research suggested that these groups held 
somewhat entrenched attitudes opposing the idea of recycling food waste, 
but that these issues could potentially be overcome if the actors were 
engaged appropriately.105 Past attempts by the Waste Resources and Action 
Programme to increase food composting rates in deprived areas in Hackney 
and elsewhere achieved low participation rates.106 Furthermore, the policy 
team acknowledged that central government is not always trusted as a 
messenger for communicating about climate change because it is seen by 
some as having an interest in taking advantage of the environmental issues 
to raise taxes, while local authorities are sometimes accused of asking 
communities to take more responsibility without a reduction in council taxes. 
Drawing also on literature about the potential effectiveness of ‘co-designed’ 
projects,107 the researchers believed that a co-designed community-engaged 
project could offer promise as an alternative, more mutually beneficial 
approach.  
  The initiative faced barriers – particularly with the provision of services at 
appropriate times for the residents – and the local council ceased to fund the 
project.108 Yet, DEFRA’s social researchers and policy colleagues saw it as a 
success because it provided policy actors with insight into how food waste 
could be reduced in deprived areas, it identified potential barriers in 
engagement and delivery, and despite the cut in local authority funding the 
 
104 PSI & SEED Foundation, 2013, p.12. 
105 PSI & SEED Foundation, 2013, p.3. 
106 WRAP, 2009, p.20.  
107 PSI & SEED Foundation, 2013, p.1. 
108 PSI & SEED Foundation, 2013, p.121. 
“Challenge and Be Challenged” 
-238- 
 
scheme continues to be effectively run and expanded by volunteers at the 
time of interviews.109 
  The ‘plug-it’, project, by contrast, is described by civil servants as less 
successful as an initiative – although from a research perspective it provided 
useful insights.110 The project was developed to test the idea that plumbers 
could act as ‘trusted intermediaries’ to discuss water efficiency with their 
customers. The notion that ‘trusted intermediaries’ could help DEFRA to 
reach more people than they would otherwise be able to reach was first 
discussed in A Framework for Pro-Environmental Behaviours.111 As with the 
Food Loop project discussed above, it was hoped that a design could be 
developed such that everybody involved would benefit: 
 
The co-design process will ensure that the tools add value for the intermediaries as 
well as for the consumer. The project will look at the `what's in it for me` perspective 
of the professional. For example, the tools should empower a plumber to give better 
advice moving him/her from just fitting products to providing a design solution for 
the client, such as providing a pumped mixer shower with an aerated water saving 
head rather than the `power shower` the customer requested. The cost fitting may be 
higher but the running costs will be a lot lower and there will be environmental 
benefits, so the plumber will generate more work, and be viewed as a 
knowledgeable professional and an environmental champion.112 
 
In its application though the research contractors found that the plumbers 
were not well suited to play the role of a trusted intermediary, because their 
 
109 Eppel et al., 2013, p.38.  
110 Eppel et al., 2013, p.38. 
111 DEFRA,2008a, p.23. At this point we might be critical of the use of ‘trusted intermediaries’ 
to engage different publics and interpret this as a move by DEFRA to avoid the issue of how 
trusted it is by different groups of people (c.f. Wynne, 2006). But given the evidence that 
different types of intermediaries (such as retailers and local institutions) have been found to 
be effective messengers for different segments (DEFRA, 2008a, Annex p.VI), this seems to be 
a justified and cost-effective means of engaging more widely than might otherwise be 
feasible for the department. 




typical work does not afford many opportunities for a salient discussion 
about water efficiency with their customers. One conclusion drawn from that 
initiative is that “demand for water efficiency will ultimately be customer 
driven” – suggesting that more needs to be done to make water efficiency 
appealing for water users.113 
  These examples show how the ABRPs have achieved some conceptual 
learning among policy actors, about the diversity of approaches to 
influencing behaviours at their disposal. From this, new policy ideas could 
be developed, although in the climate of austerity at the time that interviews 
took place a social researcher pointed out that the schemes could achieve 
impact without further government involvement, by inspiring community 
groups. Social researchers also noted that they were well-regarded by their 
policy colleagues: 
 
“The thing about our action-based research projects is that the policy people get 
heavily involved as the findings as they develop and emerge, just sort of shape them 
in a way that helps them really.”114 
 
This claim was reiterated by former SCP policy officials, who reflected 
positively on the ABRPs: 
 
“So the project itself would deliver some value, but the learning from it would be a 
more important part of it. So if you like, from a social science point of view, it would 
provide more value.”115 
 
Another generalist added: 
 
 
113 Eppel et al., 2013, p.38. 
114 A DEFRA social researcher (3). 
115 A DEFRA SCP policy official (1). 
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“So you’re not going to easily change the world with projects of that size. But you 
could experiment.”116 
 
Moreover, policy officials felt that there was an additional benefit to using an 
ABRP approach to grant funding, in that it enabled the SCP team to have 
greater control over what type of projects would be funded in contrast to the 
typical projects previously funded by the department’s Environmental 
Action Fund (1992-2008)117 or Greener Living Fund (2008-2011).118 In addition 
to requiring the testing of particular concepts and the use of the 
segmentation model, the policy team also specified rough areas of focus (e.g. 
fishing, food waste, water use etc.) in accordance with the interests of the 
policy-makers at the time.119  
  The first-phase projects were initially rated highly within DEFRA 
particularly because of their innovative nature. Their reputation within 
DEFRA was soon buoyed further when researchers pointed to their 
similarity to an idea that David Cameron had pursued when he became 
Prime Minister in 2010 – the small business research initiative, where a small 
business could win government contracts to provide policy solutions. By 
emphasising “parallels”120 between the ABRPs and the small business 
research initiative, the former were made salient under the new 
administration. And as we saw in Chapter 4, they were celebrated in the 2014 
Evidence and Innovation Strategy report.121 
  In addition to invoking alignment with the Prime Minister’s small business 
research initiative, the projects have also most recently been described as 
 
116 A DEFRA SCP policy official (2). 
117 Lucas et al., 2008.  
118 A DEFRA SCP policy official (1).  
119 A DEFRA social researcher (2). 
120 A DEFRA social researcher (1). 




pioneering a ‘co-production’ approach,122 in the context of the Cabinet 
Office’s recent plans for open policy making to become ‘the default’,123 as 
part of their agenda for civil service reforms.124 A review of the implications 
of the government’s plans for open policy making for DEFRA, authored by 
an external behavioural research consultant who consulted social researchers 
and other actors within DEFRA and the stakeholder community, identifies 
DEFRA’s ABRPs as exemplars of the sort of open ‘co-production’ policy 
making that the Cabinet Office was advocating. In these ways, the social 
researchers and other supporters of the ABRPs remain relevant and maintain 
interest within DEFRA – and indeed across Whitehall. The ABRP programme 
entered its fourth round in May 2014, and seems likely to continue.  
The ABRPs have thus been adapted to shifts in the political, organisational, 
and epistemic context within (and around) DEFRA. This is despite a change 
of ministerial priorities that has rendered much other sustainable behaviours 
work (such as the pro-environmental behaviours segmentation model) 
obsolete, as we will see in the next section.   
 
4. 2009-15: Nine ‘Headline’ Behaviours, Still Seven Publics? 
 
  So far we have considered the ways in which social researchers have 
achieved some influence in the SCP policy domain and the conditions in 
which this has been possible, paying particular attention to the role of 
challenge. Since 2006 social research has been mobilised to gradually change 
how the team thought about citizens and what could be done to promote 
 
122 Darnton, 2013b, p.29. In the sense of collaboration rather than in Jasanoff’s sense. 
123 HM Government, 2012, p.14. 
124 Rutter, 2012.  
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more sustainable ways of living. This section examines the epistemic, 
institutional, and political changes which shaped the work of social 
researchers as they moved from the SCP’s Sustainable Behaviours Unit to a 
more centralised team, the Centre of Expertise on Influencing Behaviours, in 
2009 (which was first introduced in Chapter 4).  
  Reflecting on the strength of the collaborations between the SCP officials 
and the team’s social researchers, one of the generalists recalled that the 
analysts made significant and novel contributions to the work of the team: 
  
“Discussions with social researchers were hugely important in enabling us to think 
through the benefits of insight and segmentation as a methodology to engage people 
and take them on a journey towards more sustainable practices. That’s quite 
different from traditional approaches that for example would mean working with 
established stakeholders groups such as NGOs or business.”125 
 
  We also saw in Chapter 4 that by 2009 such research was well-regarded not 
only in the SCP team but also more broadly across the department. In 
response to new demand, the SBU was turned into the more cross-cutting 
Centre of Expertise on Influencing Behaviour (CEIB). We also considered 
that despite its limitations, interviewees reported that a strength of the CEIB 
was that it enabled ‘forward thinking’ projects to be developed which might 
not have been otherwise.  
  The most significant ‘forward thinking’ project that the CEIB were 
responsible for was an update to the 2008 framework for pro-environmental 
behaviours. This was published in 2011 and entitled the ‘Sustainable 
Lifestyles Framework’.126 The updated list of behaviours (shown in Figure 
A4-6, in Appendix 4) reflected new buy-in from policy teams in areas such as 
 
125 A former SCP policy official (1).  




natural environment and biodiversity – and also formed the basis for further 
collaborative work to ensue between them. Nine ‘headline’ behaviours were 
defined, each encompassing a broad range of more specific ‘sub-behaviours’. 
As before, these were selected through engagement with the wider research 
and stakeholder community, and the actors did not always agree. A 
respondent recalled disagreeing with policy officials over the inclusion of 
installing ground-source heat pumps as the evidence suggested that they 
have a minimal environmental impact. Yet this action was still included 
because it was considered an important ‘policy driver’ by officials.127 
  In the development of the 2011 Sustainable Lifestyles Framework,128 the 
CEIB also took a symbolic step towards recognising long-standing criticisms 
of DEFRA’s dominant understanding of how to achieve sustainable 
consumption. While the publication of the Framework for Pro-environmental 
Behaviours in 2008 invited much praise and recognition for SCP’s social 
researchers it also attracted some negative attention from some academic 
social scientists who contested DEFRA’s predominantly individual choice 
framing of sustainable consumption. These sociologists argued that that 
approach overlooked the structural elements which influence resource use in 
society, and lacked a historical appreciation of how lifestyles have changed 
in the past (and therefore could change in the future).129  
  Between 2008 and 2011, the odd project which utilised a non-individualist 
perspective did get commissioned (e.g. theoretical reports on practice 
theory130 or on the sociotechnical transitions literature,131 which were briefly 
 
127 A research consultant (4).  
128 DEFRA, 2011b.  
129 See, for instance, Shove, 2003.  
130 Such as Darnton, 2010. Unpublished but referred to in Shove, 2011. 
131 Such as Geels et al., 2008. 
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defined in Chapter 1). But external researchers reported that this work did 
not appear to be applied or discussed in policy reports.132 And in the case of 
practice theory in particular, interviewees claimed that during that time 
social researchers were reluctant to engage with the research – the term 
‘practices’ was even described as ‘toxic’ as it symbolised an unwelcome 
criticism of their contribution to the policy process.133  
  By 2011, after considerable contestation between social researchers and 
members of the research community who embraced non-individualist 
approaches,134 CEIB’s social researchers came to appreciate that these 
researchers’ criticisms posed a threat to their credibility amongst internal and 
external actors:  
 
“There were a group of people who I think were very knowledgeable, social 
researchers in DEFRA and elsewhere, who were very knowledgeable about 
behavioural theory actually and understood the concepts around Nudge,135 and felt 
almost, felt a little bit concerned, possibly, that if you tell everybody that it’s all 
about Nudge, then you’re sort of putting all of your eggs in one basket. And 
actually, people will sooner or later realise that Nudge is not everything, and then 
your credibility is lost, a little bit. Because, I mean, you know, there are certain 
behaviours that change with the flick of a switch, and but there are other behaviours 
that are not so easily shifted, you know. And habits and things like that.”136 
 
The SBU’s limited engagement with practice theory was also acknowledged 
in a co-authored paper by civil servants and an external behavioural 
researcher, where it was argued that the predominance of the individualist 
behaviour change framing above practice theory was “a reflection of the 
 
132 Two different researchers reported this in interviews. 
133 A research consultant. 
134 A research consultant (3).  
135 A behavioural economics book which came to be strongly associated with the UK 
government’s work on influence behaviours, particularly after the formation of the Cabinet 
Office’s Behavioural Insights Team or ‘Nudge Unit’ BBC News, 2010a. 




policy context at the time that the programme was conceived, where 
communications campaigns were a key mechanism for public policy on the 
environment (and elsewhere),” and that DEFRA’s officials have learnt to 
expand their repertoire since then.137 
  Perhaps because the social researchers now had more autonomy to explore 
other approaches than previously, the 2011 Sustainable Lifestyles Framework 
was the first document that DEFRA published which discusses practice 
theory as part of a ‘mix of methods’.138 This mix includes paying attention to 
what are described by practice theorists as the ‘competencies’, ‘shared 
meanings’, and ‘materials’ which combine to sustain a social practice, as we 
saw in the introduction to this thesis.139 For instance, in the case of promoting 
sustainability in transport – besides behavioural ‘barriers’ such as the belief 
that somebody else should take responsibility, or ‘drivers’ such as buy-in 
into the idea of ‘doing my bit’ – ‘competencies’ such as access to other travel 
options, ‘materials’ such as infrastructure quality and ‘shared meanings’ such 
as ‘convenience’, ‘comfort’, and ‘freedom’ are all discussed.140 The mix also 
includes roles for regulation and fiscal approaches – which are emphasised 
by practice theorists and transitions theorists but relatively downplayed by 
behavioural theorists – although no examples of these are provided in the 
cases provided. 
  Since the publication of that framework, social researchers in DEFRA have 
reportedly been more sanguine about practice theory. One research 
consultant notes that DEFRA’s social researchers have come a long way in 
this regard: 
 
137 Eppel et al., 2013, p.p.41. 
138 DEFRA, 2011b, p.32.  
139 Shove et al., 2012. 
140 DEFRA, 2011b, p.27.  
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“Funny, you know, the briefs that occasionally do come out – if you think DEFRA, [a 
former social researcher in the CEIB] – happily the phrase ‘think practices’ just trips 
off her tongue! You’ve no idea how much battle there was in this along the way!”141 
 
  Even still, academic and consultancy researchers remained doubtful as to 
whether social researchers have learned and applied practice theory within 
the domain of sustainable consumption or production to a significant extent, 
rather than merely making symbolic (legitimising) efforts in a bid to be seen 
as appeasing their critics.142 From this perspective it seems that practice 
theory remains a ‘dormant seed’ in this domain. 143  
  Despite the CEIB’s formation being inspired by a rise in prominence for 
social researchers, they not only struggled to achieve internal influence 
amongst new policy areas (as we saw in Chapter 4), but also considered their 
credibility amongst external researchers to be threatened. A tough situation 
indeed. And yet it is striking that social researchers did not find their work 
fundamentally challenged on party political grounds during this time. Their 
budget was cut, in line with spending reductions across the department, 
following the formation of the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition 
Government in 2010. But the Chief Scientist had ensured that the social 
research budget was not cut proportionately more than the overall research 
budget,144 and there was not an abrupt shift in policy direction or research 
interest. In this sense, social research on sustainable lifestyles was not 
deemed ‘politicised’ in the party political sense.145 
  However, the situation changed following the replacement of Caroline 
Spelman by Owen Paterson as the Secretary of State leading DEFRA in 
 
141 A research consultant (3). 
142 Boswell, 2009, p.82. 
143 Owens, 2015, p.132. 
144 A DEFRA social researcher (1). 




September 2013. Owen Paterson now defined the department’s priorities as 
developing rural economies, animal health, plant health, and enhancing the 
natural environment – with ‘sustainable lifestyles’ falling off the agenda.146 
This sudden change had implications for ongoing research projects and 
programmes – rendering much of this work irrelevant for policy-makers. The 
significance of the move was made clear to DEFRA’s wider network of 
behavioural and practices researchers at the closing conference of the 
Sustainable Lifestyles Research Group in June 2014. There, according to one 
external consultant, a DEFRA social researcher was perceived to be declaring 
the end of DEFRA’s interest in behavioural approaches – with the 
interviewee claiming that “behaviour change died” at that conference.147  
  At the time of the ministerial reshuffle the pro-environmental behaviours 
segmentation model was under review. According to what is considered best 
practice in social marketing, segmentation models should be renewed using 
recent data every five years.148 The review149 notes that there is currently no 
appetite in DEFRA for such work for a broad range of reasons – including a 
lack of funding, a government-wide hiatus on public communications 
campaigns for which a segmentation model would be useful, the prior 
termination of commissioning regular public attitudes surveys which would 
provide quantitative data on which to base the segments: “structures in the 
Department have changed such that it is not clear where a cross-cutting 
public-focussed (not policy-specific) model of this sort would sit, or who 
would own it.”150  
 
146 A research consultant (3); DEFRA, [National Archives], 2014.  
147 A research consultant (3). 
148 Darnton 2013a, p.3. 
149 Darnton, 2013a, p.17. 
150 Darnton, 2013a, p.17. 
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  The final of these reasons is particularly intriguing from Sheila Jasanoff’s co-
production perspective:151 it highlights the extent to which knowledge 
making practices are contingent on favourable institutional structures, and 
indeed how those institutional structures are dependent on the knowledge 
making practices. Within supportive political and institutional environments, 
the previous years had seen the production of new and highly valued 
research, which then provided opportunities for new structures to emerge – 
thereby facilitating the co-production of knowledge and institutional order. 
But now the change in DEFRA’s ministerial priorities, the dilution of the 
CEIB in 2012,152 and subsequent embedding of social researchers into diverse 
policy areas has resulted in a situation where no one group of officials holds 
responsibility for sustainable lifestyles in general, and therefore a broad 
sustainability segmentation model would not have a ‘natural home’ in the 
department. In a sense, the other reasons listed are incidental to this one: if 
understanding and influencing citizens’ behaviours were to become a 
ministerial priority again, then we can expect that staff would be deployed to 
find the funding, develop an appropriate evidence-base under the 
circumstances, and engage with the evidence. 
 
5. Social Researchers’ Influence in SCP: Starting From Where 
People Are At? 
 
  The empirical material presented in this chapter has provided insights into 
the context in which DEFRA’s SCP team’s social researchers were able to 
exercise influence, and the forms of influence they achieved. It is clear that 
 
151 Jasanoff, 2004.  





under favourable epistemic, political, and institutional circumstances, social 
research was already influential before social researchers joined the SCP 
team. With increasing appreciation of behavioural research across 
government, political leadership in David Miliband, and a willingness from 
policy officials to change approach in order to avoid the failures of Are You 
Doing Your Bit?, in 2006 the SCP team began to employ social researchers 
who would gradually alter how the team developed and implemented ideas. 
By then, academic and consultancy researchers were already seeing visible 
impacts in the Securing the Future report, as well as sowing dormant seeds 
such as the idea of developing a segmentation model.153 But the social 
researchers, working closely with the social marketing official, were able to 
take this influence further by bringing the notion of ‘starting where people 
are at’ to the core of all SCP activity. They thereby shifted consideration of 
different types of citizens from a marginal afterthought to the basis on which 
many SCP ideas would be developed.  
  Key to the social researchers’ ability to achieve this influence was the fact 
that they were embedded analysts within the SCP team, as this afforded 
them proximity to the social marketing official and the generalists. Working 
closely with these colleagues and with the external research and advocacy 
groups, the social researchers built rapport with key actors and became 
increasingly involved in all aspects of the team’s portfolio of work. This also 
provided them with a platform to exercise a challenge function that went 
beyond what external analysts could achieve. Through challenge, researchers 
persuaded officials that top-down messages or incentives can be counter-
productive, made the case to drop the proposal to introduce a personal 
 
153 Owens, 2015, p.132. 
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carbon allowance given research into citizens’ views about it, and developed 
innovative action-based research projects. In that way they secured a more 
instrumental engagement with social science, and furthermore enabled 
double-loop learning research impact to the extent that policy team to 
exhibited a degree of institutional reflexivity in their conception of citizens.154 
By encouraging the team to refrain from imposing its own goals and projects 
in expectation that particular groups of people would comply with them, and 
instead to ‘start from where people are at’, ideas like the ABRPs were 
developed which were more congruent with the meanings and values of 
citizens, and less driven by scientistic policy framings. Moreover, 
researchers’ challenge was not considered problematic (as we might expect 
given the literature)155 but was in fact rewarded with greater autonomy and 
resources to serve teams across the department through a new Centre for 
Expertise on Influencing Behaviours. 
  Notably throughout the history presented in this chapter, reflexive learning 
opportunities were justified on instrumental grounds. For example, the food 
loop project was informed by the perception that there are some ‘hard-to-
reach’ groups, particularly in urban residential tower blocks,156 who could be 
better encouraged to recycle food waste if a more open and shared approach 
was adopted – indeed the research consultants conclude that the project 
supports this hypothesis.157 It follows that serving instrumental rationales for 
research projects does not necessarily preclude reflexive learning from taking 
 
154 Wynne, 1993. 
155 Norris, 1995; LSE Group GV314, 2014, p.227. 
156 Although the Food Loop report notes that some literature suggests these ‘hard-to-reach 
groups’ are now possibly more indicative of the infrastructure provided and challenges of 
urban life than attitudes or values associated with the socio-demographic group concerned 
(PSI & SEED Foundation, 2013, p.4).  




place – as long as officials perceive some instrumental value in the projects. 
Instead, we see that instrumental collaborations between social researchers 
and policy colleagues can enable reflexive learning. 
  It must be emphasised however, that while DEFRA’s social researchers take 
seriously and operationalise their commitment to providing a challenge 
function, the analysts balance that imperative against competing 
commitments they hold as civil servants. To this end, they did not find it 
appropriate to challenge everything from a social science perspective. For 
instance, opportunities were missed to use public engagement to directly 
shape the Climate Act in 2008. And while researchers did commission 
reports which challenged the prevailing individualist paradigm, they were 
not proactive in pursuing the implications of those studies for the policy 
teams’ work. They also did not, for example, challenge the notion that 
individuals in tower blocks should be targeted for reducing food waste, 
instead preferring to align the policy team’s goals with the actors they sought 
to influence. Rather, they judged that to be most effective, they had to 
balance the imperative to challenge with the imperative to cooperate with 
their colleagues. In this way they could build their credibility and influence 
without being seen as obtrusive to the policy-makers’ aims. Indeed we could 
say that the balance they achieved between these two imperatives, while 
inevitably exposing them to criticism, also enabled them to influence policy 
by ‘starting from where their colleagues were at’. 
  Further consideration of the experiences of researchers in the SBU and CEIB 
lends support to a Jasanoffian co-production158 argument, with the 
production and reception of the content of social research being co-produced 
 
158 Jasanoff, 2004.  
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with the analytical structures in which social researchers operate. With social 
researchers embedded within the SCP team, the research they produced and 
its application reflected the growing view that social research should be 
embedded at the core of the SCP team’s activities. Their move to the CEIB 
afforded social researchers more autonomy and flexibility in the work that 
they produced, and enabled them to capitalise on the new interest they had 
acquired from policy teams across the department. But the shift from being 
embedded within the SCP team towards being placed at the boundaries of 
policy teams meant that social researchers were working at the margins of 
policy teams’ activities. This provided limited opportunity to build the 
rapport on which effective challenge was predicated within the SCP team. 
The recent shift back to embedding analysts in turn provides the opportunity 
for analysts to develop those relationships again.  
  While acknowledging the restrictions and susceptibilities of social 
researchers’ challenge function, the data presented in this chapter do suggest 
a rethink of the view that reflexivity must be instilled in a government 
department from the outside. Social researchers’ challenges have enabled 
assumptions about citizens’ views and actions to be constructively altered 
within SCP policy areas, with implications for government action. It follows 
that we must call into question the latent assumption in the STS literature 
that government departments have a reflexivity deficit which can only be 
addressed through better interactions with academic social scientists. Rather, 
this chapter suggests that efforts to make these departments more reflexive 
can be driven endogenously, from within the same institution. In this way, 




mechanism’159 for enabling the type of reflexive learning envisioned by 
Pallett and Chilvers (and other STS researchers). This is not to suggest that 
external support is not necessary. Indeed, we have seen that challenge from 
outside DEFRA contributed to the context in which officials began to 
consider it necessary to bring in social research and social marketing 
expertise. We will return to this point in the analytical conclusions, where we 
consider how social researchers’ ‘capacity to challenge’ might be 
strengthened in future. 
  Furthermore, the finding that reflexivity is being driven through 
endogenous forces in DEFRA is consistent with Gibbons et al.’s point that 
actors within research organisations where research is produced in the 
context of application, such as DEFRA, are likely to exhibit reflexivity.160 Yet 
contra their argument, reflexivity has been cultivated through the work of 
internal social researchers rather than as a result of scientists’ experiences 
working on complex social and technical issues.  
  Last, this chapter has provided an initial response to Webster’s observation 
that there is an absence of STS research on the epistemic dynamics within 
government departments. It does this by showing how new forms of 
knowledge come to be recognised and utilised in different ways within the 
SCP policy area. Yet, in shedding a light on these dynamics within the civil 
service, this chapter raises more questions than it answers. Where does the 
fall in prioritisation of sustainable behaviour change work leave social 
researchers’ role in policy development and delivery in future years? How 
do social researchers’ authority and challenge function in SCP compare with 
other areas of DEFRA’s remit? How do interdisciplinary collaborations 
 
159 Pallett and Chilvers, 2013, p.1175. 
160 Gibbons et al., 1994, p.7. 
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between social researchers and other officials work in areas that have a 
stronger economic or natural science framing than sustainable consumption 
– for instance animal health, flooding, or genetically modified crops? Chapter 
4 has shown that social research is now included and appreciated in these 
areas, but further research is required to investigate how the analysts fare in 
new and ever-changing epistemic, political, and institutional contexts. The 
next chapter leaves DEFRA aside, to explore the forms of influence DECC’s 









Influencing Behaviours in DECC? Social 
Researchers and Energy Use 
 
“So we’re the game keeper and they’re the poacher in a way. And you know there 
isn’t a process for turning poachers into game keepers, really. Because it wouldn’t be 
particularly appropriate.” 
           




HE PREVIOUS CHAPTER explored the influence that DEFRA’s social 
researchers had within a specific policy area. The same question 
can be applied to social research in DECC. This chapter does this by focusing 
on the Customer Insight Team’s (CIT) engagement with policy teams 
concerned with energy efficiency or demand reduction. Throughout DECC’s 
history and despite multiple reorganisations, these teams have been grouped 
together under the same Director-General (briefly under the name of the 
‘Energy Efficiency Development Office’)1 – and invariably kept distinct from 
 
1 Between late 2011 and late 2013. See DECC, 2012c, p.9; DECC, 2013c. 
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the energy supply teams. It is the energy efficiency and demand reduction 
teams that seek to engage citizens so as to reduce the carbon emissions 
associated with energy demand. They are therefore concerned with 
behaviour change in a similar way as DEFRA’s sustainable consumption and 
production policy team was, and were also the first areas which came to 
build capacity for social research, as we saw in Chapter 5. Yet, the 
approaches to behaviour change and the roles that social researchers have 
played within these specific policy teams in DECC differ considerably from 
what we saw in DEFRA. For these reasons, policy teams associated with 
energy efficiency and energy demand reduction are ideal case studies for 
exploring social researchers’ influence in DECC. 
  Within DECC’s work on energy demand and energy efficiency, there is a 
great variety of candidate policy areas to select for exploring social 
researchers’ influence. Under the Labour Government, plans included a ‘pay 
as you save’ finance scheme for home refurbishments and the installation of 
smart meters, developing information and incentives for households to 
reduce their energy consumption, establishing community-based schemes to 
engage groups of people to save energy, stimulating greater interest in 
domestic sources of renewable energy, and legislating to raise building 
standards.2 The Coalition Government’s vision for energy efficiency was 
broadly consistent with Labour’s, and included the pay as you save scheme, 
installing smart meters across UK homes, mandating Energy Performance 
Certificates (which rate the energy efficiency of a property), introducing 
‘smarter’ domestic heating controls as the key mechanisms for reducing 
demand for heating and electricity in UK homes,3 and setting a target for 
 
2 HM Government, 2009, p.79. 




domestic buildings to emit almost zero carbon emissions before 20504 - 
noting that over 75% of domestic energy consumption arises from demand 
for space and water heating.5 Most of these policy areas arose in interviews, 
but to limit the scope of this chapter, Sections 2, 3, and 4 focus on three policy 
teams in particular: the Green Deal team, the Smart Meters Implementation 
Programme team (SMIP), and the Heat Strategy team respectively. These 
policy areas were selected because of the extent of interview and 
documentary data available.  
  In each case, policy solutions were initially framed along contestable 
determinist lines – either technologically determinist6 (in terms of insulation 
measures or microgeneration under the Green Deal, or the use of smart 
meters and in-home displays for the smart meter roll-out) or else involved a 
narrowly individualised form of determinism in which attitudes were 
thought to universally and predictably explain households’ energy-using 
behaviours (as in the case of domestic heating policy, where it was assumed 
that particular households hold identifiable attitudes which determine their 
level of energy consumption). As we will see, social researchers have 
increasingly contributed to decision-making processes within the domain of 
energy efficiency and demand reduction. Furthermore, research has enabled 
the challenging of determinist assumptions to varying degrees for the 
different policy teams involved. But such challenge did not lead to more 
reflexive policy designs during the years of the Coalition Government (2010-
 
4 DECC, 2011b, p.30.  
5 DECC, 2011b, p.29. 
6 Technological determinism is the view that technologies will shape peoples’ actions in 
universal and predictable ways (Winner, 1980). Analysts in STS have claimed that it is 
persistently believed by policy-makers (Wyatt, 2008). 
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2015). We begin by considering the Green Deal team, which is where the CIT 
was initially based after being formed in mid-2010.  
 




  The Green Deal is an energy efficiency initiative based on the concept of 
‘pay as you save’, which was advocated in a DECC-funded report by the UK 
Green Building Council in 2009.7 Under a ‘pay as you save’ arrangement, 
property owners borrow money from government to install energy saving 
measures (such as loft insulation). Consumers then pay off the debt as 
financial savings accrue from the reductions in energy bills (assuming that 
such savings are in fact realised). The finance mechanism is not strictly a 
loan, because the costs are payable by whoever pays the utility bills.8 If there 
is a change of residency, the new residents pay the remaining debt through 
their bills. Green Deal finance was available to citizens between January 2013 
and July 2015, when the scheme was closed to new applicants.9   
  The Green Building Council proposed a pay as you save scheme to achieve 
‘a step change’ in energy efficiency in buildings. They argued that this was 
necessary if the UK Government’s targets for reducing carbon emissions by 
80% by 2050 were to be achieved. Their rationale was based on the 
observation that 45% of UK carbon emissions come from energy used in 
buildings, and from the expectation that 80% of the domestic buildings that 
will be inhabited in 2050 are already standing. The authors also noted that in 
 
7 Green Building Council, 2009.  
8 Green Building Council, 2009, p.6. 




a recent survey, 15% of respondents would be attracted by a pay as you save 
mechanism for funding energy efficiency in the home.10  
  The pay as you save idea was seen by political leaders as a cheap and easy 
way to achieve reductions in carbon emissions while helping to save 
consumers money, and so there was strong political support for it ahead of 
the general election in 2010 - such that the idea featured in each of the 
Conservative,11 Labour12 and Liberal Democrat13 party manifestos. The name 
‘Green Deal’ was chosen by the Conservatives14 and was used in the 
Coalition Agreement.15 Following Kingdon, then, we see that the political, 
problem, and policy streams were aligned from around 2009 to form a clear 
policy window for the Green Deal idea to be developed.  
  Notably however, the idea was never tested against alternatives. A pilot 
study was commissioned by DECC and the Department for Communities 
and Local Government in late 2009, which compared consumer reactions 
towards particular elements of a pay as you save model (such as the degree 
of choice over who makes the installations, how the process should be 
managed, and how best to communicate with them about the process or 
costs).16 But the effectiveness of a pay as you save approach was never 
piloted against alternative models, even in the next few years during which 
time randomised controlled trials (RCTs) were highly valued within DECC. 
  Yet, the Green Deal was touted by Chris Huhne and other ministers as an 
ambitious policy – ‘revolutionary’, even – for improving energy efficiency in 
 
10 Green Building Council, 2009, p.7. 
11 The Conservative Party, 2010, p.93. 
12 The Labour Party, 2010, 8:4. 
13 The Liberal Democrat Party, 2010, p.53. 
14 The Conservative Party, 2010, p.93. 
15 HM Government, 2010, p.16. 
16 DECC & Energy Saving Trust, 2011.  
“Challenge and Be Challenged” 
-260- 
 
the domestic sector on a mass scale.17 Moreover, it was described as a scheme 
that could appeal to “every one of the 26 million homes in the UK”.18 Not 
only was the scheme expected to achieve high uptake then, but also to have 
universal appeal across diverse groups in society. 
  The scale of ambition in politicians’ rhetoric was nearly matched in the first 
economic impact assessment for the policy, which was published in 
December 2010 in preparation for the first reading of the Energy Act 2011 in 
Parliament.19 The range of eligible insulation measures was not settled at this 
point,20 but Table 321 gives an indication of the level of ambition held in terms 
of the expected number of different types of insulation in domestic buildings 
between 2013 and 2020.22 
 
Table 3: Expected Total Number of Installations for Each Measure Between 2013-2020, 
According to DECC’s Impact Assessment (2010) 
  Expected number of installations (m) 
Measure Low High Maximum feasible 
Loft insulation 2.3 3.4 4.5 
Cavity wall insulation 0.5 2.3 4 
Solid wall insulation 1.8 2.2 3.1 
Double-glazed windows 0.7 1 1.4 
Party wall insulation 0.5 0.7 0.9 
Insulated doors 1.3 1.9 2.5 
Total number of installations 7.1 11.5 16.4 
 
 
17 Huhne, 2010; DECC, 2010a; Eyre & Rosenow, 2013; House of Commons: Energy and 
Climate Change Committee, 2013.  
18 DECC, 2010a. 
19 DECC, 2010b. 
20 DECC, 2010b, p.79, fn.124. Eventually the list would include new boilers, microgeneration 
sources, heat pumps. DECC, 2011c. 
21 DECC, 2010b, p.19. 




  In eight years then, the Government would aim for 7-11.5 million energy 
efficiency installations to be completed in the domestic sector – some of 
which would occur in the same home as part of a package.23  
 The Government guaranteed that finance would only be available for 
interventions for which the expected financial savings for a bill-payer would 
be greater than the costs of installation.24 It was acknowledged that the 
initiative’s effectiveness for reducing energy consumption relies on what the 
inhabitants do after any installations are completed.25 Moreover, the authors 
appreciated that “the responses of consumers are currently not well 
understood”,26 noting that the prevalence of subsidies and grants for energy 
insulation measures in the past and the ‘novel’ nature of the scheme make it 
difficult to anticipate its success. The impact assessment emphasised that 
research projects were planned to address this.27 With the CIT in place, the 
next subsection will consider how insights from social research projects were 
utilised.   
 
 Commissioning Social Research 2.2
 
  As is clear from the background above then, in 2010 when the CIT was 
formed, its members found that their host team was working on a high 
profile and highly ambitious policy where commitments had already been 
made to a ‘pay as you save’ framing. As such, the Green Deal team were 
interested in funding research that would help to improve the delivery 
 
23 Indeed in mid-2011 Greg Barker went further – claiming 14 million homes would be 
reached in the first decade, and 26 million before 2030: DECC, 2011d. 
24 DECC, 2010b, p.14. 
25 DECC, 2010b, p.14. 
26 DECC, 2010b, p.7. 
27 DECC, 2010b, p.18.  
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(rather than design) of the policy. The Head of Customer Insight (HCI) 
started by working closely with the Green Deal generalists to establish what 
sort of short-term research projects would be deemed useful.  
  Between December 2010 (when the first impact assessment was completed) 
and November 2011, the CIT commissioned and published three research 
projects which identified potential setbacks and opportunities to overcome 
them.28 These were designed to explore public attitudes towards the Green 
Deal idea, to identify barriers to its uptake, and to reveal how the policy 
could be made most salient for the potential customers.29 One project 
highlighted that the Green Deal might be more popular if customers were 
given the choice to pay off the debt ahead of the agreed payment schedule.30 
This was then incorporated into the implementation of the policy. The 
second study highlighted that the consumer interest may be less of a ‘step-
change’ than had been anticipated and therefore more resources would be 
needed to ensure its success.31 The third brought attention to the specific 
difficulties that would arise for making the policy work in the private rented 
accommodation sector, where the bill-payer typically does not own the 
property.32  
  All three of these projects were intended to enable single-loop learning 
about how to improve the Green Deal, rather than to challenge its underlying 
assumptions. A social researcher recalled that these insights were 
 
28 DECC, 2011c, p.204. 
29 DECC, 2011c, p.204. 
30 DECC, 2011e, p.24. 
31 DECC, 2011f.  




appreciated by the Green Deal policy team and as such they achieved some 
‘visible, short-term’33 impact: 
 
“I think all of the Green Deal work was quite influential – like, showing that the 
demand for Green Deal was likely to be quite low probably led to a massive kind of 
push on trying to make it more appealing from a policy perspective – I’m not saying 
that it was only the social research that did it, but I think they were kind of clear 
examples.”34 
 
Changes were then made that would make the scheme more appealing to 
customers, such as enabling customers to pay back the debt early. The 
Treasury Office also gave an additional £200m to be used to provide 
discounts for the first customers. 
  But besides this immediate impact, the studies also formed the basis of a 
challenge to two key assumptions – first, that the policy could reach almost 
every household in the UK, and second, that it would have universal appeal 
across society. This resulted in revised estimates in the consultation-stage 
economic impact assessment, published in November 2011.35 For this, two 
new variables based on the research were introduced into the economists’ 
model. First, the analysts introduced a ‘decision making frequency’36 variable 
to capture the likelihood that energy consumers will encounter the choice of 
taking up the Green Deal or not. Second, a ‘consumer choice coefficient’ was 
defined to take into account the likelihood that survey respondents would 
pursue specific domestic energy efficiency improvements.37 Together, these 
 
33 Owens, 2015, p.127. 
34 A DECC social researcher (2).  
35 DECC, 2011c. 
36 DECC, 2011c, p.181. 
37 DECC, 2011c, p.181. See also DECC, 2012d, p.130, for a more explicit (but seemingly 
erroneous) discussion of how these variables were used to calculate a utility function to 
estimate Green Deal take-up. 
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variables were used to estimate the likely consumer uptake of different 
measures available under the Green Deal. 
  It is striking that the expected number of installations dropped significantly 
in this economic assessment compared to its December 2010 predecessor. 
Whereas the first impact assessment estimated take-up to be in the region of 
12 million between 2013 and 2020, the winter 2011 update now projected take 
up to reach approximately 3.6 million households before 2022.38 Instead of 
targeting millions of households per year, the Government aspired to reach 
hundreds of thousands.  
  Besides scaling down ambitions, the commissioned social research also 
showed that the Green Deal would have more appeal amongst some citizens 
than others: 
 
The survey showed that the groups with higher levels of interest in taking up a 
Green Deal offer were younger, male, those on means tested benefits, households 
needing two or more energy efficiency measures, those with homes that are hard to 
heat, those who struggle to pay their bills, those who live in rural areas and the 
affluent.39 
 
Hence, in addition to providing an instrumental function for estimating the 
likely number of installations made under the Green Deal, the same social 
research challenged the assumption that, supplied with the right incentive 
and information, the Green Deal could appeal to all types of people in 
society. The evidence suggested that some groups were more likely to be 
attracted by the offer of finance to install energy efficiency measures than 
others were. 
  The scaling down of expectations between the first two economic impact 
assessments was noticed by the Committee on Climate Change, who 
 
38 DECC, 2011c, p.75. 




considered it to be a watering down of ambition.40 Over the next few months 
further doubts would be raised over the scheme’s likely success, since it now 
lacked support from high street retailers, was considered complicated for 
customers, and was described as too expensive.41 
  In this context there was greater pressure on policy-makers to ensure that 
the Green Deal would be as salient to customers as possible. For social 
researchers, it clearly followed from their research projects that DECC 
needed a better understanding of who the Green Deal’s customer was likely 
to be. Having now built a rapport with the Green Deal generalists and a deep 
familiarity with social dimensions of the Green Deal scheme, the CIT was 
well placed to think more autonomously of research projects that could help 
to improve the Green Deal’s implementation, and that the policy officials 
might agree to fund. The analysts proposed a larger piece of research to 
develop a segmentation model to understand different groups’ likely interest 
in the initiative. A social researcher who subsequently worked on the 
segmentation model explained the rationale thus: 
 
“We’d done some research on the general population, we understood quite a lot 
about peoples’ motivations and barriers to energy efficiency, but we soon began to 
realise that actually this isn’t a one-size-fits-all policy really. We don’t understand 
enough about what sorts of groups exist within these sorts of populations of 
everyone. It’s quite, you know, unique for a ‘product’ – which is almost what it is – to 
be targeted at everyone. Most kinds of things wouldn’t be targeted at everyone.”42 
 
  The quotation captures how the social research initiated a rethink about the 
framing of the Green Deal for citizens. The Green Deal communications and 
policy teams now started to see their scheme as a ‘product’ for a distinct 
 
40 Committee on Climate Change, 2011. 
41 Cuff, 2012; Gosden, 2012; Eyre and Rosenow, 2012. 
42 A social researcher in DECC (7). 
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audience. In this way, the research achieved the ‘conceptual’43 use of research 
amongst policy officials and enabled a degree of double-loop learning,44 with 
the potential for this to lead to a change in the policy frame in the future, 
perhaps in more conducive circumstances.45  
  When commissioning the Green Deal segmentation model, researchers in 
the CIT were aware of DEFRA’s pro-environmental behaviours model 
(discussed in the previous chapter). But, having considered evidence 
suggesting that pro-environmental attitudes were not well correlated with 
behaviour change towards lowering energy use,46 and at a time where there 
was a government freeze on all ‘non-essential’ communications campaigns,47 
they opted for a product-specific rather than a strategic, broad-based model 
(shown in Figure 7 overleaf). To this end, the segmentation model was built 
around survey data about public views towards the Green Deal – such that 
the claim that a loan-like arrangement would function as an effective 
incentive for households to invest in energy efficiency remained an 
unquestioned assumption (rather than a hypothesis to be tested).48 The 
underlying data collection survey included questions to ascertain whether 
participants would be willing to agree to the Green Deal loan-type scheme, 
 
43 Nutley et al., 2007, p.36. 
44 Argyris and Schön, 1978, pp.18-26.  
45 Owens, 2015, pp.132-136. 
46 A DECC social researcher (1). 
47 Cabinet Office, 2010. 
48 As is clear, for instance, from the model’s inclusion of factor 6 (whether participants claim 
to ‘only take out loans when necessary’) as a causal variable, see DECC, 2012f, p.22. The 
finance arrangement was identified by an unreported number of participants in an earlier 
survey as a motivating factor amongst people who expressed interest in the Green Deal, but 
it was amongst the least frequently recognised advantages by survey participants when 
prompted, and the attractiveness of the pay as you save scheme was not tested against 




Figure 7: Green Deal Segmentation Model (DECC, 2012e, p.4) 
and how they might be encouraged to do so.49 But the survey did not explore 
to what extent the finance scheme would appeal to the different segments 
identified, and how it compared against alternatives.  
 
  Moreover, to focus the segments on understanding the Green Deal’s likely 
customers, a subset of the survey (33%) who did not self-report a ‘need’ for 
either solid wall insulation, cavity wall insulation, loft insulation, or boiler 
 
49 DECC, 2012f, p.19. 
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insulation or upgrade were removed from the segmentation base. Of the 
remaining survey base, the six segments in the diagram above emerged. 
  The segmentation model was thus clearly designed to serve end-of-pipe50 
communication functions. It was not intended to help government to 
develop policy ideas starting from ‘where people are at’ on energy efficiency 
in the home, nor does this application appear to have been considered. 
  The research project was well-received by the Green Deal team, and was 
put to use immediately to help identify communications channels for 
reaching different audiences: 
 
“It’s a nice example of something actually informing real choices in policy. 
Particularly in terms of the comms side – so yeah, when we did the advertising – we 
don’t at the moment – but when we did some advertising for the Green Deal it 
helped to identify which media partnerships to go with.” 51 
 
The same researcher recalled that the model highlighted that many people 
for whom domestic energy efficiency was a salient issue were already 
considering making renovations at home. With this in mind, the team chose 
to place advertisements (such as the examples in Figure 8 on the next page) 
in publications related to home improvements52 as well as in national 
newspapers and elsewhere.  
  Subsequent analysis found that a disproportionately high number of the 
people who paid for a Green Deal assessment before September 2013 were in 
the ‘convertibles’53 segment – suggesting that the Green Deal marketing was 
more effective at engaging people who had already considered energy 
 
50 Lowe et al., 2008, p.230. 
51 A social researcher in DECC (7). 
52 E.g. Low Cost Living House magazine, Ideal Home Show magazine (see Left Foot 
Forward, 2014). 




efficiency recently than making this ‘novel’ initiative salient to people who 
were either disengaged with insulation measures or already concerned about 
saving money and/or reducing carbon emissions. 
 
 
  The Green Deal segmentation model was clearly considered useful, then. 
Yet, the researchers have not applied this (or any other) segmentation model 
to help develop policy from the design stage in DECC. And while the CIT 
did collaborate with the Behavioural Insights Team (BIT) to run a 
behavioural trial for the Green Deal, that was designed to test the hypothesis 
that providing a service to clear space in a household’s loft at the same time 
Figure 8: Two Green Deal Advertisements Placed in Home Improvement Publications (both 
images were downloaded from DECC, 2013d) 
“Challenge and Be Challenged” 
-270- 
 
as insulating the loft would improve the salience of installing loft 
insulation.54 Hence, although the researchers successfully challenged 
colleagues’ assumptions that the Green Deal would have universal appeal 
and could be taken up by approximately 12 million households, their 
‘challenge function’ did not engender a more institutionally reflexive55 policy 
for engaging citizens on energy efficiency issues. 
 
 Dealing With the Green Deal Implementation 2.3
 
  After the launch of the Green Deal in January 2013 the scheme’s low uptake 
rate was frequently reported in the national press,56 with its failure 
predominantly attributed to the interest rate on repayments being set too 
high.57 The Green Deal policy was scrapped by Amber Rudd in July 2015, 
shortly after she became the Secretary of State leading DECC in the 
Conservative Government. Total take-up before June 2015 was in the region 
of 15,600 according to DECC’s statistics.58 Rudd explained that she cut the 
scheme because it no longer offered “value for money”.59  
  The scheme’s apparent failure was attributed to various causes – it was 
described as too expensive and too complicated for customers, while policy-
makers were accused of failing to “understand the behavioural barriers 
 
54 DECC, 2013b.  
55 Wynne, 1993, p.322.  
56 The Telegraph (2012) reported that no assessments were requested in the first month that 
this was possible. The BBC reported that only four customers committed to a deal within six 
months of the full launch (BBC News, 2013a), and less than a thousand had an agreement in 
place by November 2013 (BBC News, 2013b). 
57 Business Green, 2015. 
58 DECC, 2015a, p.5.  




preventing wide-scale take-up of energy efficiency measures”.60 But early 
indications suggest that policy officials have learnt lessons from the research 
projects for future schemes. One generalist working in the Home Energy 
team, who agreed to be quoted anonymously, has recently claimed in a 
closed audience that a future pay as you save scheme would need to be 
better targeted to specific groups of people: 
 
 “There probably was a market for the Green Deal but it was somewhere in between 
people in fuel poverty who probably wouldn’t be able to afford it and where it 
might not be appropriate to take out a loan, and others who could afford to do it 
without a loan”.61  
 
He then stated that recognising the variation amongst the population would 
lead them to target approximately four million households, rather than all 
households in the UK. Hence, lessons from the social researchers’ research 
projects from 2011/12 have been used to inform the next policy idea, so that 
interventions can be designed with an expectation of diversity amongst 
citizens, rather than along deterministic lines. The social researchers’ projects 
may therefore also be considered dormant seeds whose deeper implications 
were waiting for more suitable conditions in which to spring to life.62 
  The policy teams dedicated to this work are now well positioned with 
experience and relevant social research evidence to form the basis of more 
reflexive and effective policy designs than those of 2009/10. It now remains to 
be seen how they will fare in the new Department for Business, Energy and 
Industrial Strategy (DBEIS).63   
 
60 House of Commons Energy and Climate Change Committee, 2015, p.13. 
61 A Home Energy policy official in DECC. 
62 Owens, 2015, p.132. 
63 BBC News, 2016. 




 Conclusions on the Concluded Green Deal 2.4
 
  This section highlighted how social research has played a predominantly 
instrumental role in shaping the Green Deal – while also, to a very limited 
extent, enabling the possibility for more reflexive dialogue about the 
underlying premise of a pay as you save scheme. Although this mechanism 
for financing domestic insulation measures featured in the manifestos of each 
of the major British political parties in 2010, its effectiveness was never 
empirically tested against alternatives. The CIT did achieve success in 
encouraging colleagues to ‘think people more’, and they convincingly 
challenged two central assumptions regarding the ambition and nationwide 
appeal of the scheme. They showed that the policy would attract some 
citizens more than others, and would be unlikely to reach households on the 
scale envisioned by politicians. Yet, despite developing a segmentation 
model and experimenting with a RCT, their customer insights have yet to 
contribute to policy design processes in a more reflexive way – by ‘starting 
where the people are at’. The Government’s next scheme may provide an 
opportunity for a more reflexive approach.  
  The next section considers a second high-profile energy efficiency policy 
programme where DECC’s social researchers were involved relatively late in 














  A ‘smart meter’ is a device that can be connected to a property’s electricity 
or gas supply network to record fuel consumption data.64 The data can be 
securely transmitted to the energy supplier, the bill-payer (via an in-home 
display, ‘IHD’, or via other connected devices) and potentially to anybody 
else with the customer’s permission.65  
  In October 2008, in his first speech as a Minister of State for Energy and 
Climate Change, Lord Philip Hunt announced government plans for 
regulation to allow the installation of smart meters by energy suppliers to all 
homes in Great Britain before 2021.66 The Labour Government’s rationale for 
regulating a mandated installation followed from the expectation that they 
would bring a wide range of benefits for energy suppliers, their consumers, 
and additionally to the public in general. The Government believed that if 
energy suppliers started to install smart meters without intervention, the 
latter might design them such that consumers would get ‘locked in’ because 
each firm could feasibly make meters compatible only with their own 
systems.67 Furthermore, it was claimed that despite potential benefits for 
various actors in the system, without government intervention only half of 
the maximum number of meters would be replaced, and the benefits would 
 
64 DECC, 2013e, p.1.  
65 DECC, 2013e, p.2. 
66 House of Lords, Debate: 28 October 2008, Volume: 704, Column 1516.  
67 DECC, 2009a, p.12.  
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not be shared equally across the actors involved.68 Finally, in a context of 
commitments to reducing carbon emissions in the domestic sector by 29% by 
2020 (based on 2008 levels),69 smart meters were considered important for 
catalysing a change in UK households’ behaviour, through the provision of 
tailored energy use information.70 
  For all of these reasons, provisions were made for a possible mandated roll-
out in the Energy Act 2008.71 In summer 2009, the European Union ruled that 
its member states should introduce smart meter-type technology, contingent 
on a favourable economic analysis.72 A commitment to mandating the 
installation of smart meters in UK homes then featured in the Labour73 and 
Conservative74 party manifestos in 2010, and was subsequently pursued by 
the (Liberal-Democrat led) DECC in the Coalition Government.75  
  Government economists drafted many economic impact assessments 
between 2008 and 2013. The first was published by the Department for 
Business, Energy and Regulatory Reform (BERR) in April 2008.76 That 
assessment reported that while the economic case for the installation of smart 
meters in small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) was strong, for 
domestic settings it was less apparent that a roll-out would be cost-effective. 
But assessments produced after Lord Hunt’s announcement reported a more 
favourable economic case for the mandated installation of smart meters in 
 
68 BERR, 2008a, Annex A: p.8. 
69 HM Government, 2009. 
70 BERR, 2008a, Annex A: p.8. 
71 HM Government, 2008, p.80ff. 
72 DECC, 2009a, p.12. 
73 The Labour Party, 2010, 8:4. 
74 The Conservative Party, 2010, p.92. 
75 HM Government, 2011, p.48.  




SMEs and across 30 million homes by 2021.77 The change in the perceived 
cost-effectiveness for the domestic sector roll-out between April 2008 and 
May 2009 was explained by reference to revised assumptions about risks and 
optimum biases in the estimates.78  
  The impact assessment was updated in December 2009, coinciding with the 
Government’s response to evidence put forward in a public consultation 
over the most appropriate model for rolling out smart meters across the UK. 
The Government opted for installations to be managed by energy suppliers, 
with central government coordination for public communication.79 It was 
claimed that this would be the most time-efficient80 and cost-effective policy 
option.81 It is worth considering the December 2009 domestic sector cost-
benefit review in closer depth. As we will see in Subsection 3.2, social 
research would eventually challenge underlying assumptions regarding how 
smart meters are used in practice by citizens – with implications for the 
realisation of consumer benefits. 
  The impact assessment stated that smart meter benefits would amount to 
£6.2bn for retailers and £7.0bn for customers, spread over 12 years as the 
chosen period for the calculation.82 The list of benefits for energy suppliers 
included: i) an end to scheduled visits for meter readings, ii) savings from 
handling fewer customer enquiries or complaints, iii) efficiencies associated 
with the afforded ability to remotely cut supply to a household, iv) cheaper 
operational costs associated with pre-payment meter services, v) more 
 
77 Leading some to accuse government of ‘cooking the books’ – Henney and Anderson, 2012, 
p.2.  
78 National Audit Office, 2011, p.8. 
79 DECC, 2009b, p.18. 
80 DECC, 2009b, p.18. 
81 DECC, 2009a, p.33.  
82
 DECC, 2009a, p.3. For the non-domestic roll-out, consumer benefits were estimated at 
£2.79bn, with £0.4bn worth of value for suppliers.  
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efficient handling and recovery of consumer debt, vi) improved capacity to 
identify theft, vii) reduced wastage in the network operation, viii) lower costs 
associated with a consumer’s change of supplier, and ix) a reduction in the 
investment required for future generation capacity due to consumers shifting 
to off-peak time of consumption, following the introduction of time-of-use 
tariffs.83 
  For consumers,84 the main benefits were assumed to be financial savings 
following their use of IHDs to aid them to reduce energy consumption. 
Although evidence was limited, empirical studies had found that smart 
meters contributed to year-on-year reductions of approximately 3% in ‘long-
term’ studies (of no more than three years).85 From this, the analysts made 
‘conservative’ estimates that gross annual reductions would be achieved of 
2.8% for electricity, 2% for gas consumers with credit-based accounts, and 
0.5% for gas consumers using prepayment systems, over 12 years.86 Also 
listed under consumer benefits were reductions in carbon emissions 
associated with lower energy consumption. 
  The above consumer benefits were expected to be uniformly distributed 
across all energy consumers but it was also expected that 20% of customers 
would benefit from financial savings due to shifting their consumption 
 
83 DECC, 2009a, pp..26-28. 
84 DECC, 2009a, pp..24-26. 
85 See DECC, 2009a, p. 25. Estimates were informed by Sarah Darby, 2006, p.11. 
86 i.e., Gas consumers with a credit-based payment system could expect that after 12 years 
with a smart meter, their energy consumption will be 67% of what it otherwise would have 
been in the counterfactual scenario where they did not have a smart meter installed. To put 
these numbers in perspective, DECC’s subsequently commissioned analysis estimates that 
behaviour changes such as turning the thermostat down by 2°C can result in reductions of 
approximately 13% in gas use, while delaying to turn on the heating in a home from October 
till November can result in savings of 5.5% (Cambridge Architectural Research, 2012, p. 27). 
Savings of 33% over twelve years may therefore be possible, provided that all households 




patterns under time-of-use tariffs.87 Furthermore, a minority of consumers 
would benefit from connecting their smart meters to their microgeneration 
sources.88 The costs would be passed on to all energy customers through 
utility bills at approximately £235 per household.89 As such, it is worth noting 
that for the domestic roll-out, the costs were estimated to exceed consumer 
benefits by £1.65bn.  
  The Coalition Government maintained the previous Government’s 
commitments to mandating a supplier-led roll-out of smart meters.90 Updates 
to the economic impact assessment between 2010 and 2013 identified the 
same sources of consumer benefits as discussed in December 2009, but key 
changes include: treating reductions in carbon emissions as ‘UK-wide’ 
benefits rather than ‘consumer benefits’,91 an unexplained increase from 12 to 
18 years for the period of analysis,92 and a reduction in estimates of net 
carbon emissions saved by 2030 due to changes in projected energy 
consumption.93 In addition, the Coalition Government clarified that 
consumers could refuse to have new meters installed,94 but nonetheless, 
economic models assumed that 97% of the 26 million homes in the UK would 
have a smart meter successfully installed.95 Notably, in this final analysis,96 
calculated over an 18-year period, expected net benefits for suppliers 
 
87 DECC, 2009a, p.25. 
88 DECC, 2009a, p.26. 
89 DECC, 2009a, pp.22-23. 
90 HM Government, 2010, p.16.  
91 DECC, 2013f, p.61. 
92 DECC, 2013f, p.3. 
93 DECC, 2010c, p.23. 
94 Richards et al., 2014, p.10. See also House of Commons, Debate: 29 November 2011, 
Volume: 536, Column: 903W. 
95 This is according to the National Audit Office, (2011, p. 26), but is not explicitly stated in 
the quoted economic impact assessment (DECC, 2011h).  
96 DECC, 2013f, p.3. 
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(£9.07bn) now exceeded those for consumers (£6.3bn), and projected total 
benefits (£18.8bn) significantly outweighed total costs (£12.1bn).    
  It was acknowledged since before the Coalition Government’s formation 
that smart meters alone do not reduce energy consumption. Indeed, left to 
their own devices they increase energy use as they are connected to the 
mains power supply. Hence, the consumer benefits described in the 
economic impact assessments crucially relied upon expectations about 
property inhabitants’ behaviour change. To this end, the economists did 
consistently refer to the available social research – even prior to DECC’s 
recruitment of social researchers.97 Yet, the assumption that year-on-year 
energy savings could be maintained for 18 years following the installation of 
a smart meter remained untested by empirical studies. And as noted in the 
GO-Science review, DECC suffered from a lack of ‘people thinking’ in its 
early years and smart metering policy was no exception: 
 
[B]ehavioural or social issues about bringing society along with the policy agenda 
had not previously been thought about, e.g. on Smart meters, how behavioural 
change was going to be achieved.98  
 
  In spring 2011 this was, to an extent, about to change. Although it would 
not be possible to test the persistence of consumer savings on the timescale 
described, DECC’s social researchers could commission research to better 
understand how behaviour change could be achieved using smart meters – 
and what issues might arise in the process.  
  Between July 2009 and March 2011, smart metering policy development was 
outsourced to OFGEM (the Office of Gas and Electricity Markets). The stated 
 
97 See for instance, DECC, 2013f, p.44ff. Examples of literature cited include American 
Council For An Energy-Efficient Economy, 2010; Darby, 2006; Mott MacDonald, 2007. 




reason for this was that OFGEM was better positioned to manage the policy 
design stage.99 It was only after the policy agenda moved back to DECC that 
the department considered recruiting social researchers who would 
commission empirical projects. DECC’s officials were aware that first, 
approximately a third of the financial case for smart meter policies relied 
upon consumer benefits whose magnitude and durability were recently 
described as ‘uncertain’ by the National Audit Office (NAO),100 and second, 
that there were international examples of public opposition towards smart 
meter technologies.101  
  In the light of these potential threats to the scheme, DECC’s new SMIP 
prioritised the development of a consumer engagement strategy to ensure 
that energy consumers would get the best value for money from smart 
meters. To this end, DECC allocated £56m for the programme between 2011 
and 2015102 – including a budget for a ‘behavioural change specialist’.103 The 
SMIP’s Head of Benefits and Evaluation consulted with DECC’s Head of 
Policy Evaluation, and recruited a GSR-accredited social researcher as ‘Head 
of Research and Evaluation’ in the post allocated to the behavioural change 
specialist.104 
  While this was a promising step, by the time the Head of Research and 
Evaluation post was filled some key decisions had been made. It was already 
decided that government would mandate a staged roll-out of smart meters, 
during which suppliers could install smart meters but they would not yet be 
 
99 DECC [National Archives], 2010. 
100 National Audit Office, 2011, p.10. 
101 A social researcher in DECC (5). 
102 National Audit Office, 2011, p.4. 
103 A policy official in DECC’s SMIP. 
104 A policy official in DECC’s SMIP. 
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fully operational.105 This was because the data communications company that 
would handle data services between consumers and suppliers was not 
expected to be in operation until autumn 2013. This two-phased approach 
allowed energy suppliers to start installing smart meters in homes before 
DECC had developed a ‘code of practice’ for installations – this was being 
drafted and would eventually become operational in June 2013.106 Hence, 
although the first stage was partly justified by the promise of achieving some 
consumer benefits early on,107 suppliers’ only obligation for the first two 
years of the early roll-out phase would be to offer domestic consumers an 
IHD.108  
  Indeed by the time that the first social researcher had joined the team, the 
first stage (or ‘foundation phase’) of domestic and non-domestic smart meter 
installations had already been underway since April 2011. Given the social 
researcher’s relatively late arrival on the scene then, this person was not well-
placed to challenge the overall policy design nor the assumptions about 
consumer benefits made in previous economic assessments. Nonetheless, – 
as was the case for the Green Deal – empirical social research insights could 
help to tweak the implementation of the policy and maximise the value for 
money of the roll-out. 
  Over the next three years, the policy team employed two more social 
researchers as perceived requirements grew. The next subsection examines 
 
105 DECC, 2010c, p.36.  
106 DECC, 2013g, p.27. 
107 DECC, 2010c, p.1. The value of supplier benefits were also expected to be slightly more: 
£0.4bn against £0.43bn for the central estimate (p.37).  




efforts made by these social researchers to increase understanding of 
behaviour change associated with smart meters.109 
 
 Making Plans for Social Research: 2011-2012 3.2
  
  The Head of Research and Evaluation was managed by the Head of Benefits 
and Evaluation – an experienced civil servant who previously held posts as a 
specialist scientist. He was identified by various interviewees as a DECC 
policy official who appreciates social research methods and expertise, and 
would work collaboratively with social researchers to define research 
projects. 
  From the start of the foundation phase, the SMIP generalists and analysts 
focused on policy delivery rather than design. This focus was reflected in the 
research projects that were commissioned, as the Head of Benefits and 
Evaluation explained: 
 
“The utilities are not accountable for [consumer benefits] – whereas some of the 
other benefits of the programme were things that suppliers will try to deliver. So we 
focus mainly on the consumer benefits, and use the range of methods that you’ve 
read about to try and understand that and to try to identify risks or opportunities 
and to come up with conclusions…about what, if anything, needs to change.”110 
 
This point concerning the perceived significance of social research for 
monitoring progress was reiterated by a social researcher: 
 
“I would say there’s a real commitment to gathering and using evidence to develop 
our policies and evaluate them and change if necessary. And so that’s why the early 
learning project is great – it’s a learning project early on…to see whether anything 
needs to change or just to provide pointers on good practice to suppliers for mass 
 
109 The foundation phase was later extended until April 2016 – see DECC, 2015, p.9. 
110 A policy official in DECC’s SMIP.  
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rollout. So I think the fact that that project was commissioned demonstrates 
commitment to generating good evidence.”111 
 
We will examine the early learning research in the next subsection. For now, 
it suffices to observe that, given that i) the Head of Benefits and Evaluation 
valued social researchers’ contribution, ii) understanding consumers’ 
experiences, concerns and the realisation of benefits was a top priority for the 
SMIP, and iii) this was a policy area where ministers had already taken key 
decisions, the ensuing social research projects were not intended to provide 
an internal challenge function that would bring into question the policy 
design. Rather, the projects would be used instrumentally to monitor 
progress during the foundation phase and provide evidence from which 
actors could take decisions to ensure that the expected consumer benefits 
would be realised as far as possible, particularly during the mass roll-out 
phase. As such, the projects were intended to enable single-loop learning 
within the policy frame, rather than to help with developing the policy 
frame. This is not, however, to say that there was no need for a challenge 
function during the foundation phase. The remainder of this subsection 
situates social researchers’ influence in the context in which they operated.  
  As a first step towards planning an evaluation of the smart meter roll-out 
during the foundation phase, in summer 2011, DECC’s social researchers ran 
a stakeholder workshop to discuss how best to measure the benefits of the 
smart meter roll-out at that stage. The workshop involved representatives 
from seven energy suppliers, five DECC officials and seven members from 
academic or non-governmental institutions.  
 




  The workshop began with civil servants emphasising a wide range of 
reasons for evaluating the foundation phase – as summarised in the 
workshop report: 
 
 [B]ecause there are uncertainties over the best approach and the likely impacts 
(especially on householder behaviour); to provide feedback to improve the roll-out 
process; to provide early warning of risks; for suppliers to maximise the benefit to 
themselves, customers and UK commitments to reduce energy demand; to give the 
public (and the NAO [National Audit Office]) confidence that the roll-out is of value 
and being conducted fairly and efficiently by Government and the supply industry 
(thus maintaining credibility of the Smart Meter Programme); and because there is a 
commitment to do it.112 
 
The first reasons could be deemed instrumental (such as helping to decide 
the best approach, and to improve the scheme’s implementation), while the 
latter were clearly symbolic (e.g. to secure credibility and to stay true to 
commitments). In this way, the quotation captures a range of perspectives on 
the value of social research which were held amongst research and policy 
officials within DECC. 
  Clearly, then, officials felt that a lot hinged on comprehensively monitoring 
the effectiveness of the foundation phase for the realisation of supplier, 
consumer and society-wide benefits. But their commitments were found to 
conflict with energy suppliers’ priorities, which were to ensure that they 
achieved a set number of successful installations, with minimal 
complications, satisfied consumers, and commercially sensitive information 
about their processes protected.113 
  Some representatives from the energy suppliers used the workshop to state 
a range of concerns about conducting what social researchers considered a 
 
112 AECOM, 2011a, p.6. 
113 AECOM, 2011a, p.2. 
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valid and robust evaluation of the foundation phase. They questioned the 
necessity of using RCTs to evaluate the foundation phase of the domestic 
roll-out by comparing the benefits realised by an intervention sample against 
a control sample.114 They argued that it would be practically difficult for 
energy suppliers to design their roll-out strategy so as to make it amenable 
for the construction of randomised samples. In addition to this, it was 
claimed that the validity of any trial-based evaluation would be 
compromised by the likely self-selection of customers who are already 
sufficiently engaged and interested in smart meters enough to request one 
from their supplier. These issues were confounded by suppliers’ concerns 
about the commercial sensitivity of publishing any data that DECC planned 
to collect. Such data could reveal information about the business’s roll-out 
strategy, or bring negative attention to the company’s practices. Imagine, for 
instance, the reputational damage that could be caused if an energy 
supplier’s installation team were consistently found to be misrepresenting 
the nature of the meter upgrade to consumers, or otherwise not making 
sufficient efforts to enable their customers to maximise their use of a smart 
meter.  
  On top of this, suppliers also reminded the civil servants that they had “no 
obligations” during the foundation phase, and proposed that policy-makers 
focus on separate behavioural trials (such as those carried out by the DECC-
funded Energy Demand Reduction research project),115 “rather than trying to 
shape suppliers' roll-out activities to provide comparable situations for 
evaluation, treating them as experiments”.116  
 
114 AECOM, 2011a, pp.18-19. 
115 AECOM, 2011b. 




  Suppliers’ commercial interests thus threatened to derail an evaluation of 
the smart meters’ roll-out at the earliest stage. But the social researchers were 
persistent with their challenge and a negotiated agreement was reached, so 
that civil servants would draft a specification to identify what sort of 
evidence would be satisfactory to convince them that the suppliers were 
achieving and recording the desired impacts. Energy suppliers would then 
share their progress with the civil servants on a confidential basis. 
  While the industry representatives’ challenges to a thorough foundation 
phase evaluation were not necessarily insurmountable, (trials might be 
designed to work with the grain of suppliers’ installation plans, self-selection 
could be accounted for and sensitive data could be protected), the civil 
servants were careful to maintain a strong rapport with the companies. 
Reflecting on this relationship with energy suppliers, a policy official 
explained: 
 
“I think it’s true to say that in any relationship between government and industry, 
the element of trust is very important. So they trust us, you know with data for 
example that we’re not allowed to publish – so like individual performance, for 
example. So if we get information from them under License Conditions then we are 
restricted in publishing that, we have to publish as an aggregate level. But we rely 
on them to give us that data, and to protect it. – You know, we rely on them to 
answer data requests in a timely way, and to give us the data that we need, and they 
generally cooperate with that. So it’s partly about having a trusted working 
relationship which you build up over time.”117 
  
Consequently, a thorough process evaluation of all suppliers’ progress and 
the realisation of promised benefits was ruled out. The resulting evaluation 
would be less comprehensive.  
 
117 A policy official in DECC’s SMIP. 
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  In the months after the workshop, the Head of Research and Evaluation 
commissioned two empirical research projects to help the team to 
understand any citizen concerns about smart meters. The first project 
investigated customer “awareness, understanding and attitudes”118 with 
regards to smart meters and IHDs in homes where they have already been 
installed. Through focus groups and interviews which were run in February 
2012, the study found that people who had a smart meter installed reported a 
positive experience with the device, with many claiming (when asked) that it 
led them to consider adopting specific energy-saving measures. Probably 
due to the concerns raised by energy suppliers, this study neither reported 
on whether households had reduced their energy consumption nor 
investigated consumers’ perceptions of the installation process – which 
would have perhaps been more useful for understanding whether the 
benefits of smart meters were being realised at this early stage.  
  The second piece of empirical social research involved a series of four 
surveys to track public opinion around smart meters. The policy team were 
concerned that smart meters had faced opposition in other countries, where 
some citizens claimed that smart meters can be detrimental to brain 
development or can be used to snoop on members of the public: 
 
“I think it was Australia, basically [smart meters policy development] fell at 
customer reaction to it and there was all these rumours that it was leaking your 
brain and people were spying on you and there was this really bad public reaction 
to it. And the policy team are very, very aware of the potential for things to go 
wrong because of adverse public reaction. So it was something they were - just very 
aware of. And so we got a tracker going on just keeping an eye on attitudes and 
where things are happening, and just trying to make sure we catch things before 
they start.”119 
 
118 DECC, 2012g, p.4.  




The fieldwork surveys were run in April 2012, October 2012, April/May 2013 
and September/October 2014.120 The studies did not reveal “any big 
concerns”121 for the policy team, and while they reported high ‘awareness’ of 
smart meters, it was inferred that “understanding” smart meters was rather 
stable at about 5%. As such, they were not used to instrumentally inform any 
decisions, and if they were used at all, it would have been for symbolic 
purposes to substantiate current activity.122  
  Meanwhile in April 2012 the SMIP opened a public consultation, inviting 
input on their consumer engagement strategy and monitoring plans.123 As a 
social researcher recalled, the energy company representatives were not the 
only stakeholders who were reluctant about monitoring benefits realisation 
at this stage: 
 
“When you do stuff early, there’s always a risk that people will draw conclusions 
that things aren’t working. Well the point is that we wouldn’t expect them to 
because the full functionality isn’t yet in place. And actually we’re in this foundation 
phase as a programme where suppliers are testing their approaches in order that it 
works out really well at mass rollout. So there are risks to doing research early on in 
the programme from a policy, you know, if you’ve got risk-averse policy people 
then it can seem quite risky doing evaluation quite early on.”124 
 
  Nonetheless, in its response to the consultation in December 2012, DECC 
declared that the remaining period of the foundation phase would be treated 
as a time of intensive learning: 
 
 
120 Findings are summarised in: Ipsos Mori, 2013; 2014. 
121 A social researcher in DECC (8). 
122 Boswell, 2009, p.62. 
123 DECC, 2012h, p.32. 
124 A social researcher in DECC (8). 
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This will include gathering early insights into consumer benefits and how they may 
differ by consumer type; measuring awareness and attitudes towards smart meters; 
and learning more about what works in changing energy consumer behaviours.125 
 
The next subsection focuses on the ‘early learning’ project (ELP), exploring 
what exactly was learnt and how lessons have been taken forward. 
 
 ‘Early Learning’ From the Foundation Phase: 2012-2014 3.3
 
  By the time the ELP studies were announced, nearly a million smart meters 
had already been installed across the UK.126 Two energy suppliers complied 
with officials’ requests by allowing researchers to collect anonymised 
quantitative and qualitative data from their customers, which the 
Government was permitted to publish at aggregate-level.127 In addition to 
this, other suppliers provided annual updates to civil servants on a 
confidential basis, as agreed following the evaluation workshop in 2011.  
  The ELP consisted of a range of research studies conducted between 2013 
and 2014 – including a consumer survey and qualitative study on owners’ 
and non-owners’ attitudes to smart meters,128 an exploration of prepayment 
customers’ attitudes and experiences,129 a quantitative analysis of domestic 
customers’ energy use data,130 a behavioural trial exploring alternative 
approaches to information campaigns (without using smart meters),131 and a 
literature review of existing studies.132 An additional qualitative study was 
 
125 DECC, 2012i, p.5.  
126 DECC, 2012j, p.15.  
127 DECC, 2015c, p.13. 
128 DECC, 2015c, p.13. 
129 DECC, 2015d. 
130 DECC, 2015e. 
131 DECC, 2015f. 




conducted at the same time to understand SME customers’ experiences with 
smart meters.133 
  Despite a commitment to finding out ‘what works’ in the realisation of 
consumer benefits, the project reports were heavily caveated and not to be 
generalised – especially in terms of implications for benefits realisation 
during the mass roll-out phase.134 A range of reasons were given for this: it 
was acknowledged that the foundation phase had fewer requirements on the 
installers than would be in place in the mass roll-out, only a small data 
sample was available (from one or maximum two suppliers in particular) 
and third, much of the infrastructure that would enable benefits to be 
realised was not in place yet. 
  A wide range of areas were covered in the commissioned research, so the 
remainder of this subsection focuses on two particular kinds of insights from 
these projects: insights about domestic consumers’ engagement with smart 
meters in general (and also vulnerable domestic customers specifically), and 
insights about how smart meters have been installed and used in SMEs. Left 
out of this analysis are the behavioural trials on what kind of information 
best enables behaviour change (which did not involve smart meters), and the 
synthesis review by Sarah Darby.  
 
Early learning about domestic consumers 
  Quantitative and qualitative studies were commissioned to understand 
households’ awareness and interaction with smart meters. The quantitative 
data study compared energy use amongst smart meter owners against 
comparable households without smart meters, using three years’ worth of 
 
133 DECC, 2013h. 
134 DECC, 2015i, p.8. 
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meter data.135 It found that households with smart meters used 2.3% less 
electricity (with 95% confidence intervals between 1.6-2.8%) and 1.5% less 
gas (with 95% confidence intervals between 0.9-2.1%). These values are 
broadly consistent with expected savings as outlined in the impact 
assessments, assuming they are reproduced persistently for 18 years.136 
Despite the questionable assumption that individual households’ energy use 
would not change substantially over eighteen years, these studies were seen 
as substantiating the expectations of the policy team, and so no changes were 
deemed necessary in the light of them. 
  By contrast, the qualitative analysis revealed two important insights which 
suggested changes to help improve the customer experience and maximise 
benefits in the future roll-out.137 First, the study revealed two distinct types of 
user interactions with the IHDs. One group of users adopted an ‘information 
approach’, which typically involved occasionally (and sporadically) looking 
at the display to see how much energy was being used at a given time. 
Others took a ‘monitoring approach’, where they would use the IHD 
regularly – for example, in order to check if appliances were switched off 
before going to sleep. The latter group of users were more likely to continue 
using their appliance after a few weeks of the smart meter installation, from 
 
135 DECC, 2015e, pp.11-13. All customers in the study used a credit system – none had a 
prepayment meter. 
136 DECC, 2015e, p.19. Some data were removed based on what ‘normal’ household 
conditions should look like. For instance, households with consumption at the extreme ends 
were removed from the study. Households in which annual energy consumption doubled or 
halved between the two years were also excluded from the study “as these changes were 
deemed to be due to factors outside of the smart meter intervention”. Yet, it is unclear 
whether it is reasonable to expect households’ energy consumption to remain consistent in 
this way over the timescale projected, as a household can undergo significant change over 18 
years.  




which the analysts argued that the monitoring approach should be 
emphasised in future installations.138  
  Second, the study found that despite broadly being satisfied with the 
installation,139 some consumers did not use any information they might have 
received from the installer to help them change their energy consumption. 
Many claimed that they did not find the information helpful – citing reasons 
such as being uninterested in making changes, a ‘lack of meaning’ associated 
with the information provided, no appliance-specific feedback, and the 
absence of any apparent solutions provided to the ‘problem’ presented by 
the display.140  
  Qualitative research also identified ‘more vulnerable groups’ (i.e. those on 
lower income, older than 65 or otherwise disadvantaged) as more likely to 
find the IHD difficult to use, and, consequently, to have it unplugged.141 As 
such, they were least likely to benefit from the installation of a smart meter, 
which highlighted the need for extra effort to be taken for these customers. 
  All of these qualitative insights revealed the diversity of user practices with 
respect to smart meters, and challenged technological determinist 
assumptions that supposed users would all respond in the same, predictable 
way to receiving in-home displays. Consistent with the STS literature, they 
emphasise that policy-makers should expect variation in users’ engagement 




138 DECC, 2015c, p.131. 
139 DECC, 2015c, p.21. 
140 DECC, 2015c, p.57. 
141 DECC, 2015c, p.132; DECC, 2015d, p.12. 
142 Oudshoorn et al., 2004, p.44. 
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Early learning about SMEs 
  Qualitative fieldwork was also conducted with small and medium-sized 
enterprises who had received smart meters by one particular (unnamed) 
supplier, just prior to the codes of practice coming into force.143 The aim of 
this study was to explore consumers’ “awareness, understanding, 
experiences of and attitudes towards smart energy meters and smart energy 
products and services”.144 The report was as heavily caveated as the others 
were. Furthermore, the study could not report on how those with smart 
meters were using real-time consumption data supplied from the meters, 
because the contractors were unable to speak to any SMEs who had access to 
that data.145 The study was nonetheless flagged by one social researcher as 
important for highlighting the usefulness of qualitative methods.146 It 
produced the insight that regardless of whether they already had a smart 
meter installed or not, SME customers were typically unaware of how they 
could benefit from using a smart meter.147 Indeed, the researchers found that 
on all occasions where the supplier proposed that customers get a smart 
meter, the installation was presented as a routine meter upgrade, rather than 
as a positive change to benefit the consumer.148  
  The study therefore brought attention to significant barriers that could 
prevent full consumer benefits from being achieved. The authors 
recommended that the policy team consider how SMEs could be better made 
aware of the potential benefits of smart meters.149 DECC subsequently 
 
143 DECC, 2013h, p.2.  
144 DECC, 2013h, p.2.  
145 DECC, 2013h, p.2. 
146 According to one social researcher (8). 
147 DECC, 2013h, p.5. 
148 DECC, 2013h, p.45. 




commissioned the Carbon Trust in 2014 to identify innovative products and 
services that could be developed to enable SMEs to make the most out of 
their smart meters.150  
 
Implications for next steps 
  The implications of the empirical projects discussed in the previous section, 
along with an additional literature review by Sarah Darby,151 were 
summarised in a ‘policy conclusions’ report which outlined steps for further 
action.152 Significantly, the latter report reiterated that energy suppliers must 
ensure that they are addressing the information needs of all customers – 
emphasising that households should be shown how to use the IHD at the 
time of installation. The policy conclusions report also emphasised that 
installers should encourage households to adopt a ‘monitoring approach’ to 
using their IHD.153  
  The results of these findings were then used to convince the policy team to 
commission an action research project. This project, which is being carried 
out at the time of writing, will help officials to decide what constitutes good 
practice in the provision of energy efficiency advice, from which they will 
update guidance materials for installers.  
  The research commissioned between 2011 and 2014 was reported to have 
been well-regarded amongst evidence communities within DECC, as one 
civil servant emphasised: 
 
 
150 DECC, 2014e, pp.21-22; DECC, 2015h. 
151 DECC, 2015g. 
152 DECC, 2015h. 
153 DECC, 2015h, p. 45.  
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“So I think generally within the department, we’re seen as a best-practice example of 
using research evidence to inform policy.”154 
 
Indeed the policy team has since won an internal award for its use of 
research during this time. 
  It is clear then that while the projects did not provide a deep challenge to 
the dominant policy framing, they did identify areas where the roll-out 
seemed to be going well and areas that could be improved. The social 
research thereby enabled the policy team to hold the energy suppliers to 
account, by revealing – through the reported experience and perspectives of 
members of the public – unsatisfactory installation procedures (for example, 
some installers not engaging sufficiently effectively with consumers, or 
describing the smart meter installation as a routine upgrade) or other 
unforeseen issues (for instance, the two distinct ways in which the IHD was 
used – to provide information or to ‘monitor’). The policy team could then 
take action to ensure that issues would be better addressed in the mass roll-
out stage. If the Government remains committed to monitoring the mass roll-
out ‘live’ during phase two, rather than an evaluation after-the-event,155 then 
they have a stronger chance of ensuring that smart meters are cost-effective 
for consumers and are used to significantly reduce (rather than to increase) 
carbon emissions. 
  This portfolio of research was intended to enable single-loop learning so 
that officials can help to ensure the consumers benefit from the smart meter 
roll-out as much as possible. And indeed this was its major contribution, 
enabling quick changes to be made where required. But while the research 
does not appear to have scope to enable a reframing of the policy problem, 
 
154 A policy official in DECC’s SMIP. 




there is some evidence to suggest it achieved a conceptual rethink of the 
smart meter roll-out, by emphasising that smart meters will be domesticated 
differently in different households (or companies), with varying effects on 
energy consumption.156 It is not clear if this was a particularly new insight for 
the SMIP, but it is consistent with DECC’s experience of social research 
projects associated with the implementation phase of the Green Deal. 
Together these may have alerted other teams within DECC – and the 
ministerial leadership – of the need to ‘think people’ more during the policy 
design stage, and to be cautious of technological determinism. 
 
 Conclusions on Smart Meters 3.4
 
  Through the use of social research then, and in a context of a high degree of 
scrutiny (from the NAO in particular), civil servants’ conception of the 
domestication of smart meters gradually shifted from a vision of information 
changing all users’ behaviour, to a more nuanced consideration of how 
behaviour change could be achieved. 
 In this process, social researchers have played an important role in 
challenging energy suppliers to comply with an evaluation, as well as 
questioning assumptions about users’ engagement with the devices through 
empirical research. In particular, it emerges that there is likely to be more 
variation amongst citizens in their engagement with smart meters than 
previously expected. While officials now acknowledge the likely variability 
amongst citizens, and some steps will be taken to update guidelines for 
installers, it remains to be seen whether these will be sufficient to ensure that 
consumer benefits are fairly distributed across society.  
 
156 DECC, 2015h, p.7.  
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  There also remains uncertainty over whether the public will really benefit to 
the tune of £6.3bn,157 and if those benefits will last for the full 18 years that 
would make the business case worthwhile. But it does not follow that DECC 
should give up on trying to maximise consumer benefits, nor that the smart 
meters implementation programme should be dissolved or that smart meters 
be banned. Smart meters do have the potential to bring a range of benefits for 
energy suppliers and for consumers too, and can possibly contribute towards 
achieving a slight reduction in carbon emissions. Cutting the smart meters 
implementation programme would likely see citizens paying for smart 
meters via bills without seeing any benefits. This all suggests that it remains 
in the public interest for government engagement in the smart meter roll-out 
– funding research and exercising legislative power to hold suppliers to 
account. And given that the programme is managed by a policy team that 
has gained a reputation for its use of social research evidence, as more 
installations are completed and a fuller picture emerges, we can expect that 
social research will continue to play a prominent role in identifying issues. 
Perhaps it will also be used as the basis for more innovative ideas to engage 














4. Heat Strategy 
 
 Background 4.1
   
In December 2011, The Coalition Government published The Carbon Plan, 
which set out the Government’s ambition for achieving reductions in carbon 
emissions in line with the fourth carbon budget (for the period 2023-27) and 
for increasing the UK’s energy security.158 In the next few months, a Heat 
Strategy and Policy team would consult the public ahead of producing a 
strategy report that would subsequently provide a framing for policy 
proposals.159 In developing the evidence base for this, the team sought to 
understand variation in current domestic heat use in greater depth. This 
provided an opportunity for the CIT to engage with policy development 
early in the policy design stage. As we saw in Chapter 5, by this time, the CIT 
had built a strong reputation with policy colleagues – particularly within the 
Energy Efficiency Deployment Office – and was also expanding in size (with 
an emphasis on recruiting GSR-accredited social researchers) which would 
provide some capacity for longer-term projects than were possible hitherto.    
  This section explores how the CIT worked directly with the Heat Strategy 
and Policy team to develop their understanding of how energy is used in UK 
homes. As will become clear, researchers’ challenge to colleagues’ 
assumptions about people were more influential in terms of inspiring a 
rethink of the policy framing than was possible for the Green Deal or the 
SMIP.  
 
158 DECC, 2011b, p.13. 
159 DECC, 2012k, p.93.  




 Commissioning Social Research 4.2
 
  After the publication of The Carbon Plan, and around the same time that 
DECC was consulting on its heat strategy in 2012, economists and 
statisticians in the Energy Efficiency Development Office were surprised to 
find that the highest 10% of domestic gas consuming households in the UK 
use quadruple the amount of gas annually than the lowest 10%.160 Moreover, 
the independent variables that were expected to be most significant in their 
quantitative model (such as the size of the property, how many rooms it had, 
and socioeconomic information about the occupants) could only account for 
40% of the variation in gas consumption amongst households.161    
  When considering the quantitative data, the CIT suggested to their heat 
strategy colleagues that they should commission a qualitative research 
project to better understand the remaining variation in gas consumption. The 
social researchers then put together a brief for tendering the research project, 
translating the needs of the policy team into an outline for what was required 
empirically. Through working closely with the social researchers, the 
generalists gained an appreciation of how qualitative insights could usefully 
shed light on the matter.  
  The winning contract planned a thorough study that compared 30 high-
consuming households with 30 low-consuming households residing in 
physically similar buildings, using multiple interviews and temperature 
monitoring.162 One researcher recalled that since qualitative approaches were 
 
160 DECC, 2013i, p.22. 
161 See DECC, 2012l, Table 1: p.5. The socioeconomic factors included age, tenure  
and household income.  




a new approach for their policy colleagues, who held concerns over the 
representativeness and robustness of the data, there was a sense that a 
particularly big sample should be used: 
 
“I think in industry or in other domains, maybe, you could have done something 
similar with half the budget and actually you would have found out something 
fairly similar. And then you might not have been quite so confident. So I think there 
definitely was an increase in budget, to get people a bit more comfortable that it 
would be qualitative.”163 
 
With this rather symbolic gesture to secure legitimacy in the eyes of the 
generalists, the research project achieved buy-in from the Heat Strategy and 
Policy team from the start. Subsequently in November 2012 the researchers 
reported that, contra to many expectations, the variation in domestic gas 
consumption could not be explained straightforwardly in terms of different 
attitudes. The same researcher recalled: 
 
“And actually going into it there was a view, permeated through a lot of different 
places (such as the media, think tanks, academia), that there were some households 
that were very high consumers of gas, or in fact of energy – I think initially it was 
high-energy consuming households – that they were high energy consuming 
households, for some reason that you could point to. That there was something 
about that household that maybe they didn’t care about the planet, or they were just 
– that they didn’t care about anything, really. They just wanted to max- that it was 
something to do with ‘let’s live fast, die young’, or…that there was something to do 
with the household, which sort of, you could pin-point. And once you pinpointed 
that then maybe you could target that group, and focus on that group, and as with 
the kind of standard MINDSPACE – and marketing-type – approach you would be 




163 A DECC social researcher (1).  
164 A DECC social researcher (1). 
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The results of the research project instead pointed out that the variation was 
largely due to a relatively mundane combination of factors, as explained in 
the research report: 
 
However, it did not appear that High and Low gas users had particular behaviours 
that made them easy to identify as High or Low. Instead, each high or low gas user 
tends to have a cluster of very ordinary behaviours that happen to culminate in high 
or low gas use. There are, it seems, many different ways to be a high or low gas 
user.165 
 
The difficulty was to put this insight into practice.  
 
  Strategizing with Social Research Insights 4.3
 
  The ‘High-Low’ research project moved the Heat Strategy and Policy team 
to rethink their understanding of gas consumption, although they concluded 
that they would need more time to grapple with its policy implications. The 
immediate, short-term impact of the research on the strategy team, then, was 
not to take the Government’s domestic heat strategy in a new direction, but 
to drop plans to segment and engage the public in terms of high or low users 
of energy. Since the social researchers were engaged early in the policy 
development stage, and prior to any ministerial commitments being made on 
heat strategy, the research-based challenge to officials’ assumptions could 
straightforwardly be used to stop further development within the given 
policy framing. Furthermore, the study and interactions with the CIT that 
followed prompted the officials to demand more social science insights into 
 




energy use in the home. DECC subsequently funded two long-term research 
projects on domestic energy consumption.166 
  The significance of the High-Low research project was highlighted in 
DECC’s 2013 Heat Strategy, The Future of Heat: Meeting the Challenge.167 Yet, 
the challenge of improving domestic energy efficiency was described in 
terms of consumers’ lack of information and/or economic incentives, or 
market uncertainty over standards and regulations.168 Arguably, this was a 
missed opportunity for the full range of possibilities from social practice 
theory to be explicitly explored in the report.  
  While the research has not yet inspired a new policy framing for domestic 
heat to emerge, there is some evidence of conceptual learning from the 
research projects within DECC. The analysis reportedly attracted attention 
from across DECC – including from the Chief Scientist – and stimulated 
conversations within the department about the complexity of reducing 
energy use in UK households.169 By highlighting how embedded energy use 
is in mundane domestic practices, interest grew in gaining insights from 
recent academic research using social practice theory. By this point in late 
2012, many of DECC’s civil servants had already been exposed to ideas from 
social practice theory (not least because of the work of the Head of Science, 
Head of Social Science, the ESRC Research Fellow and the HCI as we saw in 
Chapter 5), but there still remained an open question of how those insights 
could be translated into policy-making processes. As such, a new and 
reframed policy design has yet to emerge. But it is too soon to class this 
 
166One of which began in 2012, and the other in 2014. See Energy Technologies Institute, 
2014; UCL Energy Institute, 2015.  
167 DECC, 2013j, p.76. 
168 DECC, 2013j, p.79ff.  
169 A DECC Social Researcher (1).  
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research as a dog that didn’t bark170 - it may be that the research insights are 
dormant seeds,171 which will be picked up again at a future point in 
favourable circumstances. 
  This research project is thus a good example where early – and close – 
engagement with social researchers in the policy process enabled research 
insights to inform strategic decisions about decarbonising heat demand. 
Rather than focusing on particular types of households that could be 
identified as ‘high energy consumers’, which is how the policy team 
expected to use research insights, the research project revealed that gas 
consumption is more complicated than that, and emphasised the significance 
of households’ mundane routines. For this reason, the research was valued 
for its conceptual contribution. It now remains to be seen whether – and how 
- insights from the High-Low study and the commissioned research projects 
will contribute to new domestic heat policy ideas in the Conservative 
Government.   
 
 Conclusions on Heat Strategy 4.4
 
  Domestic heat policy provided an opportunity for social researchers to 
contribute to policy design within DECC. Through early engagement with 
the now-expanded CIT, social research was commissioned that would 
challenge the dominant engineering and economic framing of domestic 
energy use. Yet, despite provoking a shift in discourse from individual 
attitudes or choices towards understanding the configuration and 
reinforcement of domestic routines which feed into high or low energy use in 
 
170 Owens, 2015, p.138. 




the home, the dialogues within the department were never translated into 
firm policy ideas by the Coalition Government. The Conservative 
Government’s heat policy priorities are unclear at the time of writing, with 
firm commitments made to permit shale gas extraction172 at the same time as 
announcing the revoking of policy for domestic buildings built after 2016 to 
emit zero carbon emissions, and a “review” of energy efficiency policies.173  
 
5. Social Researchers’ Influence in Energy Efficiency and Demand 
Reduction: Towards ‘People Thinking’?  
 
  After having seen in Chapter 5 that the Head of Customer Insight and Head 
of Policy Evaluation shared an ambition to get civil servants to ‘think people’ 
more, this chapter revealed that to a small degree, this has been achieved in 
energy efficiency and demand reduction policy areas. At a time of increased 
scrutiny of departmental spending, in relatively favourable conditions given 
the circumstances – including the presence of external pressure from 
committees, the National Audit Office, journalists, and academics – social 
researchers have gradually been able to provide research-based challenge to 
key assumptions in the Green Deal, smart meters implementation, and 
domestic heat policy areas. In these cases, research was used instrumentally, 
for instance to question the expectation that particular schemes may have 
universal appeal across UK society, to highlight the variable nature of users’ 
engagement with technologies, and to emphasise the complexity of 
behaviour change. In this regard, DECC’s social researchers have achieved 
considerable direct influence in a relatively short space of time.  
 
172 HM Treasury, 2015, p.10. 
173 HM Treasury, 2015, p.46. 
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  Yet, in contrast to what we saw in DEFRA, in neither of these cases have the 
research projects been used as a basis for the development and 
implementation of more reflexive policy ideas during the years of the 
Coalition Government. No energy efficiency or demand reduction policy has 
been framed in a way which ‘starts from where people are at’. This is despite 
the use of similar approaches as those that DEFRA’s social researchers 
employed – such as segmentation models, and experimental (or trial) 
methods to test the effectiveness of policy ideas. This emphasises the point 
that when considering the epistemic context of the ‘scientific civil service’, we 
must expect diversity between departments.174 
  Moreover, it shows that the same policy tools can be used to enable either 
single- or double-loop learning, depending on the circumstances in which 
they are developed and applied. Although we have also seen evidence to 
suggest that the research projects considered in this chapter have stimulated 
some conceptual learning, and therefore in time we may conclude that they 
functioned as dormant seeds,175 springing to life under favourable conditions.  
  The next chapter completes the empirical analysis with comparisons 
between the histories of social research in DEFRA and DECC, before I draw 




174 C.f. Webster 2007a; Wynne 2007. 
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HIS CHAPTER compares the social research functions in DEFRA and 
DECC, and then draws broader conclusions to the thesis. We start 
with an empirically-based comparison of analytical structures in the two 
departments – drawing heavily on data in Chapters 4 & 5 as well as some 
novel data. Section 3 then considers similarities and differences between 
DEFRA and DECC’s applications of social research expertise in behaviour 
change for reducing the public’s environmental impact and energy use. 
Sections 4 & 5 comprise the conclusions to the chapter and to the thesis, with 
a return to the research questions before a consideration of the limitations to 




  T 




2. Comparisons: Social Research Capacity in DEFRA and DECC 
 
  Social research capacity in both DEFRA and DECC has grown substantially 
over their short histories. Indeed one interviewee reflected that the growth of 
social research capacity arguably followed similar trajectories across the two 
organisations. Each department started with a base of zero social researchers. 
They each underwent a period of expansion, when social researchers and 
their allies negotiated for greater resources, broadened civil servants’ 
conceptions of what social research could mean for their department, created 
new roles, and increasingly gained legitimacy and appreciation for social 
research in the department. At the time of the interviews, when posts were at 
risk in both departments due to budget cuts, the number of researchers 
settled at around 15 and 20 in each department. 
  A second striking similarity is that in both departments the initial growth in 
social research capacity was driven by a motley set of actors who were 
motivated to establish a social research tradition for (differing) instrumental 
reasons. In DEFRA, this started with the first Secretary of State, Margaret 
Beckett. She wanted her department to draw a line under the past and all of 
the controversies associated with the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and 
Food by adopting new processes and producing new outcomes. In a political 
climate in which Government Ministers valued the potential contribution of 
social research evidence for improving outcomes, Margaret Beckett 
expressed a commitment to utilising social research. This commitment was 
shared by the department’s new Chief Scientist and his Science Directorate. 
Over the next few years, they pursued steps to develop a social research 




officials and the Chief Economist to identify new roles, and supporting the 
creation of research posts. During these early years the rural researcher on 
the Science Advisory Council, who was driven by a concern to contest a 
dominant agricultural economics framing, also played a prominent role in 
the collective construction of interpretations of the social dimensions of the 
department’s remit – regarding, for instance, animal health and welfare 
issues.  
  Likewise, the initial momentum for building social research capacity in 
DECC emerged from an assorted mix of actors, each with their own 
instrumental motivations. At first DECC’s political leadership did not 
express the same commitment as Margaret Beckett did in the early years of 
DEFRA. DECC’s remit was defined narrowly along engineering and 
economic lines. It was only after concerns were raised by the Head of Science 
and social researchers in DEFRA and elsewhere – who all believed that 
DECC simply could not achieve its targets without social research capacity 
(particularly in the form of behavioural research) – that the issue was 
acknowledged. The Chief Economist also played an important role in 
supporting the case for building social research capacity, by funding the 
creation of a social research post to provide expertise on policy evaluation. 
While not all officials in DEFRA and DECC sang social researchers’ praises 
during these early years, those diverse actors who drove the expansion of the 
department’s social research capacity were clearly pursuing instrumental 
(rather than symbolic) goals. It is hard to imagine how social research 
capacity would have emerged if it were not for the support of authoritative 
internal and external natural scientists, economists and senior civil servants 
pursuing instrumental motivations. 
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  Moreover, around 2009/2010 – after the number of social researchers had 
grown considerably in both departments – the researchers then gained a 
greater degree of autonomy, hence they could make more significant 
contributions towards building their own research capacity. DEFRA’s social 
researchers exercised this autonomy by forming a (short-lived) Centre of 
Expertise on Influencing Behaviour, securing firm commitments for 
expansion in the 2010 Evidence Investment Strategy, and using the clout of 
the new Head of Profession to create new embedded research posts in policy 
teams with little prior engagement with social research. Similarly, in DECC 
the Head of Customer Insight (HCI) and the Head of Policy Evaluation 
(HPE) created new roles for researchers and expanded their reach across the 
department by bringing in seconded researchers, collaborating with the 
Cabinet Office’s Behavioural Insight Team, working with the Head of Science 
to create a Head of Social Science Engagement post, creating the joint 
DEFRA-DECC Social Science Expert Panel, and actively seeking out 
opportunities to engage policy teams across the department. In this way and 
with favourable institutional support from senior staff, social researchers in 
both DEFRA and DECC have brought epistemic diversity to new policy 
teams – including in the flooding and biodiversity teams in DEFRA, and the 
energy generation and infrastructure teams in DECC.  
  In examining the processes by which social research capacity expanded in 
DEFRA and DECC, we saw that social researchers and others often used 
evidence-based challenge to promote new meanings, new roles and the value 
of social research in DEFRA and DECC. In DEFRA, outsiders were 
particularly prominent in providing a challenge function – the rural 
researcher and the other social scientist challenged ministers, the Science 




makers to reframe problems (e.g. broadening the remit to include ‘rural 
affairs’), to identify opportunities for social research to contribute via the 
Evidence Investment Strategy, and to find reasons to value the input of social 
researchers. Later, the first social researcher in the sustainable consumption 
and production (SCP) team – who had come from academia and was well 
equipped with expert knowledge which she could refer to in making her 
challenges – was particularly effective at getting colleagues in the team and 
elsewhere to see value in engaging with social research in technical policy 
areas early in the policy-making process. Providing a challenge function was 
not just a hobby for outsiders – all analysts, and particularly social 
researchers, were committed to providing challenge. The new Head of 
Profession, for instance, successfully challenged policy teams to create new 
embedded research posts at a time of declining resources, and the 
researchers in those new posts challenged colleagues to rethink how they 
understood the role of citizens.  
  In the same way, DECC’s analysts – particularly the Head of Science – 
challenged senior officials to see value in social research expertise. As 
capacity expanded, the HCI and HPE were able to challenge policy framings 
in a way that would open up opportunities for social research to contribute. 
They did this directly through their involvement on the Research 
Development Committee. They also brought in additional resources to aid 
capacity to provide a strong challenge function – particularly in the form of 
the Social Science Expert Panel and the Head of Social Science Engagement, 
who worked together to challenge scientists and engineers’ conceptions of 
the role of social science in the energy infrastructure teams in DECC. Actors’ 
provision of challenge thus emerges as a key mechanism by which new 
meanings, roles, and value for social research come to gain recognition. 
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Challenge thereby helps to make DEFRA and DECC epistemically dynamic 
institutions, such that ideas, assumptions, and understandings are constantly 
changing.  
  Moreover, we have seen that in both departments many officials conceived 
of technical policy areas as beyond the reach of social research. From their 
perspective, social science would appear to constitute the ‘missing masses’ of 
science policy, as discussed in the introduction to this thesis. In DEFRA, 
many officials saw social science as irrelevant for tackling animal health and 
welfare issues, and also for SCP policy areas. But after many years of 
challenge and social research’s contribution being proven to officials in those 
areas, they could be described by the Head of Profession as having a more 
‘natural’ understanding of the need for social research than in other policy 
areas. The same is true of DECC: the department’s original framing in 
engineering and economic terms provided little inspiration in terms of roles 
for social research. Yet, over time it came to be appreciated that social 
researchers have important contributions to make across the department’s 
remit – not only in helping to promote energy saving behaviours, but also in, 
for example, the siting of nuclear waste storage or the understanding of 
citizens’ opposition to wind turbines. Both departments have come a long 
way in promoting epistemic diversity within policy areas and 
acknowledging the multiple forms of social research that are relevant across 
environment, food, and energy policy domains. However, more can be done 
to achieve greater interdisciplinarity in these teams in the future – starting 
with early and sustained engagement with social researchers. 
    Another similarity in DEFRA and DECC’s changes in social research 
capacity is that officials in each organisation reported on multiple occasions 




hierarchy. Whether this is measured in terms of budgets,1 number of 
analysts,2 or the ‘privileging’3 of some sorts of evidence over others in the 
policy process, researchers in both DEFRA and DECC observed this 
epistemic hierarchy. The social research communities in DEFRA and DECC 
do now have experience and skills in growing their authority and resources 
and can continue to make arguments for expansion – or at least a reduction 
in line with other analytical professions. However, it remains difficult to 
secure senior posts, and researchers in both departments have expressed 
concerns, noting that it is tempting to achieve career progression by leaving 
the Government Social Research Service (GSR).  
  This issue was particularly pertinent within DEFRA’s community – perhaps 
because a longer record of employing social researchers has meant there are 
many who have had to consider their next steps for career progression. 
Researchers noted that a significant number of their GSR-accredited staff 
now work in posts for which you do not need GSR accreditation. Some of 
these researchers are based in strategic evidence roles, while others have 
moved to a generalist role within the same team that they previously worked 
for as specialists. Increasingly the Head of Profession has been taking on a 
generalist’s portfolio of work alongside her role as the Head of Social 
Research in DEFRA.4 A different researcher reflected that, in his next move 




1 As described by a social researcher in DECC (5). 
2 As described by a social researcher in DECC (5) and a social researcher in DEFRA (1). 
3 A term used by a social researcher in DEFRA (4). 
4 As reported by DEFRA’s Head of Profession for Social Research. 
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“I mean, I have been advised in the past, that if I wanted to stay as an analyst - that 
if I wanted to stay in the evidence area, that maybe I should think about transferring 
over to economics.”5  
 
Reflecting on colleagues’ moves out of the social research profession, another 
added:  
 
“I think one of the issues has been that there have been very few opportunities for 
promotion – and career progression. Particularly in a department with a small 
number of social researchers, like us. And therefore you need to look at other ways 
of broadening your skills and your development opportunities potential.”6 
 
While the situation appears similar in DECC, past and present social 
researchers gave no indication that this was a concern for them. As more of 
DECC’s community of researchers start to seek career progression it will be 
intriguing to see to what extent their expertise will be retained within the 
department’s successor, the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial 
Strategy.7 The epistemic hierarchy was also said to operate at a government-
wide level,8 and so work must also be done by the Government Social 
Research Service in the Cabinet Office in order to support social researchers 
across government departments.  
  For all of the similarities noted so far, there are also some key differences 
between the histories of social research capacity in DEFRA and in DECC. 
First is the context in which the two departments were formed. DEFRA was 
created in the aftermath of a series of controversies around the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, with strong ministerial commitment to work 
differently. This included a drive to use social research expertise, which was 
 
5 A social researcher in DEFRA (2). 
6 A social researcher in DEFRA (6). 
7 BBC News, 2016. 




then pursued by the scientists in the Science Directorate as part of their work 
on developing a strategy for science. 
  DECC was formed under different conditions. There was no public 
controversy, and no scandal. Instead it was created in a more technocratic 
move to overcome institutional barriers for addressing climate change by 
bringing together officials from different departments that were thought to 
need to work together more closely – a move which also resonated with 
Gordon Brown’s political plans to give more responsibility to Ed Miliband. 
In this context, and at a time of declining budgets, the department’s 
formation was not intended to bring a fundamental change in processes. 
There was no expressed commitment to engage with social science more, and 
indeed there was a struggle for the lack of social research capacity to be 
recognised as an issue during the first twelve months. But the Capability 
Review in December 2009 provided an authoritative impetus to the cause, 
and, with a high degree of chance, enabled social research capacity to gain a 
footing from which to grow over the next few years.  
  Despite DECC’s initial teething problems, a second (and surprising) 
difference is that while DEFRA has a longer history of making the case for 
social research to be included early in the policy process, DECC’s social 
researchers have reportedly been more successful at making the case for 
social research across the department. As one social researcher who has 
worked for both departments observed, it seemed like embedded researchers 
in policy teams in DEFRA had to work harder to make the case for the value 
of social research, while in her experience in DECC there was greater clarity 
amongst her colleagues over what her role in the team was:  
 
“So kind of from the top, [the Head of Customer Insight] had a very good idea of 
what she felt we should be doing to be answering the needs of everybody else. So 
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you had a much clearer steer of what was needed – and it was clearer to us because 
there was that much better kind of join up – it was a much more focused, smaller 
unit. Whereas in DEFRA, you don’t get any of that oversight from DEFRA because 
she works on animal health – I do a bit because I sit in her team, but if you’re in 
another part of the building then you don’t really have that.”9 
 
Indeed, DECC’s HCI made an active effort to work with every policy team in 
the department: 
 
“I kind of kept a tally of how many policy teams have social researchers worked 
with in any given year – that’s been consistently increasing over time.”10 
 
  By contrast, in DEFRA it seems that there have been a couple of cases in 
recent years in which a budget for a social researcher to join a policy team 
has been secured, with the researchers then finding that they had to make the 
case for what they could contribute to the team. The social researchers faced 
resistance – challenge even – and no doubt this was an opportunity for them 
to learn from. All of this does not necessarily mean that the social research 
capacity was better utilised in DECC than in DEFRA. We saw in Chapters 6 
& 7, that there are many reasons why social research insights might not be 
utilised within policy development processes. However, it does show that 
policy officials across DECC gained some idea of what social scientists would 
contribute to their team – and were seemingly more prepared for them – 
whereas in DEFRA there remain teams that have not worked with social 
researchers before, and the case for social research has to be made from 
scratch within each team, overcoming negative perceptions or naiveties that 
may be held about social scientists’ expertise. 
 
9 A social researcher in DECC (2).  




    It is also worth noting that while DEFRA and DECC both started with zero 
social researchers and each employed approximately 20 at the time of the 
interviews, DECC’s capacity grew much faster than DEFRA’s. Although this 
is perhaps more indicative of the epistemic conditions rather than the 
activities of key people – by the time DECC’s social research capacity was 
expanding in 2010/11, policy-makers across Whitehall had a heightened 
interest in behavioural research (an area in which the Government Social 
Research Service had now claimed expertise)11 – and this government-wide 
interest was in part shaped by the influential work previously produced by 
DEFRA’s social researchers.  
  Despite many similarities then, DEFRA and DECC have developed 
distinctive social research capacities – each of which has been heavily shaped 
by the institutional, political, and epistemic context. We can now turn to 
compare social researchers’ influence in DEFRA and DECC.  
 
3. Comparisons: Influencing Behaviour in DEFRA and DECC 
 
  A key similarity between social researchers’ work in DEFRA and DECC is 
that there were many examples of instrumental uses of research (in Boswell’s 
sense)12 to improve policy in both departments. In most cases considered, 
there was a supportive context in which there was strong political 
commitment, sufficient institutional capacity, and social researchers’ 
epistemic perspective were aligned with the dominant problem-framing, 
such that research projects could achieve ‘direct’13 impact in the short-term. 
 
11 Halpern et al., 2004; Darnton, 2008.  
12 Boswell, 2009, p.29. 
13 Owens, 2015, p.127. 
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We saw this in Chapter 6 with DEFRA’s SCP team’s use of a segmentation 
model and qualitative research (for instance, in developing material for the 
Act On CO2 campaign and for understanding the likely reactions to a 
personal carbon allowance scheme). Similarly, in Chapter 7 we saw many 
cases of research being used instrumentally within existing policy framings 
in DECC – e.g. steps were taken to make the Green Deal more appealing to 
citizens after research revealed features that made the scheme unpopular, 
and research commissioned by the SMIP team revealed that users’ 
engagement with the devices was more diverse than expected, prompting 
officials to make changes to guidelines for installers. Clearly then, under 
supportive conditions, insights from social research have been put to use 
instrumentally within policy-making processes in these two science-rich 
departments. 
  Moreover, we saw in Chapters 6 and 7 that in both departments 
instrumental uses of research have occasionally enabled double-loop 
learning which could result in a reframing of officials’ understanding of the 
issues at hand. Double-loop learning occurred in DEFRA’s SCP team when 
the social researchers challenged officials’ idea of having a single 
communications campaign for all audiences. Likewise, in DECC social 
researchers questioned colleagues’ conceptions of citizens in the Green Deal, 
smart meters and heat strategy teams. These chapters revealed that in both 
departments far-reaching forms of influence were made possible through 
social researchers’ effective use of challenge – which itself was aided by 
social researchers building a strong rapport with their colleagues. But we 
also saw that while in DEFRA’s SCP team there has been a discernible (albeit 
gradual) change in the policy framing since social researchers have been 




considered in DECC (which admittedly had a shorter history). Nonetheless, 
any new pay as you save scheme will be better informed by social research 
evidence from the outset.  
  The same chapters revealed possible examples of dormant seeds,14 where 
research insights did not achieve immediate influence, but which may be 
revisited under more conducive conditions – for instance when policy teams 
start developing new policy designs. DEFRA’s SCP team’s idea to 
commission a segmentation model three years after Andrew Darnton’s 
recommendation was a clear example. And in both DEFRA and DECC, the 
lessons of practice theory may yet be translated into novel policy designs. 
This seems more likely to happen at a time when a new policy window 
emerges and politicians are open to new policy ideas again.  
  Aside from instrumental uses of research, there emerged a few clear 
instances of symbolic uses of social research in both, DEFRA and DECC. 
DEFRA’s SCP team used the Public Understanding of Sustainable Food study to 
substantiate a decision to covertly promote meat-free diets to citizens, while 
a few of DECC’s research projects on citizens’ attitudes and engagement with 
smart meters were used to do nothing more than substantiate support for the 
policy team’s actions. In both cases, it would have been more prudent if the 
research projects were commissioned earlier in policy development so that 
the findings could inform decisions during the policy design stage. This 
would have been unlikely in the departments at those particular times 
however, since social researchers joined the policy teams quite late in the 
policy-making processes in these areas. 
 
14 Owens, 2015, p.132. 
“Challenge and Be Challenged” 
-318- 
 
  In addition, we saw that DEFRA’s Centre of Expertise on Influencing 
Behaviour (CEIB) used the discourse of practice theory in a legitimising way, 
when they saw that criticism was challenging their credibility. While no 
evidence was found of social research playing a legitimising role in DECC, 
we must be cautious of drawing conclusions from this – absence of evidence 
does not equate to evidence of absence. Further research will illuminate 
whether social research is used in a legitimising sense in the energy and 
climate change policy teams in future. 
 Among these many similarities, there is an important difference between the 
influence of social research in DEFRA’s SCP team and in DECC’s work on 
energy use. Despite using similar forms of research – segmentation models 
and qualitative research on citizens’ perspectives – DEFRA’s social 
researchers were able to move beyond an ‘end-of-pipe’15 model of research 
use in SCP policy, and even instil a sense of institutional reflexivity16 by 
‘starting where people are at’ – particularly through the action-based 
research projects (ABRPs). In DECC, however, I found no evidence of social 
research being used as the basis for more informed (and less scientistic or 
technologically determinist) policy ideas. Although, as mentioned above, it is 
the case that social researchers have a shorter history in DECC, and there is 
some evidence that the energy and climate change teams are now better 
prepared for using social research early in the policy-making process than in 
2010.  
  In summary then, the comparisons drawn in this section and the previous 
one have emphasised that on the whole, social research capacity and 
influence within DEFRA and DECC developed along broadly similar 
 
15 Lowe et al., 2008, p.230. 




trajectories, with some clear differences due to the distinctive institutional, 
political, and epistemic contexts of the time. DEFRA’s social researchers have 
progressed further in terms of influencing policy-making processes at an 
early stage. But in contrast DECC’s social researchers have achieved wider 
reach across their department, ensuring that every policy team has worked 
with social researchers in some way. So while more could be done to place 
social research at the core of policy-making processes in energy and climate 
change in future, DEFRA could also improve its engagement with social 
research by achieving broader engagement across the department, 
particularly with teams which have never worked with social research 
before.  
  Having compared social researchers’ capacity and influence in DEFRA and 
DECC, the next section revisits the research questions and draws some 
conclusions from the history of social research in the two departments.  
 
4. Analytical Conclusions: Epistemic Dynamism and Diversity in 
DEFRA and DECC 
 
  This thesis set out to explore the experiences of social researchers within 
DEFRA and DECC by answering the following research questions: 
 
Research Question 1: How has DEFRA’s internal capacity for utilising social 
research changed since it was formed in 2001? 
 
Research Question 2: How has DECC’s internal capacity for utilising social 
research changed since it was formed in 2008? 
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Research Question 3: How have social researchers influenced work on specific policy 
areas in DEFRA? 
 
Research Question 4: How have social researchers influenced work on specific policy 
areas in DECC? 
 
  In this section, I summarise how these research questions were addressed in 
this thesis. In doing so, I emphasise the epistemically dynamic and diverse 
nature of DEFRA and DECC, as was revealed throughout the empirical 
chapters. 
  I answered the first pair of questions by applying the first part of the 
theoretical framework presented in Chapter 3 (summarised in Figure 1, 















Figure 9: A Graphical Illustration of the Theoretical Framework for Understanding 





















  This framework provided the tools to explore how social research capacity 
grew in DEFRA and DECC, by focusing our attention on the processes by 
which new interpretations of the meanings, roles, and value of social 
research took hold within DEFRA and DECC – as conditioned by the 
institutional, political, and epistemic context. It emerged in Chapters 4 & 5 
that the provision of evidence-based challenge is an important mechanism by 
which civil servants came to learn about social research. By elucidating and 
disputing officials’ perceptions of what social research is, what roles 
researchers can play in their department, and why researchers’ contributions 
should be valued, insiders and outsiders convinced key officials of the need 
to develop social research capacity. They thereby contributed to reshaping 
the epistemic context within the department. It seems unlikely that social 
researchers would have come to populate these departments if key 
arguments had not occurred – such as the academic rural researcher’s 
challenges to economists and scientists in DEFRA, and the Head of Science’s 
exchanges with senior officials in DECC to persuade them to value social 
research. There are more recent examples of such disputes too – in both 
departments, senior social researchers have challenged colleagues on 
evidence and research committees to consider the role that different types of 
social research can play within their projects. Challenge, then, is an 
important mechanism by which social research capacity has grown in these 
departments.    
  The fact that epistemic exchanges take place that can result in policy-makers 
acquiring new perspectives on the meanings, roles, and value of social 
research suggests that DEFRA and DECC can be described as ‘epistemically 
dynamic’ institutions. That is to say that policy-makers’ epistemic 
perspectives are continuously in flux within these departments, enabling 
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actors to learn about social research in a way which has been conducive to 
the growth in social research capacity.  
  We also observed such epistemic dynamism within specific policy domains. 
In DEFRA’s SCP team and in DECC’s work on citizens’ energy use, social 
researchers have continuously challenged colleagues’ assumptions about 
citizens. This gave rise to innovative new research projects such as studies of 
citizens’ attitudes towards a variety of sustainable behaviours, and ABRPs. In 
DECC social researchers’ challenge enabled projects to gain a deeper analysis 
of the Green Deal’s likely customers, and an empirical study of smart meter 
users in situ. In these ways, social researchers’ interactions within policy 
areas have contributed towards making DEFRA and DECC more 
epistemically dynamic. The view of civil servants as averse to criticism17 
appears inaccurate in the light of this evidence. Rather, under supportive 
circumstances, evidence-based challenge can thrive within government 
departments. 
  It follows that there are no ‘natural limits’ to the ways that social research 
expertise can contribute to energy, environment, and food policy-making 
processes. Understanding rural communities, consumers’ behaviours and 
public attitudes have all been portrayed as more ‘natural’ areas for social 
research than other technical policy areas. Yet, as we have seen, social 
research is endowed with new meanings and roles over time. It is the 
challenging of conventional views within DEFRA and DECC that have 
enabled this to happen.  
  Clearly reflexivity has not become “a natural or easy condition within 
policy institutions”.18 And rather than taking for granted Gibbons et al.’s 
 
17 c.f. Norris, 1995, p.274.  




claims that by their very nature ‘mode 2’ organisations are more likely to 
produce research that is more transdisciplinary, heterogeneous, and reflexive 
than academic organisations, and the quality of that work is not assessed by 
peer review but by the effectiveness of the output, we should instead expect 
to find variability and change within such organisations – with different 
actors valuing and assessing research differently within the same 
organisation, and changes being heavily dependent on the conditions in 
which the officials operate. 
  It is not, then, any essential features of social science or of the departments 
themselves but rather contingent contextual changes that shapes how social 
research capacity develops in these departments. The two-part theoretical 
framework used in this thesis was valuable for illuminating the political, 
institutional, and epistemic context within DEFRA and DECC. One key way 
in which context has shaped social researchers’ capacity and influence is 
through its impact on the conditions which made challenge possible. It is 
noteworthy, for instance, that efforts to expand social research capacity in 
DEFRA and DECC have always relied upon support from actors who were 
not social researchers – because the former possessed greater authority 
among senior civil servants. This was clearly the case when the Deputy 
Director of Science and the Chief Economist in DEFRA created the post of 
Chief Social Scientist, and likewise in DECC when the capability reviews 
team persuaded senior officials to build capacity for social and behavioural 
expertise. There is historical precedent here, since over the years experts in 
the civil service have often drawn on influential authoritative figures to 
persuade senior officials to invest in their research.19 To paraphrase 
 
19 Gummett, 1980.  
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Gummett, it appears that social scientists “have become more numerous and 
more significant…, but they remain ‘on tap, not on top’”.20 
  The effective provision of evidence-based challenge was also predicated 
upon social researchers considering this as a core aspect of their professional 
role – we saw that many interviewees described their ‘challenge function’ as 
a healthy and important means by which they contribute, and they expect to 
receive constructive challenge too. Noting the presence of disagreements 
within the civil service is not a new finding – while STS analysts have paid 
little attention to civil servants’ epistemic interactions within UK 
Government agencies, the historical accounts reviewed in Chapter 3 have 
suggested that such disagreements are commonplace.21 What is novel, 
however, is the observation that government analysts’ provision of challenge 
function has been institutionally recognised as an important contribution, 
such that an individual analyst’s experience of providing challenge is used as 
a measure of their competencies and is taken into consideration when 
assessed for promotion.22 They are thus institutionally held to account for 
their provision of challenge.  
  However, incentivising individuals to provide challenge in this way is not 
sufficient for ensuring that analysts provide an effective challenge function. 
Researchers in DEFRA and DECC emphasised that the ‘capacity to challenge’ 
relies upon analysts possessing topical knowledge about the social 
dimensions of a particular policy area. The civil service convention of 
 
20 Gummett, 1980, p.69. The point that scientists remain on tap and not on top in the civil 
service has been repeated more recently by civil servants, see Government Office for Science, 
2013, p.20. 
21 Clarke, 2007; Gorsky, 2007; Gummett, 1980; Sheard, 2010. 
22 For an example of the Competency Framework used to evaluate social researchers see GSR 
Unit, 2013. For an example of the same framework for economists see Government Economic 




valuing analysts’ skills and experience above topic-specific knowledge gives 
rise to a situation where there is high staff turnover of researchers (within 
and between departments). As a result, social researchers may come with no 
prior experience of using social science in technical policy areas, and this has 
thus posed a barrier in the exercise of effective challenge in DEFRA and 
DECC. 
  The convention does have merits. In contrast to the 1970s when scientists 
were recruited for their specialist knowledge and found they were unable to 
progress through the ranks of the civil service,23 government analysts can 
now do so by gaining experience in new policy areas and on different 
projects. As discussed above, this is significant in an environment where in-
post promotion is rare and deemed difficult to justify. 
  Yet, expert knowledge on a particular issue can be lost when one researcher 
is replaced by another – we saw this, for example, with social researchers in 
DEFRA’s CEIB, or when new researchers are placed in policy teams and 
expected to provide a challenge function without prior familiarity with the 
policy domain. As we saw in Chapter 5, DECC’s Head of Customer Insight 
was able to remedy social researchers’ lack of specialist knowledge (e.g. on 
behaviour change and public engagement) by providing new recruits with 
training material based on the knowledge she had gained prior to joining the 
civil service. Prior to this, social researchers lacked the theoretical basis to 
challenge colleagues.  
   Indeed it seems that in all cases where social researchers have performed a 
challenge function within policy areas resulting in double-loop learning, this 
has always involved knowledge-based support from other actors – such as 
 
23 Gummett, 1980, p.76. 
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the Social Science Expert Panel (e.g. in supporting DEFRA officials to think 
about the public reaction to a chalara outbreak, and DECC officials to 
consider the situated nature of opposition to wind farms). Likewise, in 
DEFRA’s work on SCP policy, we saw that challenges from Tim Jackson and 
Laura Michaelis, Andrew Darnton, and the team’s first social researcher were 
all predicated on expertise gained in research environments outside of 
government. An effective internal challenge function therefore seems to 
depend upon externally supplied knowledge. 
  Given this, the lack of social science representation in the influential science 
advisory committees of these departments is concerning, as their absence 
means that an important potential source of challenge is not being mobilised. 
Stronger engagement with research communities would help to ensure social 
researchers are well equipped to provide a challenge function, as would the 
creation of a government-wide Chief Social Scientist to overlook all 
departments’ capacity for social science engagement. 
  Reflecting further upon the performance of challenge, we have seen that it is 
predicated upon other factors too. These include social researchers’ status 
within the organisational and epistemic hierarchy (such that the more senior 
they are the more influence they can achieve), politicians’ stated views of the 
value and credibility of social science, the rapport that is established between 
analysts and generalists – which in turn depends on the analysts’ location 
within the building, the timing of their engagement within the policy 
process, and the autonomy they enjoy over their resources. This all suggests 
that if government analysts’ challenge function is to be nurtured, then more 
institutional structures are required over and above the assessment of 
individual analysts. Such support could include the provision of topic-




assumptions, greater senior civil service representation for social researchers, 
to ensure that their challenge is recognised and valued across government – 
and that the case is made at a senior level, and, moreover, generalists 
working in technical policy domains should be formally required to seek 
input from social scientists in the same way as they are with lawyers and 
economists, to combat the persistent problem of social researchers being 
overlooked until too late in the policy process. Taking these steps would see 
the emergence of a far stronger challenge function in the civil service than 
that which can be achieved through focusing on individuals’ competencies 
alone.  
  To summarise the argument so far then, challenge is clearly an important 
feature of the epistemic culture within DEFRA and DECC. In favourable 
conditions, it can enable departments to become more epistemically 
dynamic, and promote learning about social research, which in turn supports 
the growth of social research capacity. And while social researchers’ 
challenge function could be strengthened in the ways noted in the preceding 
paragraphs, we can see that, over the years, the exercise of challenge has 
gradually enabled these departments to become epistemically diverse – that 
is to say, they host a variety of epistemic perspectives. 
  DEFRA and DECC are ‘epistemically diverse’ in a second sense too – in that 
social researchers’ influence has not been limited to the ‘visible, short term’24 
forms of impact which colleagues expected them to provide. Consistent with 
Owens’s observation that sometimes experts gain a degree of autonomy to 
deliver outputs beyond their briefs, so we have seen a plurality of ways in 
which social researchers have achieved influence in DEFRA and DECC.25 For 
 
24 Owens, 2015, p.127. 
25 Owens, 2015, p.16. 
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instance, in some cases they have stimulated double-loop learning.26 Social 
researchers did this in DEFRA when they developed ABRPs, and likewise in 
DECC when researchers encouraged the Heat Strategy and Policy team to 
rethink their understanding of citizens’ engagement with heat energy in the 
home.  
  In some cases, these efforts led to clear changes in the framing of problems, 
in others it remains to be seen whether they constitute a slow change in the 
framing, dormant seeds, or dogs that never barked.27 But the fact that such 
conversations have occurred within DEFRA and DECC is enough in itself to 
suggest a rethink of the idea that “instrumental rationales preclude 
transformative communicative learning”.28 Indeed, reflexive learning could 
be seen as entirely consistent with instrumental objectives to improve 
outputs and processes, if policy-makers appreciate – as they sometimes do – 
that such learning can help to better achieve their broader (occasionally 
reinterpreted) objectives. 
  Again, the diversity in the forms of influence that social researchers could 
achieve is to a large extent explained by the conditions in which the policy-
makers operate. In situations where a policy area is treated as a ministerial 
priority and is well resourced, where social researchers’ expertise is 
appreciated and engaged with early in the policy process, where capacity is 
able to expand, and when social researchers’ epistemic paradigms are 
represented as consistent with broad policy priorities, then there is good 
potential for social research to be used effectively in an instrumental way. 
Such conditions are conducive to immediate, direct impacts within policy 
 
26 Argyris and Schön, 1978, pp.18-26.  
27 Owens, 2015, p.125-145. 




framings but also to the gradual changing of policy framings. However, 
when some of these conditions are not met, it is more likely that officials – 
including social researchers – will use expertise symbolically to support 
government actions.   
  All that remains in this section is to make explicit the implicit claim that is 
being made here about the value of social researchers’ contributions in 
DEFRA and DECC. In a context where public spending is in decline and 
when government is tasked with confronting wide-ranging technical 
challenges such as climate change, environmental protection, threats to 
energy supply, and food risks, this thesis invites reflection on whether 
academic social scientists should welcome the emergence of social 
researchers in DEFRA and DECC as a positive step. This thesis cannot and 
should not claim to answer that question definitively. Social research clearly 
means different things in different contexts and its meanings are subject to 
change – as are its roles, the reasons that it is valued, and the influence that it 
can achieve. In the light of this, throughout this thesis I have adopted a 
neutral tone, preferring to give voice to actors’ perspectives than to make 
normative claims about them. But having considered the evidence presented 
in this thesis, the following reflections are offered to the reader.  
  There is nothing intrinsically ‘normatively’ democratic about the inclusion 
of social researchers in DEFRA and DECC, in the sense of empowering 
citizens to contribute directly to policy-making processes.29 Occasionally 
social researchers are able to conduct public dialogues, and sometimes these 
influence decision-making processes.30 But since there is currently no formal 
requirement that generalists seek out social researchers’ expertise, the latter 
 
29 Brown, 2015, p.9. 
30 E.g. for the siting of geological disposal facilities – see Icarus, 2015. 
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are reliant upon their colleagues valuing public engagement and openness. 
Moreover, social research has often been used to influence citizens’ 
behaviours without their direct say – sometimes for reasons unbeknownst to 
them (as we saw in the case of promoting meat-free meals). Therefore, social 
researchers cannot be understood as ‘democratising’ these technical policy 
domains if democratisation is interpreted as directly affording citizens greater 
influence over policy decisions.31 
  However, another means of democratisation is achieved through giving 
voice to a plurality of perspectives.32 It is in this sense that social researchers 
could be said to be democratising policy-making in the domains of energy, 
environment, and food policy. Their engagement in such policy areas enables 
the “opening up of plural understandings”,33 and thereby broadens the array 
of options available for consideration. In this sense, the epistemic diversity 
within institutions not only affords stronger evidence but also the 
democratisation of policy-making processes.   
 
5. Social Science in Whitehall and Beyond: Limitations and 
Opportunities for Further Research 
 
  One significant limitation of the research presented here is that I was not 
able to interview all of the actors involved. Practically this would have taken 
the project beyond the scope of a PhD. Nonetheless, there were some key 
actors who were unfortunately unable to participate in this study – some 
who were involved in the early DEFRA years, others who were involved in 
the construction of DECC, members of the Cabinet Office’s Behavioural 
 
31 Brown, 2015, p.9. 
32 Brown, 2015, p.17. 




Insight Team, officials who worked on specific policy areas (such as social 
exclusion), and other people who contributed to developing and utilising 
social research capacity in DEFRA and DECC. This issue was somewhat 
countered by feedback from interview respondents and from other civil 
servants in DEFRA and DECC who helped to identify gaps and 
shortcomings. Any remaining errors and omissions are my own.  
  The scope of the study was necessarily limited. To understand the use of 
social research expertise in the UK Government’s work on energy, 
environment, and food policy, I focused on two government departments, 
most notably excluding the Department of Trade and Industry, which is 
where the policy teams working on energy in DECC had come from. While 
there were no social researchers in the Department of Trade and Industry 
(DTI) at the time of DECC’s creation, external social science expertise was 
sometimes utilised, and this could be accounted for. The epistemic context in 
that department is of even greater interest now that DECC’s policy teams 
have been amalgamated with the former DTI teams to form the new 
Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy.34 As the UK 
prepares to leave the European Union while government departments are 
going through an unprecedented period of austerity,35 all amidst a seemingly 
supportive context of civil service reform,36 it will be fruitful to explore 
whether (and how) social researchers can make tangible contributions 
towards reflexive policy designs in DEFRA and the new DBEIS.  
  Considering social research expertise in other departments – such as the 
Department for Transport – would also be relevant, as would other 
 
34 BBC News, 2016. 
35 Institute for Government, 2015, p.4. 
36 HM Government, 2012. 
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administrations – for instance the UK’s devolved administrations or other 
countries in the European Union. Sweden in particular may be an 
appropriate comparative case, since its decentralised model of government 
will contrast with that of the UK.37 Furthermore, a study in 1970 suggested 
that, like in the UK, pay structures favoured generalists in the Swedish civil 
service ahead of specialists, while at the same time the importance of social 
scientists in government was “rapidly growing”.38 It would be very 
interesting to find out what social research means to energy, environment, 
and food policy officials in such contexts. There are thus plenty of 
opportunities for further research on social researchers within governments. 
  A second limitation of this project is that the empirical chapters on the use 
of social research in policy development focused predominantly on 
interactions between social researchers and policy-makers. While this 
framing was fruitful, other means by which social science entered DEFRA 
and DECC were only discussed insofar as they related to social researchers’ 
work. This may explain why we have seen little evidence of the 
sociotechnical transitions literature – it is likely that researchers engage with 
other actors, such as scientists, engineers, and economists rather than social 
researchers. Or else, it may be that such work has entered policy discourses 
through an enlightenment model of influence.39 As such, there remains more 
to be uncovered in terms of the contributions of social science in DEFRA and 
DECC. 
  Moving beyond the role of social science in government, other questions 
also follow from this study. Scientists, engineers, statisticians, economists 
 
37 The Swedish Institute, 2016. 
38 Elder, 1970, pp.106-107. 




and social researchers are expected to work together and provide challenge 
to each other (and to other colleagues) in a department. Yet, the Government 
Office for Science recently reported that government scientists are often 
deterred from challenging colleagues.40 It will therefore be particularly 
illuminating to conduct case studies around analysts’ collaborations within 
set areas where we might expect challenge to occur. For instance, Dieter 
Helm accused DECC’s economic analysts of naivety for expecting oil prices 
to continue to rise (which has implications for energy generation policies),41 
while in a recent analysis of UK newspaper articles DEFRA’s scientists were 
portrayed as wedded to the support of badger culling in contrast to academic 
scientists who, on the whole, were found to construct proportionally more 
arguments against culling.42 Neither Helm nor Lodge and Matus interviewed 
analysts within government to understand those analysts’ experiences. The 
epistemic dynamics deserve to be examined in greater detail, and provide a 
third set of problems for further research. 
 
6. Closing Remarks 
 
  I close this thesis with two normative considerations for social scientists 
concerned with pursuing research impact on policy processes in the future. 
First, under conducive political and epistemic circumstances, and with 
appropriate institutional support, social researchers can – and do – make 
important contributions to the utilisation of social science within technical 
environment, food, and energy policy remits. The idea of social science as the 
 
40 Government Office for Science, 2013. 
41  Helm, 2011, p.85. 
42  Lodge and Matus, 2014, p.375. 
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‘missing masses’ in these policy domains now seems a far cry from the 
experiences of policy-makers in these domains. 
  Second, researchers who argue for socially robust policy processes should 
welcome and encourage epistemic debate (and particularly the challenge 
function) within government departments. Social researchers and other 
actors within the civil service are open to insights and challenge, and 
collaborating with them could promote institutional reflexivity.  
  This PhD has thus contributed novel and utilisable empirical and theoretical 
insights for those interested in UK policy-making processes for energy, 
environment, and food – and/or expert advice for government in general. 
Recent institutional, political, and epistemic changes in the UK (particularly 
the recent closure of the Department of Energy and Climate Change) provide 
opportunities and threats to social research capacity and to its utilisation in 
policy design and delivery in technical policy domains. Our attention should 
now turn to consider how these play out in practice in the coming months 
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Appendix 2: Example of a Consent Form for 
Interviews 




Appendix 3: Example of a Topic Guide for 
Interviews  
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Appendix 4: Full-Page Sized Figures 
  
Figure A4-1: An Organisational Chart of DECC Staff Positions, c. September 2009 










Figure A4-2: A Shortlist of Environmental Behaviours to Promote to Citizens 




  Figure A4-3: DEFRA's Segmentation Model (Eppel et al., 2013, p.38) 




Figure A4-4: Acceptability of the Twelve Behaviours Amongst Different Segments 





Figure A4-5: DEFRA’s Segmentation Model Overlaid with the 4Es Model 
(DEFRA, 2008a, p.10) 
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